CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 8 août 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 25 August 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 10125/21 Snezhana NADJAKOVSKA against North Macedonia lodged on 8 February 2021 communicated on 8 August 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the dismissal of the applicant’s claim against her employer related to a salary supplement, and the alleged inconsistency of case-law and insufficient reasoning of the domestic courts’ judgments. The applicant is a civil servant. In 2008 she met the statutory criteria for a salary supplement for the first career step on the ground of positive appraisals in the past three evaluation periods (“salary supplement for a career step”). In 2010 she was promoted to a higher post. In 2018 she filed a claim requesting that her employer pay an increased contribution to the national pension fund calculated by taking into account the salary supplement for the second and third career steps to which she considered to have been entitled to based on her positive evaluations between 2008 and 2014. She also sought that her right to salary supplement for each step be acknowledged from 2011 and 2014 onwards. The first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding that the three-year period for the career step started to run anew following each promotion. The Appeal Court confirmed that finding, not replying expressly to the applicant’s argument that the findings of the first-instance court ran contrary to already established jurisprudence of the domestic courts. The applicant submits copies of final judgments delivered by the Appeal Court before the final judgment in her case following claims brought by civil servants who had been promoted at the time they filed their claims. In these judgments the Appeal Court accepted that civil servants (who had evidently been promoted) were entitled to an increased salary supplement for the next career steps, without accepting that the career steps started to run anew with each promotion or without explicitly addressing the question of their promotion. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the inconsistent case-law of the domestic courts and about insufficient reasoning of the domestic courts’ judgments in her case. She also complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the fact that her claim was dismissed resulted in a lost income and a lower basis for the calculation of her future pension. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular: (a)     was the principle of legal certainty breached on account of the divergent case-law allegedly applied to the applicant’s case (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, §§   116 ‑ 34, 29 November 2016; Stoilkovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 29784/07, §§ 39-49, 18 July 2013; and Balažoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 45117/08, §§ 29-34, 25 April 2013)? (b)     did the domestic courts provide sufficient reasoning in reply to the applicant’s arguments regarding the alleged deviation from the previously established case-law (see Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania , nos. 41373/21 and 48801/21, §§ 68-69, 16 July 2024; and Deryan v. Turkey , no. 41721/04, §§ 30-43, 21 July 2015; Atanasovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 36815/03, §§ 36-39, 14 January 2010)? 2.     Did the applicant have “a legitimate expectation” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to have her claim accepted (see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 65, ECHR   2007 ‑ I; Gáll v. Hungary , no. 49570/11, §§ 31-40, 25 June 2013; and Grbac v. Croatia , no. 64795/19, §§ 106-107, 16 December 2021)? If so, has there been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention (see Aliyeva and Others v. Azerbaijan , nos. 66249/16 and 6 others, §§ 106-12 and   128-36, 21 September 2021; mutatis mutandis , Stojanovski and Others v.   the   former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 14174/09, §§ 46-61, 23   October 2014 and Damjanac v. Croatia , no. 52943/10, §§ 88 et seq., 24   October 2013)?