CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 3 mars 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } Published on 24 March 2025   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 14694/24 John k/a Ganni ATTARD against Malta lodged on 22 May 2024 communicated on 3 March 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the culling of the applicant’s sheep which he raised for the purposes of making products for human consumption. On 3 November 2012 the police entered the applicant’s farm and arrested him while officers of Veterinary Regulation Department (‘VRD’) slaughtered his sheep, on the spot, on the basis that they had not been registered and tagged (a certification, following tests, that the sheep are free from disease). By the time the applicant was released from his (later to be found) unlawful arrest and detention and was able to take urgent precautionary measures late in the day, 216 sheep had already been slaughtered. Following the slaughter, tests were carried out on the sheep showing that they were not ill or suffering from any disease. By an appeal judgment of 29 April 2016, confirming a first-instance judgment, the applicant’s administrative challenge to what he claimed was an abusive action was dismissed. The Court of Appeal considered that Article   76 of Chapter 36 of the Laws of Malta which provided for the Minister of Agriculture to order the culling of animals which were suspected to be sick, did not apply as the order had been given by the director of the VRD. However, bearing in mind the wider legislation, the second schedule of Chapter 497 of the Laws of Malta (The Public Service Act), the measure was nevertheless lawful, as the latter provided that the director of the VRD could exercise the necessary functions to safeguard public health from illnesses carried by animals. Indeed, the officials who testified considered that in the absence of registration in the national life stock database, the origin of the sheep could not be traced and thus they had to be considered as a threat to public health, and the health of other animals, and therefore their culling could be ordered by the VRD. The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining, inter alia , under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the unlawful culling of his sheep. During these proceedings an order to cull the remaining sheep was suspended. By an appeal judgment of 23 January 2024, the Constitutional Court, confirming a first-instance judgment, considered that the measure was lawful, as held by the administrative jurisdictions via their now final judgment. It had also been proportionate to the aim pursued according to the Court’s case law cited by the first-instance court, and the applicant had not explained why that conclusion had been incorrect. It lifted the order for suspension of the order, considering that it was for the VRD to decide what to do with the remaining sheep. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention that he was deprived of his property (his sheep) unlawfully, as no provision of law allowed for the culling of unregistered and healthy sheep, and the provisions relied on by the domestic courts had not been foreseeable. Moreover, the measure was disproportionate (given that the sheep had not been sick) and devoid of procedural guarantees. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant been deprived of his possessions in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention? In particular, was the legal basis, on which the VRD’s decision was based, sufficiently precise and foreseeable in its application (see Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, § 163, ECHR   2006-VIII), or was its application and interpretation unpredictable and overly broad (see, for example, Ecodefence and Others v. Russia , nos.   9988/13 and 60 others, § 112, 14 June 2022, and Nešić v. Montenegro , no. 12131/18, §§   52 ‑ 53, 9 June 2020). Was it accompanied by relevant procedurals safeguards (see for example Markus v. Latvia , no. 17483/10, §   75, 11   June 2020)? The Government are invited to provide the text of the legal basis relied on by the domestic courts, as well as any examples when that text was used as a legal basis in such, or comparable, circumstances, accompanied by any relevant case-law.   2.     Bearing in mind that the sheep had not been tested prior to the decision, nor found to be sick later, was that deprivation necessary in accordance with the general interest, and did it cause the applicant a disproportionate burden for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, conversely, S.A.   Bio   d’Ardennes v. Belgium , no.   44457/11, §§ 52-58, 12 November 2019)?