CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 14 novembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 December 2024   SECOND SECTION Application no. 48100/20 Süleyman KUL against Türkiye lodged on 28 July 2020 communicated on 14 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s isolation during his detention. The applicant was a judge serving at the Court of Cassation. On 21 July 2016 he was arrested and detained in Sincan Prison following the attempted coup d’état of 2016 on account of charges of membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation / Parallel State Structure” ( Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması , hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”). On 8 October 2016 he was transferred to Silivri L-Type Prison and was placed in an individual unit upon a decision of the prison’s administration and observation board, in accordance with Articles   9/2 (d-e), 24/1-d, 113 and 116/1 of Law no.   5275. The decision stated that his placement in an individual unit aimed at ensuring safety and order within the prison facilities and the safety of the detainee himself due to his former profession, as well as following the domestic legislation given the charges against the applicant. The enforcement judge and the Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objections, finding the impugned treatment in accordance with the law and the procedure. On 6 April 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected his application, in which he had complained of his alleged isolation stressing its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell, as being manifestly ill-founded. The applicant claims to be held under the same conditions at the time of lodging of his application. He complains, in particular, under Article 3 of the Convention that his detention in an individual unit constitutes solitary confinement in view of its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell. He argues that he is allowed to leave his cell for less than one hour per day and is isolated during that time as well. He also states that his cell of 7 square metres was dirty at the time of his transfer, and that he had to stay in dire conditions for a week. Lastly, he maintains that he is constantly being checked on by prison guards in his cell at nighttime. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, due to his detention in an individual unit? In that connection, did the applicant’s detention in that unit constitute solitary confinement in the form of total or relative social isolation (see   Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §§ 119-24 and   135, ECHR   2006-IX, and Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) , nos. 24069/03 and 3   others, §   104, 18 March 2014)?   2.     Did the authorities give substantive reasons for the applicant’s placement in an individual unit? Have there been subsequent decisions for the prolongation of his detention regime, and if so, was the applicant informed of those decisions (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§   139 and   145, and Öcalan , cited above, § 105)?   Was the imposition of this measure accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing its proportionality and the applicant’s welfare? In particular, was the applicant’s physical and mental condition monitored and his physical or psychological capacity to deal with long-term detention in an individual unit assessed when the decisions to impose and prolong such a detention regime upon him were taken (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §   139, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia , nos.   3501/20 and 2 others, §§   126 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   3.     What was the total duration of the applicant’s detention in an individual unit (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 137-45, and Bora v. Turkey (dec.), no.   30647/17, §§ 24-6, 28 November 2017)?   4.     What were the physical conditions of detention in the individual unit the applicant was detained in? Were these conditions compatible with the Court’s case-law to alleviate the effects of his alleged isolation (see   Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 126-30, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   110-15)?   5.     Was the applicant allowed ample opportunity to communicate with other persons and to have access to outdoor exercise or social activities (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 116-26)?   In particular, was the applicant allowed regular visits from his family and lawyer (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 131-35, and Öcalan , cited above, §§ 127-35)?