CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 17 avril 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } Published on 4 May 2026   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 25502/25 Manuela ALBANI against San Marino lodged on 13 August 2025 communicated on 17 April 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns administrative proceedings following a recruitment procedure. In 2023 the applicant (at the time an Uditore Commissariale , ‘UD’) and two other UDs unsuccessfully participated in a recruitment procedure to become a Commissario della Legge (‘CoL’ – a first-instance judge). The successful candidate, following a recommendation of the Chief Justice and the eventual decision of the Judicial Council (‘JC’) in charge of the procedure, was a certain Z. At the same time, the applicant also participated, this time successfully, in a recruitment procedure to become a Procuratore del Fisco (a State Attorney). The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the CoL recruitment procedure via administrative proceedings against the JC. At first instance the natural judge declared her incompatibility to hear the case on the basis that she was a member of the JC, party to the proceedings. The case was assigned by the Chief Justice to judge S. The first-instance judge (S) dismissed the applicant’s claim. He held that, since then, the applicant had obtained a new position and was no longer a serving UD (a requirement to apply for CoL) thus, in any event, she could not re-sit the competition (even assuming it were to be annulled which was the object of the case). She therefore had no interest to pursue the case. On appeal, the Judge of Appeals (P) confirmed those findings in a final judgment of 30 April 2025. In addition, in so far as the applicant had complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the failure of the first instance judge to examine the merits of her claim, the Judge of Appeals recalled that the assessment of such a claim was dependent on the fulfilment of preliminary procedural requirements which had not been fulfilled in the present case. In any event it considered that the recruitment procedure had been fair and the complaints unfounded. At both instances the applicant had unsuccessfully asked the judges hearing the case to abstain. Thus, at both instances the applicant lodged the respective recusal requests. In respect of judge S, she referred to his friendship (in and outside of work) and his strict collaboration (going beyond the normal professional relationship) with Z (interested party in the proceedings – controinteressato ), including his support for the latter in the competition, which was compounded by the fact that he had failed to abstain on the basis of situations which would have made it preferable for him to abstain (optional abstention, article 10 (4) of Law no.   145/2003). In respect of P, she referred to her friendship and close professional relationship with Z who had been her UD for years, and with whom she had collaborated for her publications, as well as that with S. The subsequent, respective, recusal requests were dismissed by judgments of 14 July 2024 and 14 April 2025 respectively. The Judge for Extraordinary Remedies (‘JER’) noted that since the judges had found no reason to abstain for the purposes of optional abstentions, he could only examine whether any grounds existed for mandatory abstentions, the law having provided for the possibility of recusals only in the cases of the most serious and objectively evident situations which would have required that the natural judge be replaced. In respect of S, the JER noted that S had denied having been asked to pronounce himself on the competences of Z and thus it had not been proved that he had supported Z’s nomination, and there had not been concrete proof of their strong friendship, S having diminished the importance of the circumstances raised by the applicant. In respect of P, no consideration could be taken of any links with S, the law not providing for such scenario, and no friendship outside the workplace had been proved in relation to Z. In the absence of concrete proof of a strong friendship, it was for the judge herself to decide on her abstention. A request to hear witnesses had been rejected, the JER having considered that they could not prove evidence of friendship outside the workplace. The applicant complains under Article 6 about several failures in the procedure before the JC; that her case had not been decided by an independent and impartial tribunal given that the administrative courts are subject to disciplinary actions by the JC (party to the proceedings) and to the control of the Chief Justice (party interested in the outcome of the proceedings); that her recusal requests (related to S and P’s lack of impartiality) had been rejected; that she had not been given access to relevant documentation; and that the administrative courts failed to enter into the merits of her claim, it having been rejected as inadmissible on unfounded reasons. Under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 6 she further complains that she did not have an effective remedy against her complaint of the partiality of the judges since the JER dismissed her complaints without the latter having made any assessment of the evidence presented or heard witnesses, concluding that it was for the judge at issue to decide on the abstention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Was Article   6 §   1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the administrative proceedings in the present case? In particular, could the outcome of those proceedings be decisive for the civil right at issue?   2.     If so, did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, before the administrative courts, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention? In particular:   (a)     Were the administrative courts which dealt with the applicant’s case independent and impartial as required by Article   6 §   1 of the Convention?   (i)     Bearing in mind that both the first instance and appeal judges were subject to career development or disciplinary actions which depended on the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council, the former being a key player in the competition being challenged by the applicant and the latter being a party to the proceedings, were the proceedings before those courts compatible with the principles of independence and impartiality required by Article   6 §   1 of the Convention (see, for reference purposes, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no.   76639/11, §   79, 25 September 2018; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v.   Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 157-63, 6 November 2018; Thiam v. France , no. 80018/12, § 85, 18 October 2018; and Sramek v.   Austria , 22 October 1984, § 42, Series A no. 84)? In this context what procedural safeguards were in place (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 234)? The parties are requested to compare and contrast any safeguards applicable in the context of disciplinary proceedings and the respective judicial review.   (ii)     Was judge S, hearing the applicant’s case, impartial given his alleged friendship and close professional ties with Z (see, for example, albeit in a different configuration, Suren Antonyan v.   Armenia , no.   20140/23, § 136, 23   January 2025; and contrast Steck-Risch and Others v. Liechtenstein , no.   63151/00, § 48, 19 May 2005, and Doynov v. Bulgaria , no. 27455/22, §   59, 1 April 2025)?   (iii)     Was judge P, hearing the applicant’s case, partial on the basis of her alleged proximity with Z?   (iv)     Bearing in mind the relevance of national procedures for ensuring impartiality (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 99, ECHR 2009) did the procedure for abstention and recusal in the present case afford the applicant with a relevant procedural safeguard as required by Article 6 (see for example, A and B v. Malta , no. 4986/24, § 76, 24 June 2025, 24 June 2025; Mikhail Mironov v. Russia , no. 58138/09, § 37 et seq., 6 October 2020; and Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. Georgia , nos. 4468/21 and 17256/22, §   58, 29 August 2024)?   (b)     Furthermore, were the administrative courts’ findings arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable? and have the administrative courts failed to observe the principle of fairness laid down in Article 6, in particular, was the applicant allowed to adduce relevant documentary or witness evidence? And did any such rejection contain adequate reasons?   3.     (a) In so far as the applicant complains, separately, under Article 6 [ lex specialis to Article 13] about the recusal procedure before the Judge for Extraordinary Remedies, is Article 6 applicable to those proceedings? In particular, can such proceedings be considered as part and parcel of the main proceedings, or are they to be considered as ancillary (see respectively, A   and   B v. Malta , no. 4986/24, § 38, 24 June 2025, and Schreiber and Boetsch v.   France (dec.), 2003); see also Biagioli v. San Marino dec., no. 8162/13, §§   82 and 85, 8 July 2014)? In the latter case, to what extent can such proceedings influence the main proceedings, so to make Article 6 applicable on that basis?   (b) If Article 6 is applicable to the proceedings before the Judge for Extraordinary Remedies, did the applicant have a fair trial before that court? In particular, was the applicant allowed to present evidence and observations relevant to her case and were her arguments actually “heard”, that is to say duly considered, by the court?