CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 14 novembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 December 2024   SECOND SECTION Application no. 54624/20 Mehmet KAYA against Türkiye lodged on 3 November 2020 communicated on 14 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s alleged isolation during his detention. The applicant had been a prosecutor who was subsequently dismissed from his post. On 21 July 2016 he was detained on account of charges of membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation / Parallel State Structure” ( Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması , hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”). On 20   September 2016 he was transferred to Manisa T-Type Prison and was placed in an individual unit upon a decision of the prison administration which stated that his name had been listed in the letter sent by the Ministry of Justice’s Directorate General of Prisons (“Directorate General”) regarding the inmates to be placed in individual units. The applicant’s objection to the decision of the prison administration was rejected by the enforcement judge who found the treatment lawful given that it had been implemented following the decision of the Directorate General. The Assize Court rejected his further objections. On 5 May 2020 the Constitutional Court found his application, in which he had complained of his alleged isolation in prison stressing its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell, inadmissible. At the time of lodging of the application, the applicant was still held in the same cell. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention of his alleged solitary confinement, stressing its length and the physical conditions of detention in his cell. He claims that he is allowed to leave his cell only for one hour and a half per day with two other inmates, that he is being searched by prison guards every time he leaves his cell, and that his visits, specifically during holidays, participation in social and sportive activities, and access to means of communication are restricted. He also argues that his cell measures approximately 9   square metres and does not receive sufficient natural light. Lastly, he states that his psychological condition deteriorated due to his isolation and that he started to receive psychiatric treatment as a result. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, due to his detention in an individual unit? In that connection, did the applicant’s detention in that unit constitute solitary confinement in the form of total or relative social isolation (see Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §§   119-24 and   135, ECHR 2006-IX, and Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) , nos. 24069/03 and 3 others, §   104, 18 March 2014)?   2.     Did the authorities give substantive reasons for the imposition of the impugned detention regime, in particular, in view of the prison administrations’ decision relying on the decision of the Ministry of Justice’s Directorate General of Prisons? Did the prison administration have any discretion regarding the implementation of the measure following the letter of the Directorate General?   Have there been subsequent decisions for the prolongation of this measure, and if so, was the applicant informed of those decisions (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 139 and 145, and Öcalan , cited above, § 105)?   Was the imposition of this measure accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing its proportionality and the applicant’s welfare? In particular, was the applicant’s physical and mental condition monitored and his physical or psychological capacity to deal with long-term detention in an individual unit assessed when the decisions to impose and prolong such a detention regime upon him were taken (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §   139, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia , nos.   3501/20 and 2   others, §§   126 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   3.     What was the total duration of the applicant’s detention in an individual unit (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 137-45, and Bora v. Turkey (dec.), no.   30647/17, §§ 24-6, 28 November 2017)?   4.     What were the physical conditions of detention in the individual units the applicant was held in in Manisa T-Type Prison (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 126-130, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   110-15)?   5.     Was the applicant allowed ample opportunity to communicate with other persons and to have access to outdoor exercise or social activities (see Öcalan , cited above, §§ 116-26)?   In particular, was he allowed regular visits from his family and lawyer (see   Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 131-35, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   127-35)?