CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 20 janvier 2022

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sAE6FB95D { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:32.01pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s743F3A55 { margin-right:0pt; margin-left:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s2044A09A { margin-left:6.51pt; margin-bottom:6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; padding-left:1.99pt; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } Published on 7 February 2022   FIRST SECTION Application no. 49560/17 J.R. against Poland lodged on 3 July 2017 communicated on 20 January 2022 STATEMENT OF FACTS The applicant, Mr J.R., is a Polish national who was born in 1960. He   is   currently detained at the Gostynin Centre. The circumstances of the case 1.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. Detention at the Gostynin Centre 2.     In April 1993 the applicant was convicted of rape and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In December 2000 the Garwolin District Court convicted the applicant of the rape of an eight-year-old girl and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. In a report of March 2006, the prison psychologists established that the applicant was suffering from a personality disorder and sexual preference disorder. He was assigned to serve his prison sentence in a therapeutic wing and transferred to such a facility at Rzeszów Prison. His term of imprisonment was due to come to an end on 24 July 2014. 3.     In a report of 22 April 2014, a psychiatric expert established that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder relating to a light mental impairment and a sexual preference disorder in the form of sadism. Relying, inter alia , on this report, on 23 May 2014 the Director of the prison requested the Rzeszów Regional Court to declare the applicant a person representing a threat ( osoba stwarzająca zagrożenie ) within the meaning of the Act of 22   November 2013 on Procedure regarding Mentally Disturbed Persons Representing a Threat to Life, Health or Sexual Freedom of Others (“the 2013 Act”). Subsequently, the Director of the prison requested the court to order the applicant’s detention at the Gostynin Centre. 4.     The applicant objected to the request. He submitted, inter alia , that in the course of his imprisonment he had received many awards for good behaviour and followed a ten-month course of therapy for sex offenders. 5.     On 2 September 2014 the Rzeszów Regional Court found the applicant to be a person representing a threat and ordered his detention at the Gostynin Centre. 6.     It noted that, according to the report of experts in psychiatry and psychology of 11 June 2014, the applicant did not suffer from mental illness ( chorob   psychiczna ) or impairment ( upośledzenie umysłowe ), but from a serious mental disorder in the form of dissocial personality. There was no possibility for the applicant to undergo therapy at liberty since he had denied his personality problems and his disorders in the sexual sphere. He   had also been dependent on psychoactive drugs. 7.     In reaching the finding that the applicant was a person representing a threat, the court had regard to the following. First, it noted that, at the time when the prison Director made his request, the applicant had been serving   term of imprisonment in a therapeutic system. Second, it observed that the documents submitted by the prison Director, such as the psychological and psychiatric reports, the applicant’s prison file and his health records as well as the expert report of 11 June 2014, clearly indicated that in the course of his imprisonment the applicant had been suffering from a mental disorder in the form of dissocial personality. Third, according to the same expert report, the applicant’s mental disorders were such that they pointed to a very high risk that he would commit an offence against life, health or sexual freedom. 8.     The court accepted the conclusion of the expert report of 11 June 2014 as to the nature of the risk posed by the applicant. It noted that the expert in sexology had found that the impugned risk was high, but not very high. However, the court did not agree with the conclusion of that expert, noting that the applicant had not properly cooperated with the expert in the course of the interview. The applicant requested the court to admit evidence from other experts in psychology and psychiatry, but the court refused this request as unjustified. 9.     Having regard to the factors specified in section 14(1) of the 2013 Act, the court ordered that it was necessary to confine the applicant at the Centre. It found that he should follow therapy in detention, because therapy at liberty would not be effective. 10.     On 7 November 2014 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. His cassation appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 26 January 2017. 11.     On 7 November 2014 the applicant was detained at the Gostynin Centre. 12.     On 8 January 2016 the Płock Regional Court dismissed his request for review of his continued detention. 