CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 16 septembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 7 October 2024   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 1508/24 Manuela NOGALES DE LA MORENA against Spain lodged on 4 January 2024 communicated on 16 September 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE On 16 May 2018 the applicant, acting on behalf of an inheritance community ( comunidad hereditaria ) composed of her two siblings and her, requested the reversion of her late parent’s expropriated land. The applicant alleged that the expropriation had been undertaken as part of a project for the construction of a new town to cover the need of housing in Madrid, consisting of two zones - at the east and west parts of a main road. Her parents’ expropriated land had been in a sector in the west zone where 11.210 residences were to be constructed. However, dwellings had been constructed only in the east zone and, for the past 50 years, there had not been any relevant construction activity in the west zone, which remained a rough landscape. The applicant’s reversion action was based on section 54.1 of the Expropriation Act of 1954 ( artículo 54.1 de la Ley de Expropiación Forzosa de 16 de diciembre de 1954 ), which attributes both to the original owners of an expropriated land and to their heirs the right, under certain conditions, to claim its reversion. The applicant brought administrative proceedings against the absence of a reply on the part of the city council. The Court of First Instance rejected the applicant’s action without ruling on the merits. The Court of Appeal quashed the Court of First Instance’s judgment and ruled on the merits. It rejected the claim for reversion because the projected new town had indeed been created during the eighties and the nineties. The initial project had been divided into two clear zones (east and west of the road). Regarding the west zone (in which no dwelling had been constructed) the Court of Appeal found that the conditioning of natural paths in the landscape, the demolition of illegal farms, the works to allow passing over a water stream, as well as the public parking and bike lane, could be considered as sufficient fulfilment of the cause of the expropriation, based on the reports of the council engineers. The applicant’s appeal on points of law and further action for annulment were declared inadmissible. The Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal inadmissible on 5 September 2023. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol 1 that her right to obtain the reversion was refused unlawfully and without justification. The applicant argues that the public authorities have not developed any construction in the west zone or integrated this zone into the new town in the east and therefore the intended purpose of the expropriation of her parents’ land has not been fulfilled. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Does the claim raised by the applicant concerning the right of reversion constitute a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention (see The Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v.   Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, § 51)?   2.     If so, did the refusal to grant the claim by the national courts amount to an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?   3.     If so, was that interference in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? In particular, did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 having regard to the applicant’s allegation that the intended purpose of the expropriation has not been realised (see, mutatis mutandis, Motais de Narbonne v. France , no. 48161/99, §§ 21-23, 2   July 2002)?   4.     The applicant is requested to submit the inheritance documents that were submitted with the claims at the domestic level.