CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 29 novembre 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 18 December 2023   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 47082/18 Satenik HOVSEPYAN against Armenia lodged on 26 September 2018 communicated on 29 November 2023 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The case concerns the death of the applicant’s husband, M. Sargsyan, in prison and the subsequent investigation. On 29 December 2015 M. Sargsyan was found guilty of a criminal offence and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. On 22 February 2016 M. Sargsyan was transferred to Nubarashen Prison. On 1 March 2016 his body was found in the toilet of his prison cell hanging from a belt attached to a metal rod. The same day criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 110 § 1 of the Criminal Code (incitement to suicide). In the course of the criminal proceedings, the applicant was recognised as the victim’s legal heir. An autopsy was performed which essentially concluded that M.   Sargsyan’s death had resulted from a mechanical suffocation caused by hanging from the neck. It also concluded that M. Sargsyan might have committed suicide by hanging himself or he might have been hanged by another person. On 26 September 2016 a joint forensic psychiatric and psychological examination was ordered. According to the ensuing forensic report received on 3 March 2018, M. Sargsyan had not suffered from any mental illness but might have had a temporary psychological disorder that manifested itself in despair, feelings of helplessness and depression which, however, had been impossible to establish unequivocally because of the insufficiency and inconsistency of information in the criminal case file. During the investigation, the investigator twice decided to stay the criminal proceedings on the grounds that it had been impossible to identify the person against whom criminal charges could be brought. The first time the applicant appealed, and the investigator’s decision was reversed. The second time the proceedings were resumed following the receipt of the above ‑ mentioned report on the joint forensic psychiatric and psychological examination. On 26 March 2018 the investigator decided to stay the criminal proceedings for the third time on the same grounds. At the same time, he instructed the police to take operative-intelligence measures capable of identifying the person against whom criminal charges could be brought. No appeal was lodged against this decision. The applicant complains under Article 2 of the Convention that the State did not take adequate measures to prevent her husband’s death and did not carry out an effective investigation. She complains under Article 13 of the Convention that she has no access to the materials of the criminal case and has no opportunity to oversee the adequacy and effectiveness of the investigation. She also complains under the same provision that she is deprived of any opportunity to receive compensation. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Was M. Sargsyan’s right to life, ensured by Article 2 of the Convention, violated in the present case?   2.     Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life ( for the relevant principles, see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no.   24014/05, §§ 169-182, 14 April 2015), was the investigation by the domestic authorities in the present case in breach of the guarantees of Article   2 of the Convention?   3.     Did the applicant have at her disposal an effective domestic remedy for her complaints under Article 2, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?