CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 31 mai 2021

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 21 June 2021   THIRD SECTION Application no. 31062/20 Lyudmila Stefanovna DEMYANKOVA against Russia lodged on 10 June 2020 communicated on 31 May 2021 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applicant, a farmer, owns a plot of land and uses it for agricultural production. The application concerns underground installation of an optic fibre cable by a telecommunication company “Rostelecom” (company which partially belongs to the State) on the applicant’s land, which was not authorised by the applicant and precludes her from certain agricultural activities, as well as the outcome of civil proceedings initiated by the applicant against “Rostelecom” in this respect. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Is the application compatible with the provisions of the Convention ratione personae ? In particular, was the State responsible for acts of Rostelecom in 2015, when the cable had been installed beneath the applicant’s plot of land, taking into account the Rostelecom’s legal status, the nature of its activity, the context of operation (monopoly or heavily regulated business), its institutional and operational independence (see Ališić and Others v.   Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.   60642/08, §   114, ECHR   2014)?   2.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention, in terms of underground installation of the optic fibre cable by “Rostelecom” without the authorisation of the applicant as the owner of the land? In particular, which restrictions does the optic fibre cable impose on the applicant’s property rights, taking into account the category of land and the permitted use of the land ( категория земель и вид разрешенного использования земельного участка )? Should any protective zones for the cable be established / have they already been established on the applicant’s land?   3.     If yes, was the interference carried out “subject to the conditions provided for by law” (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v.   Latvia [GC], no.   71243/01, §§   95-97, 25   October 2012, with further references)? In particular: (a)     What was the legal basis authorising “Rostelecom” to perform underground installation of the optic fibre cable at the applicant’s plot of land (see, mutatis mutandis , Khamidov v.   Russia , no.   72118/01, §   141, 15   November 2007)? (b)     Were there steps, under the applicable law, “Rostelecom” ought to have taken, in order to perform underground installation of the optic fibre cable on the applicant’s land?   4.     Did the interference serve a legitimate public (or general) interest, within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins , cited above, §   106)?   5.     Was the interference reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised? In particular, did the interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant? 6.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article   6   §   1 of the Convention (see Bochan v.   Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no.   22251/08, §§   61-62, ECHR 2015, with further references)? In particular: (a)     What was the legal foundation for the courts’ judgments refusing to afford legal protection to the applicant’s property rights in the absence of any applicant’s authorisation for the construction (see, mutatis mutandis, Anđelković v.   Serbia , no.   1401/08, §   27, 9   April 2013)? (b)     Did the domestic courts provide adequate and sufficient reasoning to dismiss the applicant’s claim for elimination of violations of her property rights (see Hirvisaari v.   Finland , no.   49684/99, §§   30-33, 27   September 2001)?