CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 25 septembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sD11CFAB7 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:15.01pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify; padding-left:1.99pt; font-family:Arial } .sFBC99493 { font-style:italic } .s887E3550 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Published on 14 October 2024   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 11025/22 Irakli PIRTSKHALAVA against Georgia lodged on 4 February 2022 communicated on 25 September 2024   SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the lawfulness and impartiality of the composition of the Supreme Court of Georgia which dealt with the applicant’s case, and the procedural fairness of the proceedings against him. In particular, the applicant claimed that one of the judges – Sh.T., the former Prosecutor General of Georgia – had not been impartial on account of his prior role in the prosecution service. In this respect, the applicant stated that his case had attracted heightened public interest and had been commented on by the former Prosecutor General (Sh.T.’s predecessor). Accordingly, Sh.T. must have been privy, at the time when he served as the Prosecutor General, to internal information about the prosecution service’s strategy in handling the criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant and this reality must have been obvious to an external objective observer. The applicant also claimed that Sh.T. had been appointed to the Supreme Court in violation of a statutory eligibility criterion. The applicant additionally claimed that (a)   he had been unable to examine as witnesses in the criminal case against him two of his former co-accused individuals whose cases had been separated from the main proceedings as a result of their plea-bargain agreements with the prosecution service; (b)   he had not been given an adequate opportunity to challenge the evidence against him because he had been unable to demonstrate evidentiary items from the case-file material to several witnesses when questioning them, despite having a procedural right to do so; and part of the evidence against him had been examined without his personal participation despite his having submitted medical evidence certifying inability to attend and requesting the postponement of the trial. The criminal proceedings against the applicant ended with the Supreme Court’s inadmissibility decision dated 23   September 2021 (served on 12   October 2021). According to the applicant, he became aware of the fact that Judge Sh.T. had been in the composition of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court when he got acquainted with the final decision in his case. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d)   of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy with respect to the complaints concerning the impartiality and lawfulness of the composition of the Supreme Court of Georgia, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and has he exhausted it (see Ugulava v.   Georgia (no. 2) , no. 22431/20, §§36-43, 1   February 2024)? Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against them, in accordance with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention? In particular, (a) Was he able to obtain the attendance of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them, as required by Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention (see, for instance, Murtazaliyeva v. Russia [GC], no. 36658/05, § 139-168, 18 December 2018)? (b) Was the applicant given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the evidence against him? Was the composition of the Supreme Court of Georgia which dealt with the applicant’s case a “tribunal established by law” as required by Article   6 §   1 of the Convention? Was the composition of the Supreme Court in the applicant’s case independent and impartial, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?