CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 14 novembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 December 2024   SECOND SECTION Application no. 29952/20 Resül YILDIRIM against Türkiye lodged on 22 June 2020 communicated on 14 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s alleged isolation during his detention. The applicant had been a judge and a former member of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors who was subsequently dismissed from his post. On 17 July 2016 he was detained following the coup attempt of 2016 on account of charges of membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation / Parallel State Structure” ( Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması , hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”). On 8   December 2016, as he was being held in Sincan T-Type Prison, he was placed in an individual unit. On 18   August 2017 he was transferred to Kocaeli F-Type Prison where he was once again detained in an individual unit. According to the applicant, he did not receive any information regarding the reasons for the specific detention regime imposed on him until he objected to the enforcement judge. In rejecting his objection, the enforcement judge dealing with the applicant’s detention in Sincan T-Type Prison noted that the measure was taken for security reasons. The enforcement judge dealing with the applicant’s detention in Kocaeli F-Type Prison additionally noted that the applicant’s name had been listed in the letter sent by the Ministry of Justice’s Directorate General of Prisons (“Directorate General”) regarding the inmates to be placed in individual units, which noted that the applicant was to be kept alone during the course of his detention. The Constitutional Court rejected his application, in which he had complained of his alleged solitary confinement, stressing its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell, as being manifestly ill-founded. At the time of lodging of the application, the applicant was still being held in the same cell. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention of his alleged solitary confinement, stressing its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell. He claims that he is allowed to leave his cell only for one hour per day without the company of any other inmate and that he was not allowed to interact with anyone during the three years of his detention. He also states that his cell does not receive sufficient natural light and the prison guards check on him at frequent intervals during nighttime by turning the lights on. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, due to his detention in an individual unit? In that connection, did the applicant’s detention in that unit constitute solitary confinement in the form of total or relative social isolation (see   Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §§ 119-24 and   135, ECHR 2006-IX, and Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) , nos. 24069/03 and 3   others, §   104, 18 March 2014)?   2.     Did the authorities give substantive reasons for the imposition of the impugned detention regime, in particular, in view of the prison administrations’ decisions relying on security grounds as well as the decision of the Ministry of Justice’s Directorate General of Prisons? Did the prison administration have any discretion regarding the implementation of the measure following the letter of the Directorate General?   Have there been subsequent decisions for the prolongation of this measure, and if so, was the applicant informed of those decisions (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 139 and 145, and Öcalan , cited above, §   105)?   Was the imposition of this measure accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing its proportionality and the applicant’s welfare? In particular, was the applicant’s physical and mental condition monitored and his physical or psychological capacity to deal with long-term detention in an individual unit assessed when the decisions to impose and prolong such a detention regime upon him were taken (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §   139, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia , nos. 3501/20 and 2   others, §§   126 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   3.     What was the total duration of the applicant’s detention in an individual unit (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 137-45, and Bora v. Turkey (dec.), no.   30647/17, §§ 24-6, 28 November 2017)?   4.     What were the physical conditions of detention in the individual units the applicant was held in in both the Sincan T-Type and Kocaeli F-Type prisons (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 126-130, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   110-15)?   5.     Was the applicant allowed ample opportunity to communicate with other persons and to have access to outdoor exercise or social activities (see Öcalan , cited above, §116-26)? In particular, was he allowed regular visits from his family and lawyer (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 131-35, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   127-35)?   In view of the Kocaeli Execution Judge’s decision of 24 November 2017 (E: 2017/5230, K: 2017/6071), did the detention regime imposed on the applicant entail a restriction on all social and educational activities?