CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 26 novembre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 15 December 2025   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 38838/19 Georgiy Anatoliyovych DINOVSKYY against Ukraine lodged on 15 July 2019 communicated on 26 November 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention and under Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 about the Supreme Court’s decision in his case. In February 2010 a court ordered the applicant’s reinstatement in his previous post at a private university. In April 2010 and January 2011 the university issued orders providing for the applicant’s reinstatement. The State Bailiffs discontinued enforcement of the 2010 judgment on the grounds that the order for reinstatement had been issued. The applicant claimed, however, that he was not reinstated as he was not allowed to take up his previous job duties. He twice challenged the Bailiffs’ decisions to discontinue enforcement. His claims were granted by domestic courts which found that the judgment had not been duly enforced. In 2015, referring to the failure to actually reinstate him, the applicant claimed before the domestic courts the payment of average salary due for the period of non-compliance with the reinstatement judgment which was, according to him, still ongoing. He relied, in particular, on the Enforcement Proceedings Act (1999) and subordinate legislation issued under the Act (as worded at the relevant time), which provided that the enforcement of a reinstatement judgment was considered complete from the moment the employee was actually allowed to take up his previous job duties on the basis of the employer’s order. The applicant’s claim was granted by the local and appellate courts which found that, while the orders formally providing for reinstatement had been issued, the applicant was not actually allowed to take up his job duties. The university appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court (“the SC”). The applicant submitted a written reply and asked to be present at the hearing before the SC. The latter decided not to grant his application and to examine the case without the presence of the parties. On 16 January 2019 the SC allowed the university’s appeal in cassation, quashed the lower courts’ decisions and rejected the applicant’s claim. The SC reasoned that the issuance of a reinstatement order in itself was sufficient for full enforcement of a reinstatement judgment. It relied, for that interpretation, on the resolution of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of 1992 on the practice in labour disputes, and on a Supreme Court’s ruling 2015 in a previous case. The SC also stated that the applicant’s complaint about not being able to actually take up his work duties could have been addressed by “other means” but did not specify what those means could be. At the relevant time, Article 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that a court of cassation was to deal with matters of law and could not establish or consider established any circumstances which were not established or rejected in lower courts’ decisions and could not decide on the probative value of evidence. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular:   (i)     did the Supreme Court provide sufficient reasons for its decisions and were its decisions “arbitrary” and/or “manifestly unreasonable” (see, for example, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, §   61, ECHR   2015, and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos.   55391/13 and   2   others, § 185, 6 November 2018, with further references)?   (ii)     did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Ukrainian law to reassess the facts and the evidence in the case in the manner it did, in particular without holding an oral hearing, or was it obliged to remit the case for new examination by the lower courts (see, for example, Sokurenko and   Strygun v. Ukraine , nos. 29458/04 and 29465/04, §§ 22-29, 20   July 2006)?