CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 février 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 4 March 2024   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 40034/20 Miroslav POKORNÝ against the Czech Republic lodged on 2 September 2020 communicated on 12 February 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the dismissal of the applicant’s action for disavowal of paternity of two children born in wedlock in 2003 and 2008. After having divorced the mother and found by means of a DNA test that he was not the children’s biological father, the applicant lodged in 2018 the above action, relying on Article 792 of the Civil Code allowing the court to accept an action for disavowal of paternity even after the applicable time-limit of six years had elapsed, provided that the child’s interest or considerations of public order so require. Two levels of courts dismissed the applicant’s action, emphasising that he had cared for the children for many years, that the mother did not want to designate the biological father and that the children still considered him as their father; lastly, the economic aspect could not be overlooked, given that the mother had to care for two other children (of the applicant), one of whom was disabled. The courts thus considered that it was in the best interest of the children not to disavow the applicant’s paternity after the lapse of the applicable time-limit, and that there were no considerations of public order for doing so since the applicant’s objection that he had to pay the maintenance was of a subjective nature and did not render the current status quo unacceptable or contrary to fundamental values. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and the Constitutional Court dismissed his constitutional appeal for being manifestly ill-founded (I. ÚS 1449/20). It held that the courts had duly examined his arguments and explained why it was not in the interest of the minor children to accept the applicant’s request, the best interest of the children being the primary criterion which could prevail over the parents’ interests. Relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complains about a wrong assessment by the courts of the interests at stake, claiming that the children’s interests not to have a person who is not their biological father registered in their birth certificate were disrespected and that the mother’s immoral conduct had not been considered. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Did the domestic courts’ refusal to disavow the applicant’s paternity, despite the existence of DNA evidence to the contrary, violate his right to respect for his private and family life, contrary to Article   8 of the Convention? Have the courts reached a fair balance of the interests involved (see, mutatis mutandis , Kautzor v. Germany , no. 23338/09, 22 March 2012; A.L. v.   Poland , no. 28609/08, 18 February 2014; R.L. and Others v. Denmark , no.   52629/11, 7 March 2017)?