CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 February 2026   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 45460/19 REKUPERATSIYA SVYNTSYU, TOV against Ukraine lodged on 16 August 2019 communicated on 12 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application mainly concerns an alleged inconsistency in application of domestic law by courts at final instance in disputes concerning tax penalties. On 29 July 2014 the Krasnogvardiiskyi District Tax Inspectorate of Dnipropetrovsk ordered the applicant company to pay 1,071,896.72   Ukrainian hryvnias (an equivalent of over 66,000 euros) as a penalty for non-compliance with foreign-currency control regulations, which was discovered in 2009. The order gave rise to two sets of parallel administrative proceedings. In the first, the tax authority sought to recover the outstanding amount from the applicant company. In the second, the applicant company sought to have the impugned order of the tax authority quashed. In both sets of proceedings, the applicant company argued that the statutory limitation period for imposing the penalty had expired. According to the applicant company, its arguments were in line with the interpretation of the relevant limitation rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Ukraine (“the SCU”) in its ruling of 4 November 2014. In the first set of proceedings, on 23 February 2016 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine (“the HACU”) upheld the applicant company’s arguments and dismissed the tax authority’s claim on the ground that the statutory limitation period had expired. In the second set of proceedings, on 18 February 2019 the Cassation Administrative Court within the newly created Supreme Court (“the CAC”), dismissed the applicant company’s claim holding that the limitation period had not expired. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company mainly argues that when examining its case, the CAC departed from the domestic courts’ settled case-law on the application of statutory limitation rules. It submits, in particular, that the CAC was required either to follow the interpretation adopted in the above SCU ruling or to refer the conflicting issue to the Grand Chamber of the newly established Supreme Court, a domestic mechanism for overcoming inconsistencies in domestic case-law. The applicant company also relies on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Is Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applicable to the proceedings in the present case? If so, was there a breach of the applicant company’s right to a fair hearing? In particular, was the principle of legal certainty complied with in the course of the proceedings before the Cassation Administrative Court, having in mind the conclusions of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in its ruling of 4 November 2014 (see Borg v. Malta , no. 37537/13, §§ 107-08, 12 January 2016; Melgarejo Martinez de Abellanosa v. Spain , no. 11200/19, §§ 29-30, 14   December 2021; and, mutatis mutandis , Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v.   Turkey   [GC], no.   13279/05, §§ 49-58, 20 October 2011; Suverénní řád Maltézských rytířů - České velkopřevorství v. the Czech Republic , no.   15440/22, §§ 71-78, 11 September 2025)?   2.     In respect of the remainder of the applicant company’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, do they disclose a violation of these provisions, as alleged by the applicant company?   The parties are invited to support their arguments in respect of the above questions with examples of   relevant case-law   of the domestic courts.