CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 28 janvier 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 16 February 2026   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 46/26 Askim SILGIR against Germany lodged on 15 December 2025 communicated on 28 January 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns criminal proceedings in which the applicant was convicted for importing and trafficking drugs and the use by the German courts in those proceedings of EncroChat user data as main evidence. From 2018 onwards the French authorities investigated EncroChat, an encrypted mobile-phone telecommunications tool which operated as a closed network. The investigation culminated in the remote retrieval of EncroChat user data, including text messages, by the French authorities from 1 April to 2 June 2020 (for further details regarding the French investigation see A.L.   and E.J. v. France (dec.), nos. 44715/20 and 47930/21, §§   4-34, 24   September 2024). Pursuant to a European Investigation Order issued by the Frankfurt am Main Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office the French authorities transferred the data to the prosecutor’s office via the German Federal Office for Criminal Investigation, in so far as they concerned alleged criminal acts committed in Germany. The German investigative authorities decrypted and sifted through the transferred data and conducted further investigative measures to identify the senders and recipients of the text messages exchanged over EncroChat. On 11 July 2023 the Bremen Regional Court convicted the applicant for importing and trafficking drugs and sentenced him to a prison sentence of five years and six months. The court based the conviction mainly on messages exchanged over EncroChat. The applicant’s subsequent appeal on points of law was rejected by the Federal Court of Justice on 26 March 2024, and on 8 September 2025 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication (2 BvR 875/24). Invoking Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the German courts had used the illegally obtained private communication data as main evidence for his conviction and that the technical details of the retrieval of EncroChat user data were not shared with him. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life or correspondence, within the meaning of Article   8 §   1 of the Convention (compare Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, §§ 495-96, 25 May 2021;   Van Vondel v.   the   Netherlands , no. 38258/03, § 49, 25 October 2007; Copland v.   the   United Kingdom , no. 62617/00, § 43, ECHR 2007-I; and Malone v.   the   United Kingdom , 2 August 1984, § 64, Series A no. 82)?   In particular, did the use of the EncroChat user data by the German courts and authorities in the criminal proceedings constitute an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life or correspondence?   If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article   8 §   2 of the Convention?   2.     In view of the use of the EncroChat user data by the German courts and authorities in the criminal proceedings, did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention and did he have a possibility to examine the authenticity and quality of the electronic evidence (compare Yüksel   Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, §§ 302-08, 344 ‑ 45, 26   September 2023)?   3.     The applicant is requested to submit to the Court the counterstatement of the public prosecutor’s office in the appeal on points of law proceedings and the documents referred to therein.