CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 19 décembre 2022

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 16 January 2023   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 11027/22 Davit KEZERASHVILI against Georgia lodged on 17 February 2022 communicated on 19 December 2022 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The case concerns the applicant’s conviction for embezzlement by the Supreme Court by means of written proceedings, following his acquittal by the trial and appellate courts. It also concerns the composition of the Supreme Court in the proceedings against the applicant which included the former Chief Prosecutor and the question of whether the appointment of the latter to the Supreme Court was carried out in accordance with the law, including with respect to the requirements set out in the law concerning the necessary qualifications for a candidate to be appointed to the post. Additionally, the case relates to the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to presumption of innocence in relation to statements made by the Prime Minister in the Parliament and the allegation, relying among other elements on the refusal by the United Kingdom to extradite the applicant to Georgia, that the criminal proceedings against him had been politically motivated on account of his status as a former senior government official. The applicant relies on Articles   6 and 18 of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him in accordance with Article   6 §§   1 and 3   (c) of the Convention? In particular, was his conviction by the Supreme Court by means of written proceedings in compliance with the applicant’s rights under that provision (see, among other authorities, Zahirović v.   Croatia , no.   58590/11, §§   55-57, 25   April 2013 and Gómez Olmeda v.   Spain , no.   61112/12, §§   32-33, 29 March 2016)? Did the Supreme Court provide adequate reasoning for the applicant’s conviction?   2.     Was the applicant’s case examined by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”? In particular:   - Was the Supreme Court of Georgia, in view of its composition, a “tribunal established by law” as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? - Was the Supreme Court of Georgia, in view of its composition, independent and impartial, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In their replies to the above questions the parties are asked to refer, among other things, to the Court’s judgment in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v.   Iceland [GC], no.   26374/18, §§   205‑90, 1 December 2020.   3.     Has the applicant exhausted relevant domestic remedies in respect of the alleged breach of his right to be presumed innocent under Article   6 §   2 of the Convention on account of a statement made by the Prime Minister in Parliament? If so, has there been a breach of the provision in question?   4.     Having regard to the nature of Article 6 of the Convention, in particular the question of the existence of either explicit or implied restrictions within that provision, can the scope of Article 18 be extended to cover the former provision (see Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no.   919/15, §   261, 16   November 2017)?   5.     If so, has there been a breach of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention? In particular what purpose or purposes did the authorities pursue with respect to the restrictions allegedly imposed by the State under Article 6? More specifically, were any of the purposes of the restrictions different from those permitted by the latter provision? If the authorities pursued more than one purpose, which one was dominant (see Merabishvili v.   Georgia [GC], no.   72508/13, §§   292-308, 28   November 2017)?