CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 14 novembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 December 2024   SECOND SECTION Application no. 51110/19 Musa GÖKÇE against Türkiye lodged on 10 September 2019 communicated on 14 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s alleged isolation during his detention. The applicant was a public servant serving at the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. On 30 September 2016 he was arrested and placed in Silivri L-Type Prison on account of charges of membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation / Parallel State Structure” ( Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması , hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”). On 17   April 2018 he was placed in an individual unit upon a decision of the prison’s management and supervisory board, in accordance with sections 9/2 (d-e), 24/1-d, 113 and 116/1 of Law no.   5275. The decision stated that his placement in an individual unit aimed at ensuring safety and order within the prison facilities and the safety of the detainee himself due to his former profession, as well as following the domestic legislation given the charges against the applicant. The applicant maintains that he was not informed of the reasons for his placement in an individual unit at the time. The enforcement judge and the Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objections to that placement on the grounds that the prison administration had discretion regarding the placement of detainees and that the impugned measure was in accordance with law. The Constitutional Court rejected his application, in which he had complained of alleged isolation in detention stressing its length, the restrictions imposed and the physical conditions of detention in his cell, as being manifestly ill-founded. The applicant claims to be held under the same conditions at the time of lodging of his application. He complains, in particular, under Article 3 of the Convention that his detention in an individual unit constitutes solitary confinement in view of its length and the restrictions imposed. He argues that he is only allowed to leave his cell for a one-and-a-half-hour period twice per day, is being extensively searched each time he leaves and enters his cell, and only permitted to communicate with three to four persons during that time. He also states that he is being checked on by prison staff at hourly intervals, including nighttime. The applicant also complains of the physical conditions of detention in his cell, pointing to the allegedly poor sanitary conditions of the bathroom, the existence of mould, the lack of a kitchen sink, and the lack of a ventilation system. He argues that he was not examined by a psychologist prior to his placement in an individual unit and could see one only after his request to that effect. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, due to his detention in an individual unit? In that connection, did the applicant’s detention in that unit constitute solitary confinement in the form of total or relative social isolation (see   Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §§ 119-24 and 135, ECHR 2006-IX, and Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) , nos. 24069/03 and 3   others, §   104, 18   March 2014)?   2.     Did the authorities give substantive reasons for the imposition of the impugned detention regime? Have there been subsequent decisions for the prolongation of that regime, and if so, was the applicant informed of those decisions (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§   139 and 145, and Öcalan , cited above, § 105)?   Was the imposition of this measure accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing its proportionality and the applicant’s welfare? In particular, was the applicant’s physical and mental condition monitored and his physical or psychological capacity to deal with long-term placement in an individual unit assessed when the decisions to impose and prolong such an detention regime upon him were taken (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §   139, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia , nos.   3501/20 and 2   others, §§   126 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   3.     What was the total duration of the applicant’s detention in an individual unit (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 137-45, and Bora v. Turkey (dec.), no.   30647/17, §§ 24-6, 28 November 2017)?   4.     What were the specific physical conditions of detention in the applicant’s individual unit? Were these conditions compatible with the Court’s case-law to alleviate the effects of his isolation (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§   126-30, and Öcalan , cited above, §§ 110-15)?   5.     Was the applicant allowed ample opportunity to communicate with other persons and to have access to outdoor exercise or social activities? (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 116-126)?   In particular, was he allowed regular visits from his family and his lawyer (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 131-135, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   127-135)?