13.     In three periodic reports of 28 April 2016, 25 October 2016 and 19   April 2017 a team of experts from the Centre established that there was no very high risk that the applicant would commit an offence specified in the 2013 Act and that, accordingly, he should be released from the Centre, placed under preventive supervision and continue his therapy as an outpatient. 14.     Consequently, the Płock Regional Court instituted of its own motion proceedings for review of the necessity of the applicant’s continued detention (case no. I Ns 133/16). On 5 October 2017 the Regional Court held that his continued detention was necessary, having regard to the nature and degree of the applicant’s disorders, the lack of therapy for his sexual preference disorder and the fact that his treatment at the Centre was at an early stage and had not yet produced appropriate results. 15.     The court took account of the report of 13 June 2016 drawn up by a team of four external experts. That report concluded that the applicant’s detention was no longer necessary and that he should undergo therapy at liberty, while noting that there was a high risk that he would commit an offence specified in the 2013 Act. The court observed that in assessing the degree of relevant risk the experts who prepared the report of 13 June 2016 had mostly relied on the assessment made by the team from the Centre, without making their own assessment of the results of the therapy. 16.     For that reason, the court gave more weight to the findings made in the report of 10 May 2017 prepared by another team of four court experts in psychiatry, psychology and sex therapy, namely K.P., W.T., J.Ł. and A.Z. Those experts concluded that the applicant suffered from a dissocial personality disorder and sexual preference disorder in the form of sadism. They noted that there was no treatment for the former and that the applicant should undergo therapy for the latter. According to the report, there was a very high risk that the applicant would commit another prohibited act within the meaning of the 2013 Act and thus his continued detention was necessary. 17.     The applicant’s lawyer requested the court to obtain information from the Centre as to whether they could provide therapy for sexual preference disorder. The court dismissed that request, noting that the Director of the Centre was responsible for providing adequate therapy, and that this issue was not subject to the court’s assessment. At the same time, the court noted that the applicant had not been offered sex therapy at the Centre. 18.     The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. He argued, inter alia , that one of the experts (W.T.) who prepared the report of 10 May 2017 had ruled out that any therapy for persons with dissocial personality could be effective. The applicant also submitted that that report had not been based on a long interview, contrary to what had been stated in the decision of 5   October 2017. 19.     On 4 January 2018 the Łódź Court of Appeal, sitting in camera, dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal. It did not address the above ‑ mentioned arguments raised by the applicant. 20.     The conclusions of three periodic reports of 19 October 2017, 19   April 2018 and 19 October 2018 were similar to those made in the three earlier periodic reports (see paragraph 13 above). 21.     On an unspecified date the Płock Regional Court instituted, of its own motion, proceedings for review of the necessity of the applicant’s continued detention (case no. I Ns 133/18). 22.     On 9 May 2018 the applicant requested the court to obtain a report of experts from outside the jurisdiction of the Płock Regional Court. He submitted that the Gostynin Centre had been operating for several years, but the court had never released anyone from it and that most of the court’s decisions had been based on the reports of court experts K.P., W.T., J.Ł. and A.Z. The court refused the applicant’s request. It ordered the same experts to prepare a report in the case. The report was submitted on 18 June 2018. The experts concluded that there was still a very high risk that the applicant would commit a prohibited act and that his continued treatment at the Centre was necessary. 23.     On 16 July 2018 the Director of the Centre submitted to the court several objections to the expert report of 18 June 2018. He claimed that the report was incomplete and unreliable, and included assertions unsupported by the facts. The Director noted, inter alia , that 1)   the court experts had referred to theoretical models concerning the behaviour of persons with personality disorder, but not to the actual behaviour of the applicant at the Centre; 2)   over a period of nearly four years the applicant had not, contrary to some other patients, manifested verbal or physical aggression towards other patients or staff; 3)   the court experts had improperly related the conclusions of the experts from the Centre; the latter confirmed that the applicant had suffered from personality disorder, but the intensity of negative traits of his personality had decreased