CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 19 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 9 February 2026   FIRST SECTION Applications nos. 44015/22 and 44016/22 Irena PIOTROWSKA against Poland and Aleksandra JANAS against Poland lodged on 16 September 2022 communicated on 19 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applications concern disciplinary measures taken against the applicants – ordinary court judges – in response to their having questioned the validity of the appointment of another judge. The applicants sat in a panel of three judges assigned to examine an appeal against a first-instance divorce judgment. The third member of the panel had been appointed to the Katowice Court of Appeal by the President of the Republic on recommendation of the National Council of the Judiciary (“the NCJ”) as established under the Amending Act on the NCJ and certain other statutes of 8 December 2017 ( ustawa o zmianie ustawy o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz niektórych innych ustaw ). On 11 December 2019 the panel, by majority, referred a question to the Supreme Court, seeking to determine whether the mere participation of the NCJ in the judicial appointment procedure was sufficient to conclude that a judicial panel including a judge appointed in such a procedure was constituted in violation of the law. Five days later, the deputy disciplinary officer for ordinary court judges ( Zastępca Rzecznika Dyscyplinarnego Sędziów Sądów Powszechnych , “the deputy disciplinary officer”) initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicants, considering that their decision undermined the dignity of judicial office. Shortly after, he applied to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (“the DCSC”) for the suspension of the applicants from judicial duties and for the reduction of their salaries for the duration of the suspension. Following the abolition of the DCSC in July 2022, the applicants’ case was transmitted to the newly created Chamber of Professional Liability (“the CPL”). On 19 September 2022, at the applicants’ requests, the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, to indicate to the Government of Poland, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the respondent State ensure that the disciplinary proceedings concerning each applicant’s suspension from their judicial functions comply with the requirements of “fair trial” as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in particular that the composition of the body dealing with their case meet the requirements of an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. In March 2023 the deputy disciplinary officer withdrew his request for the applicants’ suspension from judicial duties. Consequently, the CPL discontinued its proceedings in this respect. On 14 June 2023 the deputy disciplinary officer discontinued the disciplinary proceedings against each of the applicants. The applicants appealed, arguing that he had failed to admit that no disciplinary offence had ever been committed. It appears that the CPL dismissed these appeals. On 3 May 2024 the Court lifted the previously indicated interim measures. The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the CPL which heard the case concerning the requests for their suspension from judicial duties and the reduction of their salaries was not an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicants complain that the disciplinary measures taken against them adversely affected their social and professional reputation and, in consequence, amounted to a breach of the right to respect for their private life. Relying on Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants also complain that the disciplinary measures taken against them pursued an ulterior motive to intimidate them and other judges, and to deter them from scrutinising the legality of judicial appointments. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Can the applicants claim to be victims of a violation of their Convention rights in view of the fact that they were ultimately not suspended from judicial duties and the deputy disciplinary officer for ordinary court judges dropped the disciplinary charges against them?   2.     Was the CPL which dealt with the applicants’ suspension case “an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”, as required by Article   6 § 1 of the Convention (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v.   Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, §§ 211-52, 1 December 2020; Reczkowicz v.   Poland , no.   43447/19, §§ 216-82, 22 July 2021; and Juszczyszyn v.   Poland , no.   35599/20, §§ 192-211, 6 October 2022)?   3.     Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, on account of the disciplinary and suspension proceedings initiated against them? If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention?   4.     Were the measures imposed by the State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by that provision, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention (see Juszczyszyn , cited above, §§ 306-38)?