CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 6 novembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 24 November 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 2834/21 Gordana JANKULOSKA against North Macedonia lodged on 11 January 2021 communicated on 6 November 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns criminal proceedings against the applicant (a   former Minister of Interior of the respondent State) for having incited, at the request of the then-Prime Minister (N.G.), an employee of the Ministry of Interior (Gj.P.) to buy an armoured car favouring a certain supplier. The background to the case is similar to that in Taleski and Others v. North Macedonia ((dec.), nos.   77796/17 and five other applications, §§ 4-8, 24   January 2023). In April 2018 the trial court disjoined the criminal proceedings against the applicant from those against N.G. and Gj.P., given that the applicant had a high-risk pregnancy and it could not be anticipated whether she could attend the hearings. In May 2018 a panel of the trial court presided by Judge D.K. convicted N.G. and Gj.P. The judgment stated that the applicant had incited Gj.P. to commit the offence. Judge D.K. publicly pronounced that judgment in the presence of the media, reiterating the finding concerning the applicant. In the ensuing criminal proceedings against the applicant, the trial court panel (also presided by Judge D.K.) scheduled but subsequently adjourned several hearings, initially due to the applicant’s pregnancy and subsequently because she had given birth on 28 June 2018. The trial court held hearings on 29 and 30 August, 4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 18, 26 and 27 September, and on 1 and 3   October 2018, allowing for breaks of one and a half hours during the hearings. The applicant requested that Judge D.K. be recused, inter alia on account of the tight scheduling of the hearings, as well as given the trial court’s finding in the judgment convicting N.G. and Gj.P. and Judge D.K.’s statement when pronouncing that judgment. The president of the trial court dismissed the applicant’s request, finding that Judge D.K. had been conducting the proceedings lawfully and impartially. The trial court admitted in evidence inter alia eight audio-recordings of intercepted conversations, despite the fact that in previous proceedings against other persons the court had excluded, as inadmissible, such evidence from the case files. The applicant was not given a copy of the audio-recordings and a report of her technical counsel ( технички советник ) concerning their authenticity was not admitted into evidence, as it had been submitted belatedly. The trial court (composed of Judge D.K., another judge and three lay judges including a certain Z.J.) convicted the applicant of abuse of office. As for the use in evidence of the audio-recordings, it found that, irrespective of how the audio-recordings had been produced, they had been lawfully obtained by the Special Prosecutor’s Office (“the SPO”), had been validated as evidence by the Act on the SPO and had not been the sole evidence against the applicant. The Appeal Court and the Supreme Court confirmed the trial court’s judgment. In its judgment adopted in September 2020, the Supreme Court also found that the applicant’s addenda to her appeals and to the extraordinary review requests lodged with the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court respectively, enclosing new evidence which she had been unable to submit earlier, had been lodged out of time. According to the applicant, two of the five judges of the Supreme Court to whom her case was initially assigned were subsequently replaced by other judges. The applicant’s requests to inspect the case file, in order to ascertain the circumstances related to that change, apparently remained unanswered. In August 2025 Z.J. made a written statement before a notary public that he had not participated in the trial court’s deliberations (which, according to the information available to him, had never taken place) and had never voted for the trial court’s judgment, but that Judge D.K. had given him minutes of deliberations to sign. Under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention the applicant complains that i)   she was convicted, in violation of the principle of legal certainty, on the basis of the audio-recordings which had been obtained unlawfully and were the sole evidence against her, and that she did not have a possibility to challenge them; ii) she did not have access to all the audio-recordings handed over to the SPO, which may have included evidence to her advantage, and there had been no legal procedure in which to challenge the selection of evidence by the SPO; iii) the trial was conducted hastily, despite the applicant’s high-risk pregnancy and, subsequently, the fact that she had just given birth; iv) Judge D.K. (who was subsequently appointed as a Constitutional Court judge) had not been impartial; v) the applicant was not convicted by a “tribunal established by law”, in view of the manner in which the trial court’s judgment was adopted; vi) the composition of the Supreme Court’s panel changed without any reason and contrary to the relevant rules of court; and vii)   the Appeal and Supreme Court did not consider her addenda to the appeals and the extraordinary review requests. The applicant also complains under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that Judge D.K. had a preconceived idea as to the applicant’s guilt. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charge against her in accordance with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention? In particular:   (a) did she have a fair hearing, in view of the circumstances in which the audio-recordings from the allegedly unlawfully intercepted communications, used in evidence in the proceedings, were obtained and the applicant’s alleged lack of opportunity to challenge their authenticity (see for the relevant principles Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, §§   302-4, 26   September 2023)?   (b) were the principles of the adversarial nature of proceedings and equality of arms observed with regard to the disclosure to the defence of the evidence possessed by the prosecution (ibid., §§ 307-8)?   (c)   did Judge D.K.’s statement given when pronouncing the judgment convicting N.G. and Gj.P. and the trial court’s finding therein affect the applicant’s right to a fair trial in a manner incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia , nos.   46632/13 and 28671/14, §§ 102-8, 23   February 2016)? Can Judge D.K. be considered impartial, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in view of the trial court’s finding in the judgment convicting N.G. and Gj.P. (see Gorše v. Slovenia , no. 47186/21, §§ 49-50 and 54-65, 6 March 2025) and bearing in mind Judge D.K.’s subsequent career advancement?   (d) did the applicant have adequate time and facilities to prepare her defence, as required by Article 6 § 3 (b), given the schedule of the hearings in view of the specific personal circumstances of the applicant (see, for example, Kikabidze v. Georgia , no. 57642/12, §§ 43-44, 16 November 2021)? (e) was the applicant convicted by a “tribunal established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland   [GC], no.   26374/18, §§ 211-17, 1   December 2020; and Posokhov v. Russia , no. 63486/00, § 39, ECHR 2003-IV), in view of the allegations concerning the deliberations and voting of the trial court’s panel? (f) has there been a violation of the applicant’s right of access to a court or to a fair trial, given that the Appeal and Supreme Courts did not consider the addenda to the applicant’s appeals and extraordinary review requests, respectively (see, mutatis mutandis,   Evaggelou v. Greece , no.   44078/07, §§   17-19, 13 January 2011;   and Reichman v. France , no.   50147/11, §§ 27-31, 12 July 2016; see also, mutatis mutandis, Kikabidze , cited above, §§ 51 and 56; and, among many similar authorities,   Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 3) , no.   60824/08, § 90, 19 January 2023)? (g) in view of the alleged changes of the composition of the Supreme Court panel adjudicating the applicant’s case, was that panel independent and impartial, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Moiseyev v.   Russia , no. 62936/00, §§ 172-85, 9 October 2008)? Was the Supreme Court’s panel which decided the applicant’s case a “tribunal established by law” (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson , cited above, §§   223 and 229; Kontalexis v. Greece , no.   59000/08, §§   38 et seq., 31 May 2011; and DMD GROUP, a.s., v. Slovakia , no.   19334/03, §§ 58 et seq., 5 October 2010)?   2. In view of Judge D.K.’s statements and the trial court’s finding in the proceedings against N.G. and Gj.P, was the presumption of innocence, guaranteed under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, respected in the applicant’s case (see Gorše , cited above, §§ 51-65)?