and currently he only required therapy outside the Centre, while being subject to supervision; 4)   the impugned report relied on a single interview, while the reports of experts from the Centre were based on an everyday, nearly four-year-long assessment of the applicant’s behaviour and the actual progress made in his therapy; 5)   the court experts had not envisaged the possibility that the Centre’s patients could follow therapy at liberty, while the 2013 Act clearly provided for it; 6)   the applicant’s sex therapy was not at an early stage as indicated by external experts, but had already lasted nearly four years; 7)   the previous reports of the experts from the Centre had been disregarded by the Plock Regional Court, which had only taken account of reports of court experts, even though the Centre’s experts had a better view of his behaviour than court experts whose report was based on a single interview. 24.     On 30 July 2018 the applicant contested the findings of the report of 18 June 2018. He again requested the court to seek a report from experts from outside the jurisdiction of the Płock Regional Court, which was necessary in order to obtain fair and impartial expert evidence in the case. The applicant also submitted that two of the experts (K.P. and A.Z.) who contributed to the report of 18 June 2018 had been employed by the Gostynin Centre in the past and had participated in his therapy. Relying on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 15 November 2016 (case   no.   K   6/14), he argued that experts called by the court should not have been institutionally connected to the Gostynin Centre. In addition, as regards the report of 18 June 2018, the applicant asked the court to obtain supplementary information from the experts, inter alia , on the length of their interview with him. 25.     On an unspecified date the applicant requested that expert W.T. be recused from his case. On 19 November 2018 the Płock Regional Court, sitting in camera, dismissed that request. It found that the expert could not be regarded as partial on account of the fact that he had presented a   particular view on the subject matter of the proceedings. 26.     In the periodic report of 19 April 2019, a team of experts from the Centre noted that the applicant’s motivation for his therapy had decreased. They concluded that there was a very high risk that the applicant would commit an offence specified in the 2013 Act and that his continued detention and therapy were necessary. 27.     On 10 June 2019 the Płock Regional Court ordered the applicant’s continued detention in the Centre which it deemed necessary (case   no.   I   Ns   133/18). It relied on the nature and degree of the applicant’s disorders, the negative results of the treatment provided so far and the lack of a possibility for effective therapy at liberty. The court found that it was unnecessary to obtain evidence from another team of experts since the expert report of 18 June 2018 had been reliable and its conclusions persuasive for the court. The fact that expert A.Z. had been employed by the Centre was not a sufficient reason to call into question her impartiality. The   court did not refer to objections raised by the Director of the Centre. 28.     The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. He argued, inter alia , that the Regional Court had uncritically relied on the expert report of 18   June 2018. In his view, that report was unreliable and partial. He pointed to the lack of impartiality of expert W.T. That expert had stated before the first ‑ instance court that there was no effective therapy for persons with dissocial personality disorder and that there was always a very high risk that such persons would commit a prohibited act. The view of expert W.T. ruled out the possibility of his being released from the Centre and thus predetermined his conclusions, regardless of the individual situation of a person confined at the Centre. The applicant also repeated his objections to the partiality of expert A.Z. 29.     On 22 October 2019 the Łódź Court of Appeal, sitting in camera, dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal. It found that the Regional Court’s decision had been justified by two expert reports, namely that of 18   June 2018 drawn up by the court experts and that of 19 April 2019 prepared by the Centre’s experts. It also found that allegations regarding experts W.T. and A.Z. had been ill-founded for the same reasons as relied upon by the Regional Court. 30.     In two periodic reports of 18 October 2019 and 27 March 2020, the experts from the Centre concluded that the applicant’s confinement and treatment at the Centre should continue. Compassionate leave 31.     On 23 November 2017 the applicant requested the Płock Regional Court to grant him leave to attend his mother’s funeral on the following day. The court informed the applicant that it had no jurisdiction to decide on this issue and referred him to the Director of the Centre. The latter declined to deal with the request. On 24 November 2017 the applicant again requested the court to grant him compassionate leave. 32.     