CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 6 septembre 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s539148BA { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#000000 } Published on 25 September 2023   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 5481/21 DOYEN SPORTS INVESTMENTS LIMITED against Portugal lodged on 14 January 2021 communicated on 6 September 2023 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applicant is a company with its headquarters located in Malta. The application concerns the suspension of various debit operations on the applicant company’s bank account at Bank C., ordered by the public prosecutor and confirmed on 28 February 2019 by the investigating judge of the Lisbon Criminal Investigation Court in criminal proceedings brought against non-specified persons under the Fight Against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act (Law no. 83/2017 of 18 August 2017). The order was renewed several times by the investigating judge of the Porto Criminal Investigation Court, to whose jurisdiction the proceedings were transferred. On 29 April 2021 the investigating judge ordered the seizure of up to 2,900,000 euros from the applicant company’s bank account, under Sections   178 § 1 and 181 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 16 March 2022 the Porto Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant company against this decision and declared the suspension order terminated, on the ground that it was time-barred. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant company complains that its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions was infringed, since the imposition of the suspension measure on its bank account was based on mere suspicions. It also alleges that the decisions of the investigating judges in this regard were insufficiently reasoned, and that the suspension order remained in place for almost two years without the company ever being given the status of defendant in criminal proceedings ( constituição de arguido ) or benefiting from adversarial proceedings. It further complains of a lack of access to the case file due to the fact that it was protected by judicial confidentiality ( segredo de justiça ). Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company complains of the excessive length of the proceedings, since the order suspending debit operations lasted almost two years with no significant procedural developments. Under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the applicant company submits that its right to the presumption of innocence was breached in that it was compelled to prove the inexistence of tax fraud and money laundering although it was prevented from having access to the evidence attached to the file. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been a violation of the applicant company’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention?   In particular:   1.1.     Was the suspension of debit operations, and its renewal, on the applicant company’s bank account lawful? Did it pursue a legitimate aim? Was it proportionate to the aim pursued (see Varvara v. Italy , no. 17475/09, §§   83-84, 29 October 2013; and Filkin v. Portugal , no.   69729/12, §§   84-92, 3   March 2020)?   1.2.     Was the applicant company provided with reasoned decisions concerning those measures and afforded a reasonable opportunity of putting its case to the competent authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measure (see G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos.   1828/06 and   2   others, § 302, 28 June 2018; Jokela v. Finland , no.   28856/95, § 45, 21   May 2002; and Filkin , cited above, §§ 79 and 88)?   2.     Is Article 6 § 2 of the Convention applicable to the proceedings concerning the suspension of debit operations on the applicant company’s bank account? In the affirmative, was the presumption of the applicant company’s innocence respected in the present case?