CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 8 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD37F5C3B { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:7pt } .s83BE5C30 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super } Published on 26 January 2026   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 31691/24 Luis ALONSO RIVEIRO against Spain lodged on 16 October 2024 communicated on 8 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the State’s alleged failure to protect the applicant from exposure to trimethylamine, a substance released from a fish derivatives factory enclaved in the residential area where he lives, near the shore of a protected bay. Trimethylamine is an organic compound that is responsible for the odour produced by decaying fish. In 2011 and 2014, the Galicia High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court declared null and void two decisions that had granted environmental licences to expand the factory. The courts noted that the factory was located in a zone classified within the Natura 2000 sites and that the industry had not been qualified as a clean activity. They found that the activity was incompatible with the residential area nearby. The applicant was not a party to those proceedings. After the judgments had been published, the applicant submitted, together with a citizens’ platform, several complaints to the city council where they exposed their grievances regarding the continuation of the activity and the odour nuisance caused as well as the illegal discharge of sewage water into the bay. In 2020 the city council granted new licences to expand the factory. The applicant challenged these decisions and complained of a breach of urbanistic regulations and his fundamental rights. On 27 January 2022 a first instance court upheld his claim and annulled the new licences, inter alia , because the final judgments of 2011 and 2014 had found that the industry could not be considered a clean activity and had therefore annulled the previous licences. The court concluded that the res judicata principle required an outcome consistent with those judgments. Both the company and the city council appealed. They complained that the first instance court had ruled ultra vires by applying the res judicata principle, which in their view had not been raised in the applicant’s claim. The applicant opposed to the other parties’ appeal although he did not file a cross-appeal ( adhesión a la apelación ) seeking a favourable outcome based on some of the reasons raised in his initial complaint and different to the res judicata principle. On 10 November 2022 the High Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 27   January 2022, finding that the first instance court could not base its decision on the res judicata principle because this had not been duly raised by the applicant in his initial claim. However, the High Court did not order the resumption of the proceedings, nor did it analyse the issue on the merits. It held that the procedural law did not allow it to go into the merits because a cross-appeal seeking a different, favourable outcome on other grounds was missing. It further acknowledged that it was aware that the substantive issue raised by the applicant would remain unsolved. The applicant brought an appeal on points of law and complained that the High Court had left his claim unsolved. He argued that it was not reasonable to expect him to have submitted a cross-appeal because he had obtained full gain of cause before the first instance court. On 23 November 2023 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of interest in cassation, holding that the issue was already settled in the case-law. On 17 June 2024 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal inadmissible. Independently of the above, on 13 March 2024 the Supreme Court delivered a judgment in a similar case. It established, following the case-law of the Constitutional Court, that the requirement of a previous cross-appeal was in fact not necessary in order to decide a case on the merits. The applicant invokes Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention and complains that the State did not prevent the nuisance caused by the fish industry. He alleged that several years of exposure to environmental nuisance affected his mental health and psychological well-being and that, despite the judgments issued against the company, the industrial activity has not only continued but rather developed, making things worse. Furthermore, he complains that the requirement of a cross-appeal hindered his right to access to a court, that his claims before the domestic courts remained unsolved and that he did not have an effective remedy to complain about the violation of his rights.   QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Were the 2020-2024 proceedings directly decisive for the determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations under Article 6   §   1 of the Convention (see Zander v. Sweden , 25 November 1993, §§   22 and 24-25, Series A no. 279-B; Ivan Atanasov v. Bulgaria , no.   12853/03, §   90, 2   December 2010; and Andersson and Others v. Sweden , no.   29878/09, §§   44-48, 25 September 2014)?   2.     If so, did the requirement to file a cross-appeal, as applied in the applicant’s case, with the result that the merits of his claim about breaches of urbanistic regulations and his fundamental rights were not examined, constitute an unjustified limitation on the applicant’s right of access to a court for the determination of his civil rights and obligations, contrary to Article   6 §   1 of the Convention?   3.     Was the alleged environmental nuisance, namely the exposure to trimethylamine, serious enough to affect adversely and to a sufficient extent the applicant’s enjoyment of the right to respect for his private life or his home under Article 8 of the Convention (see López Ostra v.   Spain , 9   December 1994, § 51, Series A no. 303-C; Dubetska and Others v.   Ukraine , no.   30499/03, §§ 105-108, 10 February 2011; Kotov and Others v.   Russia , nos.   6142/18 and 12 others, § 108, 11 October 2022; and Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], n o   53600/20, §   514, 9   April 2024)?   4.     Did the granting of the industrial licences and the domestic courts’ alleged inadequate reaction to the applicant’s grievances constitute an unlawful interference with his private life or his home, contrary to Article   8 of the Convention?   5.     Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints under Article 8 of the Convention, as required by Article   13 of the Convention?