On the same day the Płock Regional Court rejected his request for lack of jurisdiction. It found that the provisions of the 2013 Act did not confer on the court the competence to decide on the temporary release of a   person confined at the Gostynin Centre; nor was that competence conferred on it by the Code of Civil Procedure. Relevant legal framework The 2013 Act 33.     The Act of 22 November 2013 on Procedure regarding Mentally Disturbed Persons Representing a Threat to Life, Health or Sexual Freedom of Others ( Ustawa o postępowaniu wobec osób z zaburzeniami psychicznymi stwarzających zagrożenie życia, zdrowia lub wolności seksualnej innych osób ; “the 2013 Act”) entered into force on 22 January 2014. 34.     The 2013 Act regulates the procedure applicable to “persons representing a threat” ( osoby stwarzające zagrożenie ). Under section 1 of the 2013 Act such persons must fulfil the following requirements: 1)   they are (were) serving a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment executed in a therapeutic system; 2)   during the execution of their sentence they suffered from mental impairment, personality disorder or sexual preference disorder; and 3)   their mental disorders are of such a nature or intensity that there is at least a high likelihood of them committing a prohibited violent act against life, health or sexual freedom, punishable by imprisonment of up to at least ten years. Measures provided by the 2013 Act are applied by the civil sections of the regional courts. 35.     A prison Director may file an application with the court declaring an individual to be a person representing a threat within the meaning of the 2013 Act (section 9). In order to determine whether an individual suffers from a mental disorder the court appoints two experts in psychiatry and, in certain cases, additionally an expert in psychology and sexology (section   11). The person concerned must be represented by a lawyer of his choice or appointed by the court. Having regard to the expert reports, results of the therapeutic treatment provided so far and the possibility of undergoing treatment at liberty, the court may subject a person representing a threat to preventive supervision ( nadzór prewencyjny ) if there is a high risk that the person would commit a prohibited act referred to in section 1(3) of the 2013 Act (section   14(2)). If such risk is very high, the court may order the person’s placement in the National Centre for Prevention of Dissocial Behaviour (“the Centre”; section 14(3)). Those measures are applied without maximum duration. 36.     A person detained in the Centre undergoes appropriate therapeutic treatment whose aim is to improve his state of health and behaviour in order to enable him to function in society without posing a threat to the life, health or sexual freedom of others. The Director of the Centre draws up an individual therapy plan for each detained person (section 25). 37.     The detained person may, at any time, apply to the court to determine the need for his continued placement in the Centre. A decision rejecting the application may be appealed against if at least six months have passed since the decision on the previous application was made (section   32(1)). 38.     At least once every six months the court decides whether the continuation of the person’s detention in the Centre is necessary, having regard to a psychiatric report and the results of therapeutic treatment. Every six months the Director of the Centre submits to the court a   psychiatric report on the detained person and the results of his treatment (section 46). 39.     On an application from the detained person the Director of the Centre or, of its own motion, the court, may at any time discharge the detained person from the Centre if the results of his therapeutic treatment and his behaviour justify a conclusion that his further confinement is no longer necessary (section 47 (1)). The regulation of the Minister of Health 40.     The regulation of the Minister of Health of 16 January 2014 on the National Centre for the Prevention of Dissocial Behaviour provided that the capacity of the Centre was sixty beds. Initially, the regulation specified that detainees should stay in single rooms, then (from September 2015) in double rooms and finally (in September 2018) the Minister of Health removed the provision on occupancy limits in the rooms. The regulation also specified the minimum number of various categories of staff employed in the Centre per ten detainees. The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 23 November 2016, case   no.   K 6/14 41.     