CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 13 novembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 December 2024   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 863/22 Carlos PAIVA DE ANDRADA REIS against Portugal lodged on 28 December 2021 communicated on 13 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent in tax enforcement proceedings initiated against him. In a judgement dated 23 October 2012, the Lisbon Tax Court considered the applicant, in his capacity as manager, to be liable for the debt of company   M. and ordered him to pay the tax authorities the sum of 451,664.61   euros (EUR) in withheld personal income tax with respect to the period 2001 ‑ 2004. The applicant appealed against the judgment. He relied on a judgment of the Lisbon Criminal Court of 16 July 2012, which had acquitted him of the offence of embezzlement ( abuso de confiança ) of social security contributions on the grounds that he had not exercised de facto management of company M. during the period in question. In a judgment dated 9 June 2021, the Central Administrative Court of the South (hereinafter the “TCAS”) upheld the judgment of the Lisbon Tax Court, ruling that the acquittal judgment of the Lisbon Criminal Court could not be taken into account. The TCAS held, on the one hand, that as the applicant had not contested his status as manager in his initial defence pleadings ( petição inicial ), he was estopped from invoking this supervening legal argument. On the other hand, the TCAS considered that the tax courts were not bound by the outcome of criminal proceedings given that the authority of res judicata of criminal judgments only extended to civil proceedings under domestic law. The applicant alleges that by refusing to take into consideration the Lisbon Criminal Court’s judgment of 16 July 2012, the TCAS has infringed his right to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Is Article 6 § 2 applicable to the impugned proceedings? In particular, is there a link between the tax proceedings in question and the criminal proceedings in the context of which the applicant was acquitted (see Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 32483/19   and   35049/19, §   122, 11 June 2024; Allen v.   the United Kingdom   [GC], no.   25424/09, §   104, ECHR 2013; and Melo Tadeu v. Portugal , no. 27785/10, §§   50 ‑ 51, 23   October 2014)?   2.     If so, having regard to the fact that the applicant had been acquitted of the offence of embezzlement on the grounds that he had not exercised de facto management of company M. during the period in question, have the reasonings employed by the Lisbon Tax Court and the TCAS, when considered as a whole, and in the context of the exercise they were required to undertake under domestic law, violated Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in its second aspect, to the extent that it amounted to the imputation of criminal liability to the applicant (see Nealon and Hallam , cited above, §§ 168-169)?