CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 February 2026   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 24744/19 Sergiy Adamovych VASYLYUTA against Ukraine lodged on 18 April 2019 communicated on 12 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the alleged failure of domestic authorities to refund the applicant, a former individual entrepreneur, the unduly collected value-added tax (VAT). According to the applicant, although the overpayment in question had been established by final court decisions in his favour, a tax authority refused to reimburse it. In 2014 he launched administrative proceedings seeking recovery of the outstanding amount from the State budget. The first-instance court and the court of appeal found in his favour and ordered the State Treasury to reimburse the overpayment. On 23 October 2018 the Supreme Court quashed those decisions and dismissed the applicant’s claim. Without examining the merits of the case, it held that, instead of directly seeking recovery of the impugned amount from the State budget, the applicant should first have sought a judicial order obliging the tax authority to issue a certificate confirming the overpayment ( «висновок про повернення» ) and forward it to the Treasury. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complains that the Supreme Court’s decision violated his right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, as he could not obtain the amount owed to him by the State. He also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the cassation proceedings were unfair and unreasonably lengthy. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a “possession” within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis ,   S.A.   Dangeville v.   France , no.   36677/97, 16   April 2002, § 48)?   2.     If so, has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention? Has that interference been in the public interest, and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, and, if so, did it impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see Buffalo S.r.l. in liquidation v. Italy , no. 38746/97, § 39, 3 July 2003; Shchokin v.   Ukraine , nos.   23759/03 and 37943/06, §§ 50-53, 14 October 2010; Antonov v.   Bulgaria , no. 58364/10, § 64, 28 May 2020)?   In particular, in view of the Supreme Court’s reasons for dismissing the applicant’s claim, can he be considered to have had a possibility to effectively challenge the tax authority’s refusal to refund the unduly collected VAT (see, mutatis mutandis ,   G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v.   Italy   [GC], nos.   1828/06 and   2 others, § 302, 28 June 2018)?   3.     In respect of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, is this provision applicable to the proceedings in the present case (see National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom , 23   October 1997, § 97, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII)? If so, do they disclose a violation of the Convention, as alleged by the applicant?