The President of the Republic and the Ombudsman challenged the compatibility of various provisions of the 2013 Act with the Constitution and the Convention. Furthermore, two courts referred legal questions on the constitutionality of the Act. In its leading judgment of 23 November 2016 (no. K 6/14), the Constitutional Court sitting as a bench of five judges held, by a majority of four to one, that practically all of the contested provisions (sections 1, 2(3), 9, 11, 14(1-3), 15(1), 19(3) and 25) were compatible with the Constitution and the Convention. It relied extensively on the Court’s case ‑ law and comparative material. The only provision declared partly unconstitutional was section 46(1) of the 2013 Act. It was found incompatible with Article 41 § 1 in conjunction with Article 31 § 3 of the Constitution in so far as it provided for a report on the necessity of further detention in the Centre to be prepared by only one psychiatrist. The Constitutional Court held that in order to ensure proper procedural safeguards to the person concerned, when deciding on the issue of extension of preventive detention, the court should have at its disposal a report of the same number and type of experts as applicable to a decision on placement in the Centre as specified in section 11 of the 2013 Act. 42.     On the question of whether placement in the Centre should be considered as being of a penal nature, the Constitutional Court noted that such placement constituted a form of deprivation of liberty, combining elements of psychiatric detention and several security measures provided for in the Criminal Code. Such placement was the final result of the examination of a person whose behaviour during the execution of a   long ‑ term custodial sentence has led the prison director to conclude that it was in the public interest to provide that person, on release from prison, with specialised therapeutic measures during detention at the Centre. The   reason for placement was not the offence for which the prisoner had served a long ‑ term prison sentence. The basic prerequisite for placement in the Centre was a personality disorder diagnosed during the execution of a   prison sentence such that the person remaining at liberty posed a real risk of committing a prohibited act specified in the 2013 Act. Both the therapeutic and preventive nature of the placement were only indirectly linked to the fact that the person had committed an offence in the past. The   decision on placement in the Centre must be based on a prior finding by the civil court that there was a very high likelihood that the person representing a threat would again commit an offence referred to in section 1(3) of the 2013 Act. Having regard to all the applicable statutory conditions, the Constitutional Court found that placement in the Centre was not a penal measure, although it constituted a severe form of deprivation of liberty. It could in no way be regarded as a renewed conviction for the same offence committed in the past. Placement in the Centre could only be ordered after a person had served a custodial sentence, always of long duration, and not instead of such a sentence. In the Constitutional Court’s view, these differences meant that the constitutional standards of Article 42 §   1 (the non-retroactivity of criminal law) and Article   2 of the Constitution (the ne bis in idem principle) were not applicable to the assessment of placement in the Centre. 43.     The Constitutional Court further noted that the 2013 Act introduced the possibility of the civil court’s ordering therapy in a closed centre and by doing so ensured the requirement of a “distance” between this measure and the penalty of imprisonment. The manner of execution of the court’s order specified in the 2013 law rendered this form of confinement much closer to the compulsory placement of the patient in a psychiatric institution regulated by the Mental Health Protection Act   than to the penalty of imprisonment. 44.     On the question of the proportionality of section 1 of the 2013 Act, the Constitutional Court noted that life, health and personal liberty featured exceptionally high in the hierarchy of constitutionally protected values. Nevertheless, when the court found a high or very high likelihood that a mentally disturbed convict about to be released would threaten the life, health or sexual freedom of another person, his personal freedom could be limited (preventive supervision) or forfeited (placement in the Centre). It   held that such a serious interference with personal liberty protected by Article 41 § 1 of the Constitution did not violate the essence of the liberty of the person representing a threat as defined in section 1 of the 2013 Act. 45.     The Constitutional Court held that section 14(3) of the Act (placement in the Centre) was compatible with Article 41 § 1 in conjunction with Article   31 § 3 of the Constitution (proportionality principle). When interpreting section 14(3) in the context of sections 3 and 14(1) and (2), it concluded that detention in the Centre of a person representing a threat was an exceptional measure that could only be applied when preventive supervision, namely a less intrusive measure, would be insufficient. The Constitutional Court found that preventive detention without maximum duration was intended by the legislator to be a measure of last resort and should only be applied where the disturbed person posed a particularly serious and real threat to the safety, health and life of others, and the likelihood that he would commit another offence was “very high”. The CPT’s report on the visit to Poland carried out from 11   to   22   May 2017 46.     