CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 17 décembre 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 6 January 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 34616/21 İlhan AKILLI against Türkiye lodged on 31 May 2021 communicated on 17 December 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s placement in an individual unit for seventeen months during his pre-trial detention and his alleged isolation resulting from that practice. On 9 September 2016, during the course of his pre-trial detention on account of charges of membership of an illegal armed organisation (“FETÖ/PDY”), the applicant was placed in an individual unit at the Eskisehir H-Type Prison. In response to his objection to that practice, the Eskisehir enforcement judge found that his placement in the individual unit resulted from security concerns within the prison and was in accordance with law. The enforcement judge also noted that the applicant was allowed to spend thirty minutes per day in the exercise yard and that the prison administration tried to increase that daily limit. Starting from 16 May 2017 the applicant was allowed to benefit from open air for one hour per day. On 29 November 2017, in response to his requests to be transferred to a normal cell, the prison administration informed the applicant that the security concern that required his stay in an individual unit persisted and that no steps would be taken for his transfer. The applicant was held in an individual unit until he was released on 6   February 2018. On 13 October 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected his individual application as being manifestly ill-founded. It found that although the applicant had been allowed to benefit from open air only by himself for fifteen months of his seventeen months in the individual unit, he could not be considered to have been completely isolated as he had continued to receive visitors so that his communication with his family and the outside world had not been completely disrupted. In view of the period at issue and the conditions of the applicant’s detention, the threshold of severity had not been reached. Relying on Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant complains of his detention in an individual unit, which, according to him, amounted to solitary confinement. In that connection, he maintains that he was allowed to benefit from open air only by himself for most of his time in the individual unit and could leave his cell for only thirty minutes during eight months of that time, that he had no access to social and sportive activities, and that there was no effective remedy regarding his grievances. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, due to his detention in an individual unit? In that connection, did the applicant’s detention in that unit constitute solitary confinement in the form of total or relative social isolation (see   Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no.   59450/00, §§   119-24, ECHR 2006-IX, and Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) , nos. 24069/03 and 3 others, §   104, 18   March 2014)?   2.     Was the applicant provided with adequate reasoning for his placement in an individual unit? Have there been subsequent decisions for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention in that unit (see Ramirez   Sanchez , cited above, §§ 139 and 145, and Öcalan , cited above, §   105), and if so, was the applicant informed of those decisions?   Was the imposition of that measure accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing its proportionality and the applicant’s welfare? In particular, was the applicant’s physical and mental condition monitored and his physical or psychological capacity to deal with long-term detention in an individual unit assessed when the decisions to impose and prolong the impugned detention regime were taken (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §   139, and Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia , nos.   3501/20 and 2   others, §§   126 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   3.     What were the physical conditions of detention in the individual unit the applicant was held in (see Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 126-30, and Öcalan , cited above, §§ 110-15)?   4.     Was the applicant allowed ample opportunity to communicate with other persons and to have access to outdoor exercise or social activities (see Öcalan , cited above, §§   116-26)?   In particular, was he allowed regular visits from his family and lawyer (see   Ramirez Sanchez , cited above, §§ 131-35, and Öcalan , cited above, §§   127-35)?   5.     Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints regarding his placement in an individual unit, as required by Article   13 of the Convention (see Neshkov and Others v.   Bulgaria , nos.   36925/10 and 5 others, §§ 180-91, 27 January 2015)?