CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 26 août 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 16 September 2024   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 56234/16 Rodion Volodymyrovych KIRYEYEV against Ukraine lodged on 20 September 2016 communicated on 26 August 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application mainly concerns the applicant’s lack of access to court regarding his action of 17 February 2016 challenging his dismissal from the post of a judge pursuant to the President’s Decree of 18 January 2016. The decree was issued on the basis of the High Council of Justice’s (“the HCJ”) decision of 5 November 2015 finding that the applicant had committed a “breach of oath” when authorising the arrest of a former Prime-Minister in 2011 and proposing to dismiss him from the judicial position. In so far as the applicant’s action concerned the HCJ’s decision of 5   November 2015, it was rejected as lodged after the expiry of the statutory one-month time-limit initially by the Higher Administrative Court’s (“the HAC”) ruling of 22 February 2016 and eventually, in a separate set of the proceedings instituted by the applicant in March 2016, by the final decision of the Supreme Court (“the SC”) of 11 October 2016. The courts dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had been informed of the HCJ’s decision of 5 November 2015 only on 8 February 2016 because he had been away from his residence “trying to avoid political persecution” since late February 2014. The courts found that the applicant must have become aware of the HCJ’s decision when it had been published on the HCJ’s official Internet site on 1   December 2015. The courts also found no evidence of the alleged “political persecution”. In so far as the applicant’s action concerned the President’s Decree of 18   January 2016, the HAC rejected it as unsubstantiated on 2 March 2016 finding that the President had lawfully exercised his relevant powers. On 4   April 2016 the SC rejected the applicant’s appeal against the HAC’s judgment of 2 March 2016 as lodged out of time and refused his request for an extension of the statutory ten-day time-limit, in which he claimed that he had received the full text of the contested judgment on 12 March 2016. The SC noted that the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing of 2   March 2016 during which the introductory and operative parts of the contested judgment had been pronounced and that the time-limit in question had started to run on that date. The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention regarding the courts’ refusal to examine his claims and appeals on the merits. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Did the applicant have access to a court for the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, regard being had to the fact that his action against the decision of the High Council of Justice of 5 November 2015 and his appeal against the judgment of the Higher Administrative Court of 2 March 2016 were not examined on the merits for having been lodged out of time (see Melnyk v. Ukraine , no.   23436/03, §§ 22-31, 28 March 2006; Mushta v. Ukraine , no. 8863/06, §§   37-47, 18 November 2010; and Kravchenko v. Ukraine , no. 46673/06, §§   39-50, 30 June 2016)?