In respect of living conditions in the Gostynin Centre, the CPT’s report stated, inter alia : “117. ... patients at the National Centre (which was accommodating many more patients than planned initially) lived under relatively cramped conditions; some of the rooms had had to be fitted with bunk beds, which was not conducive to creating a   therapeutic environment and contributed to tensions between patients and between patients and staff. On the positive side, rooms at ... the National Centre were always unlocked and patients could associate during the day and had access to pleasant common rooms equipped with sofas, tables, TV, radio and games, books and newspapers.” 47.     As regards treatment, the CPT’s report read, inter alia : “121. ... As for the National Centre, there was no psychiatric treatment sensu stricto (only a few patients were on psycho-active medication with their consent ...), but instead assistance (exclusively on a voluntary basis) was offered to persons with personality disorders, learning disabilities and “disorders of sexual preference”, by means of individually tailored programmes comprising individual and group psychotherapy, work with sexologists and addictologists, occupational and art therapy. However, the delegation was told by staff that approximately 75% of the patients were not interested in any therapy and remained uncritical towards their deeds and conditions, some of them being persuaded that they had been placed at the National Centre by error or for political motives. Furthermore, patients had access to means of diversion such as table tennis, table football and billiard for 2-3 hours per day and to the gym four times a week. While welcoming genuine efforts made by the staff of the National Centre to involve as many patients as possible in therapeutic activities, the CPT cannot escape the impression that there is a general problem with the concept of therapy at the establishment and, in particular, no clear idea of what to do with patients who refuse treatment and rehabilitative activities. Many patients interviewed by the delegation failed to understand the reason for their placement and were unable to say how long they would have to remain at the National Centre (a few of them thought they would spend the rest of their days there). Predictably, this had a negative impact on their mood, their attitude and motivation to co-operate with the staff. The Committee recommends that a serious reflection be undertaken into the concept and philosophy of treatment at the National Centre in Gostynin, in the light of the above remarks. In addition, more should be done to provide therapeutic and rehabilitative activities such as anger management, life skills training, recreation and sports [emphasis in the original]. This would help defuse ambient tension in the establishment (...).” 48.     With regard to guards, the reported stated: “128. Both the Regional and the National Centre in Gostynin employed security guards (they were employees of the respective institutions). (...) The guards acted exclusively under instructions of doctors, and had to report to them. (...) By contrast, guards at the National Centre had more powers (they were e.g. in charge of convoys to outside medical and other institutions) and carried special means (long   truncheons, handcuffs and pepper spray) at all times, including inside the accommodation areas and in full view of patients. This is an intimidating and unjustified practice; the CPT recommends that it cease without delay [emphasis in the original].” Report on the Ombudsman’s visit carried out on 26 June 2017 49.     As regards staffing issues, the Ombudsman noted that in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Health of 16 January 2014 on the Centre, for ten detainees there should be at least one psychiatrist, six psychologists, fourteen nurses and seven group therapists. Given the current number of detainees (42) and staffing levels, the Ombudsman observed that there were significant shortages of staff having direct contact with the patients. Report on the Ombudsman’s visits carried out on 2   July 2018 and Reports on the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture’s visits carried out from 18 to 20   February 2019 and from 8 to 10   March 2021 50.     As regards overcrowding, the Ombudsman and the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture reported an increase in the number of patients held in the Centre from fifty-five in July 2018 to sixty-five in February 2019 and ninety-five in March 2021. In connection with the staffing problems they noted that, on the one hand, the number of employees exceeded limits stipulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Health of 16   January 2014 and on the other, the number of specialists did not comply with the Regulation of the Minister of Health of 16   January 2014. COMPLAINTS 51.     The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention about the initial decision ordering his detention at the Centre and all subsequent decisions confirming the necessity of his confinement. The applicant submits that six periodic reports prepared by the experts from the Centre between April 2016 and October 2018 concluded that he could be released and continue his therapy at liberty subject to supervision. 