CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 3 octobre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5FFF0A75 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:7pt } .s25D5DE94 { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:7pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s25D4CC02 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .s9252AC04 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } Published on 20 October 2025   FOURTH SECTION Applications nos. 24258/17 and 27710/17 Ali Asan OZENBASH against Russia and Zair Sitbelyalovich SMEDLYAYEV against Russia lodged on 20 March 2017 and 24 March 2017 respectively communicated on 3 October 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The circumstances of the case The applications concerns the banning of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (hereinafter – “the Mejlis”) by the “Supreme Court of Crimea” on 16   April 2016. The self-governing institutions of the Crimean Tatar people comprise the Qurultai of the Crimean Tatar People (hereinafter – “the Qurultai”), their national congress, and the Mejlis, which is the Crimean Tatar people’s representative executive body. The Qurultai consists of 250 delegates who, according to the Regulation on Qurultai, are elected for 5 years through universal, equal, and direct elections among the Crimean Tatars who either reside permanently in Ukraine or are Ukrainian nationals regardless of their residence. The Qurultai has subsidiary structures to support its functioning as a national congress, including internal organs and commissions to carry out specific tasks between plenary sessions. The Mejlis consists of thirty-three members who are elected by and accountable to the Qurultai. It functions as the permanent executive body between Qurultai sessions which are to be held every five years. The latest full Qurultai session, the 6th, convened in Bakhchysaray, Crimea in October 2013. On 15 February 2016, relying on the anti-extremism provisions of the Russian Federation legislation, the “Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea” brought before the “Supreme Court of Crimea” an action against the Mejlis, seeking a judgment declaring the Mejlis as an extremist organisation and consequently banning its activities. On 12 April 2016 the activities of the Mejlis were temporarily suspended pending the “court’s decision”. On 26   April 2016 the “Supreme Court of Crimea” granted the prosecutorial action. On 29   September 2016 the Administrative Division of the Russian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Mejlis. This appeal judgment is final and not amenable to any further appeal. The applicants in both applications, who are Ukrainian nationals, had leadership roles at the Qurultai at the material time. In 2013 the applicant in the application no. 24258/17 was elected as the Chair of the Audit Commission, while the applicant in application no. 27710/17 was elected as the Chair of the Qurultai’s Elections Commission. The applicant in application no. 24258/17 alleges that, between 2014 and 2016, he was prevented from entering Crimea from the Kherson Oblast in Ukraine on several occasions, measures which he challenged unsuccessfully in Crimean “courts”, and that, as of 2015, he received anti-extremism warnings from “local prosecutorial authorities”. The applicants’ complaints The applicants submit that the prohibition of the Mejlis impacts more than just the institution itself and its thirty-three members, but effectively encompasses the entire Crimean Tatar People’s system of self-governance. The applicants complain that ordering the ban on the Mejlis constitutes an interference with their freedom of expression and association under Articles   10 and 11 of the Convention respectively. The applicants also complain under Article 18 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 11, that the real purpose of banning the Mejlis was to silence and to punish the political opposition in Crimea. With regard to the court proceedings concerning the prohibition of the Mejlis, the applicants allege several breaches of their right to a fair trial under Article   6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they allege that the courts adjudicating the case were not “established by law”, that the rules of jurisdiction were breached, and that the administrative courts assumed the role of prosecution. The applicants further invoke Article 7 of the Convention and complain that Russia’s anti-extremism legislation was applied retroactively, with retrospective effect in Crimea. The applicants further complain under Article 8 of the Convention that they were prevented from communicating freely with other representatives of the Crimean Tatar self-government bodies or with Crimean Tatars on professional and private matters. Additionally, the applicants submit that they had no effective remedy for the alleged breaches mentioned above, as required by Article 13 of the Convention. They further complain under Article 14 of the Convention that they were discriminated against in the enjoyment of their rights due to their civic and political activities. Lastly, the applicant in the application no. 24258/17 complains under the Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention that his freedom of movement was systematically restricted.       QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Have the applicants complied with the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention?   2.     Can the applicants, in view of their personal capacity as Qurultai officials, claim to be victims of a violation of the Convention, within the meaning of Article   34?   3.     In the affirmative, has there been a violation of the applicants’ right to freedom of association, contrary to Article   11 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) , [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 1123-28, 25   June 2024)?   4.     Were the restrictions imposed by the respondent State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by that provision, contrary to Article   18 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§   1351 ‑ 82)?   5.     Do the applicants have locus standi to invoke Article 6 of the Convention in relation to the proceedings concluded by the judgment of the Russian Supreme Court of 29 September 2016, in view of the fact that they were not a party to those proceedings (see   Athanassoglou and Others v.   Switzerland [GC], no. 27644/95, § 43, ECHR 2000-IV; Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain , no. 62543/00, §§ 35-39, ECHR 2004-III)?   6.     In the affirmative, were the proceedings concerning the ban on the Mejlis adjudicated by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) , [GC], cited above, §§ 943-46, 25 June 2024?   7.     Does the designation of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People as an extremist organisation, which triggered the applicability of Russian anti ‑ extremism legislation in Crimea, comply with the requirements of Article 7 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ukraine v. Russia (re   Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1274-78)?   8.     Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life and correspondence, in breach of Article   8 §   1 of the Convention?   9.     Did the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their Convention complaints, as required by Article   13 of the Convention?   10.     Have the applicants suffered discrimination contrary to Article   14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 11 (see Ukraine v. Russia (re   Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1181-90)?   In particular, have the applicants been subjected to a difference in treatment in view of their civic and political activities?   11.     In application no. 24258/17, has there been a restriction on the applicant’s right to liberty of movement, guaranteed by Article   2 §   1 of Protocol No.   4 to the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§   1174-75)?