CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 13 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 February 2026   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 10930/23 Adriana SANDU against Romania lodged on 27 February 2023 communicated on 13 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns allegations of discrimination regarding the allocation of a settling-in adoption allowance (“ indemnizație pe perioada concediului de acomodare” ) between individuals whose income is derived from employment or assimilated activities and individuals whose income is derived from dividends and rental income. The applicant is the sole shareholder of a limited company. Her earnings consist solely in rental income and dividends, for which she pays certain taxes. On 2 December 2021, the applicant adopted a child born on 23   November 2013, and subsequently lodged a request with the Gorj County Agency for Payments and Social Inspection (“AJPIS”) for a settling-in adoption allowance, which was rejected. On 4 July 2022 the Gorj District Court dismissed as ill-founded the applicant’s proceedings seeking the annulment of the administrative decision rejecting her request for the allowance. In a final decision of 2 November 2022, the Craiova Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision, on the grounds that, according to Law no. 273/2004 on the adoption procedure, the allowance was only payable to individuals who pay income tax, and the legislator’s aim was to offer the settling-in allowance to those individuals „who undertake a daily (professional) activity, which implies their travelling away from home for work purposes”. The applicant argues that she was discriminated against because of the exclusion of individuals who derive their income from rent and dividends from the settling-in adoption allowance. In this respect, she invokes Article   14 of the Convention, taken together with Article   1 of Protocol No. 1, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. She also complains about the manner in which the domestic courts examined her case (Article 6 of the Convention), and of her right to respect for the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), as she was refused the allowance despite the fact that she is a taxpayer. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Since the Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.   37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), has the applicant suffered discrimination on account of her employment status and/or to her tax status, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 and/or to Article 1 of Protocol No.   12 to the Convention, insofar as she was denied a settling-in adoption allowance due to the fact that her income was not derived from employment or an assimilated activity (see Weller v. Hungary , no. 44399/05, §§ 26-40, 31   March 2009)?   2.     Can the applicant claim to have had a legitimate expectation, for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, to receive a settling-in adoption allowance following her adoption of a child (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 57, ECHR 2004-IX; compare with Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], no. 78630/12, § 57, 11 October 2022)?   In the affirmative, has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1, given that the authorities denied her request for the allowance?   If so, was that interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest? In particular, did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see Krajnc v.   Slovenia , no. 38775/14, §§ 50-51, 31 October 2017, and, mutatis mutandis, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC] , no. 53080/13, §§ 72-127, 13 December 2016)   3.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations before the Court of Appeal, in accordance with Article   6   §   1 of the Convention? In particular, did the Court of Appeal effectively examine the argument raised by the applicant regarding the allegedly restrictive and discriminatory interpretation of Law no. 273/2004 adopted by the authorities and the District Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Donadzé v. Georgia , no.   74644/01, §§ 31 et seq., 7 March 2006)?