52.     In his letter of 27 December 2018, the applicant complains about the report of 18 June 2018 prepared by court experts W.T., A.Z., K.P. and J.Ł. He alleges that expert W.T. was present during the applicant’s interview only for ten minutes, while A.Z. and K.P. were the applicant’s therapists at the Centre and could not subsequently act as external experts. The applicant further submits that this report was contested by the Director of the Centre. 53.     In his letter of 8 March 2018, the applicant alleges that the rules concerning therapy at the Centre were not respected. The Centre resembled a prison and its internal rules were stricter than those in prison. 54.     In his letter of 20 December 2017, the applicant complains, in substance under Article 8, about the refusal to grant him leave to attend his mother’s funeral. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Article 3 1.     Did the material conditions of the applicant’s detention at the Gostynin Centre, in particular the personal space available, general overcrowding and the constant presence of the guards, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment? Reference is made to: (1) the reports on the Ombudsman’s visits carried out on 26   June 2017 and 2   July 2018; (2)   the reports on the visits by the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture carried out from 18 to 20   February 2019 and from 8 to 10   March 2021; and (3) the findings made in the report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to Poland carried out from 11 to 22   May 2017. 2.     Having regard to the conditions prevailing at the Gostynin Centre, was it possible for the applicant to properly follow the therapeutic treatment offered by the Gostynin Centre? In the negative, did that situation amount to inhuman or degrading treatment (cf.   Rooman v.   Belgium [GC], no.   18052/11, §§   141-148, 31   January 2019)?   Article 5 § 1 (e) 1.     Was the applicant deprived of his liberty in breach of Article   5 §   1 of the Convention? In particular, did the deprivation of liberty fall within paragraph (e) of this provision? 2.     In the affirmative, was the applicant’s detention justified under Article   5 § 1 (e) of the Convention in the period covered by the periodic reports from April 2016 to October 2018 (cf. Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos.   10211/12 and   27505/14, §   127, 4 December 2018)? 3.     In the affirmative, was the applicant’s detention justified under Article   5 § 1 (e) of the Convention in the light of the domestic courts’ reliance on the reports of 10   May 2017 and 18 June 2018 prepared by experts K.P., W.T., J.Ł. and A.Z.? Reference is made to the following: (a)     the applicant’s assertion that those reports were based on short interviews with him; (b)     the Director of the Gostynin Centre submitted several objections to the report of 18 June 2018, to which the court did not refer in its decision of 10   June 2019; (c)     can the evidence of expert W.T. be considered “objective medical expertise” in view of the fact that this expert stated that there was no effective therapy for persons who, like the applicant, suffer from a dissocial personality disorder? 4.     In the affirmative, was the applicant’s detention “lawful” and ordered “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” as required by Article   5 §   1 (e) of the Convention? 5.     Did the domestic courts consider whether less severe measures would be sufficient in the circumstances of the applicant’s case to safeguard the individual or public interest (cf. Ilnseher , § 137, cited above)? 6.     Was the applicant ensured a proper therapeutic environment at the Gostynin Centre as required by Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention (cf.   Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, §§ 205-211, 31 January 2019)? Reference is made to the report on the Ombudsman’s visit carried out on 26   June 2017 and the findings made in the CPT’s report on the visit to Poland carried out from 11 to 22 May 2017.   Article 8 § 1 1.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life within the meaning of Article   8 §   1 of the Convention on account of the refusal to grant him leave to attend his mother’s funeral? 2.     If so, was that interference in accordance with the law in terms of Article   8 §   2? Reference is made to the fact that the prohibition to grant leave does not have legal basis in the statute and is solely provided for by the internal rules of the Centre. 3. Did that interference pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 8 § 2? 4.     Was that interference “necessary in a democratic society” in terms of Article   8 §   2? Reference is made to the fact that the domestic court did not assess the applicant’s request on the merits and did not explore alternative ways of ensuring his attendance at the funeral (see, Solcan v. Romania , no.   32074/14, 8 October 2019).