CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 16 mai 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 June 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 18270/24 G.N. against Lithuania lodged on 20 June 2024 communicated on 16 May 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns exploitation of a minor for prostitution. The applicant was born in October 2003. In 2019-20 her mother committed suicide, her father’s parental rights were permanently withdrawn, she was diagnosed with a schizotypal disorder and it was recognised that she had a mild intellectual disability. In October 2020 she met E., a man born in 1999. In April 2021 she was emancipated by a court decision and married E. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the police, alleging that from June to September 2021, when she had been 17 years old, E. had exploited her for prostitution. A pre-trial investigation was opened against E. and he was later charged with trafficking of a child (Article 157   §   1 of the Criminal Code) and profiting from prostitution of a minor (Article   307 § 3 of the Criminal Code, as valid at the material time). It was established that the applicant and E. had placed online advertisements for sexual services and had communicated with clients to arrange meetings. On an unspecified number of occasions, E. had driven the applicant to meet the clients, where she provided them with sexual services and received payment. She would later give part of the money to E. On 8 September 2022 the Klaipėda Regional Court acquitted E. of the aforementioned charges but convicted him of profiting from prostitution of another person under Article 307 § 1 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that the applicant had been emancipated and could not be considered a minor. On 26 January 2023 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision in part. It held that the applicant’s emancipation within the meaning of civil law did not affect the fact that, for the purposes of criminal law, she remained a minor until she reached the age of 18. Nonetheless, it upheld E.’s acquittal of trafficking of a child under Article 157 § 1 of the Criminal Code, finding that it had not been proved that the applicant had been trafficked – in particular, she had received money from clients directly and later shared it with E. according to their agreement. However, the Court of Appeal convicted E. of profiting from prostitution of a minor under Article   307 § 3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The applicant was awarded 4,000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 24 February 2024 the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Court of Appeal. It held that Article 157 § 1 of the Criminal Code criminalised the buying and selling of a child. “Buying” meant that the “buyer” gained control over the child, and “selling” implied that the child had already lost his or her freedom and merely changed the “owner”. The Supreme Court considered that E.’s actions had not amounted to “selling” the applicant – E. and the applicant had decided together that she would engage in prostitution, they had both placed advertisements and communicated with clients, and the applicant had received money from the clients directly. While that proved that E. had profited from prostitution of a minor, it did not show that, on each occasion when the applicant provided sexual services, she had been “sold”, that is to say transferred from E.’s “ownership” to the client’s “ownership”. The applicant complains that E.’s actions corresponded to the definition of human trafficking provided in various international conventions and in Article 157 § 1 of the Criminal Code: he sold her for sexual exploitation, by using his influence over her and abusing her vulnerability. Thus, the authorities were under an obligation to take all possible measures to properly assess the criminal offence and adequately punish the perpetrator, but by failing to recognise E.’s actions as trafficking of a child, the domestic courts failed to discharge their positive obligations under the Convention. She raises these complaints under Article 3 and Article 6 of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Was the applicant a victim of human trafficking within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention (see S.M. v. Croatia [GC], no. 60561/14, §§   290 and 296, 25 June 2020, and Krachunova v. Bulgaria , no. 18269/18, §§   145 and 147, 28 November 2023)?   2.     Did the domestic authorities discharge their positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention (see S.M. v. Croatia , cited above, §§ 306 and   308)?   3.     Has there been a violation of Article 4 of the Convention on account of the fact that in the domestic criminal proceedings the perpetrator was convicted of profiting from prostitution of a minor but acquitted of trafficking of a child (see, mutatis mutandis , B.B. v. Slovakia , no.   48587/21, §§   89-101, 24 October 2024, and Chowdury and Others v.   Greece , no. 21884/15, §§ 123-27, 30   March 2017)?