CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 9 mai 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 26 May 2025   THIRD SECTION Application no. 33392/20 ANKO S.A. against Greece lodged on 3 August 2020 communicated on 9 May 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the rejection as inadmissible of the applicant’s objections against a fine imposed for arbitrary use of public property. Since June 1994 the applicant company rented a warehouse from a private company. On 23 October 2007 and after consecutive transactions, ownership of the warehouse and the underlying land was transferred to the Administrative Region of Central Macedonia. All notarial documents mentioned the pre-existing lease. On 5 October 2018 the Municipality of Ampelokipi-Menemeni acquired exclusive ownership of the property pursuant to law no. 4483/2017. On 11 July 2019 compensation protocol no. 21073(6415)/21-05-2019 (the fine) for arbitrary use of public property, issued by the Regional Unit of Thessaloniki of the Administrative Region of Central Macedonia, was served to the applicant. By then, Article 3 § 23 (a) of law no. 4092/2012 had already introduced an admissibility requirement for contesting “acts issued by the Land Property Agency imposing fines of any kind or determining compensation, in accordance with the applicable legislation on public property”, of having paid a percentage (20%) of the imposed fine or compensation and up to EUR   30,000 as court fee. The applicant contested the compensation protocol before the civil courts. On 11 February 2020 the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s objections by way of judgment no. 1671/2020, for non-compliance with Article   3 § 23 (a) of law no. 4092/2012. That judgment was final, under Article 326 § 3 of law no. 4072/2012 which stipulated that such decisions on objections against compensation protocols for arbitrary use of public property may not be appealed. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that: - there has been a violation of its right to access to a court, claiming that Article 3 § 23 (a) of law no. 4092/2012 only refers to fines or compensation imposed by the Land Property Agency; that even assuming that the provision includes acts issued by other authorities, it lacks clarity and foreseeability; and that, in any event, the provision does not serve a legitimate aim, while the fee is disproportionately high; - there has been a violation of the principle of equality of arms, claiming that the national courts did not invite it to deposit the fee within a short time limit after the hearing, whilst they had the discretionary power to do so under Article 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure; - there has been a violation of its right to a fair trial, claiming that its objection regarding time-barring of the charged sum was not examined in substance, since the request was dismissed as inadmissible. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Has there been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? Did the applicant company have access to a court, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention (see, for example, Zubac v.   Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§   76-99, 5 April 2018; Church of Greece v.   Greece , no. 44547/15, §§ 45 ‑ 62, 21 January 2025)?   In particular:   (a) Has the very essence of the right of access to court been impaired in the present case?   (b) Was the procedural requirement under Article 3 § 23 (a) of law no.   4092/2012 foreseeable to the applicant, through, for example, interpretive provisions in the national legislation or well-established administrative practice and/or case-law?   (c) Have the limitations on the applicant company’s access to court pursued a legitimate aim   and been proportionate to such aim?   (d) Did the national courts have the discretionary power to invite the applicant to deposit the fee after the hearing? If yes, why didn’t the national courts make use of this possibility?