CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 7 novembre 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 27 November 2023   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 4637/23 LTD ILIYARD against Georgia lodged on 17 January 2023 communicated on 7 November 2023 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the freezing of all of the applicant company’s assets in relation to the ongoing tax evasion proceedings. According to the applicant, the freezing order did not have a clear and sufficiently delimited legal basis and, additionally, was a disproportionate measure on account of the fact that all of the company assets, rather than the property equivalent to the amount allegedly owed to the State, was frozen. The measure complained of interfered, in the applicant’s submission, with its lawful business activity, affecting its capacity to operate normally. The applicant company also complained that it was not afforded an effective remedy at national level in respect of this grievance. The applicant’s latest request to have the order lifted was rejected on 30   November 2022. The applicant company relied on Article   13 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1, on account of the freezing of all of its assets?   2.     If so, was that interference lawful? In particular, was the applicable legislation sufficiently precise regarding the legal grounds and conditions for freezing, and was the freezing order compliant with the latter?   3.     Was the interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties?   4.     Did the interference in the present case impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see Džinić v.   Croatia , no.   38359/13, §§ 67-82, 17   May 2016)? Among other things, did the domestic authorities assess whether the value of the frozen assets corresponded to the amount allegedly owed to the State? Did the domestic authorities have the possibility to limit the freezing of the applicant’s property to a certain amount or did they have no choice but to freeze the entirety of the property? Did the domestic courts assess the impact of the order on the applicant’s business activity? Was the freezing order subject to any time ‑ limits?   5.     Did the applicant have at its disposal an effective domestic remedy for the Convention complaints under Article   1 of Protocol No.   1, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?