CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 17 avril 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } Published on 4 May 2026   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 5150/26 Aurora FILIPPI against San Marino lodged on 30 January 2026 communicated on 17 April 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns administrative proceedings following a recruitment procedure. In 2023 the applicant (at the time an Uditore Commissariale , ‘UD’) and two other UDs unsuccessfully participated in a recruitment procedure to become a Commissario della Legge (‘CoL’ – a first-instance judge). The successful candidate, following a recommendation of the Chief Justice and the eventual decision of the Judicial Council (‘JC’) in charge of the procedure, was a certain Z. The applicant challenged the recruitment procedure, and her claims were rejected at first instance, by judge S, whose judgment was confirmed on appeal by a judgment of 23 October 2025, by judge P. During the first-instance proceedings the applicant had unsuccessfully requested judge S to abstain (on the basis of his friendship with Z). She raised the matter again on appeal noting that a recusal request on the same basis, by another candidate, had already been rejected in proceedings before the Judge of Extraordinary Remedies (‘JER’). The Court of Appeal dismissed her request noting precisely that the JER had already considered the request as unfounded on the merits, and, at the same time, finding that the applicant could not raise the matter on appeal, her having failed to raise it before the JER. During the appeal proceedings the applicant also unsuccessfully requested the recusal of judge P, for preferences towards Z (who had for several years been P’s UD; who had been publicly praised by P for a contribution towards a publication of a book authored by P; and had close office and out-of-office relations) as well as her enmity with the applicant (resulting from a situation in 2018 consequent to which the applicant considered that she had been subjected to unfavourable treatment). However, by a judgment of 23 July 2025 the JER considered that the points adduced did not prove friendship, nor had the enmity been proved. In that light, the applicant’s request for certain evidence to be presented and witnesses be heard was irrelevant. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention the applicant complains that her case had not been decided by an independent and impartial tribunal given that the administrative courts are subject to disciplinary actions by the JC (party to the proceedings) and to the control of the Chief Justice (party interested in the outcome of the proceedings); she further complained about the lack of impartiality of both the first-instance and appeal judges in the administrative proceedings; as well as about the outcome of her recusal requests and various procedural failings during the proceedings before the JER. Lastly, she also complained about the fairness of the administrative proceedings in so far as she had not been given access to all the necessary documentation, not all her arguments had been replied to, and that there had been a manifestly arbitrary interpretation of the law. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, before the administrative courts, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention? In particular:   (a)     Were the administrative courts which dealt with the applicant’s case independent and impartial as required by Article   6 §   1 of the Convention?   (i)     Bearing in mind that both the first instance and appeal judges were subject to career development or disciplinary actions which depended on the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council, the former being a key player in the competition being challenged by the applicant and the latter being a party to the proceedings, were the proceedings before those courts compatible with the principles of independence and impartiality required by Article   6 §   1 of the Convention (see, for reference purposes, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no.   76639/11, §   79, 25 September 2018; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v.   Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 157-63, 6 November 2018; Thiam v. France , no. 80018/12, § 85, 18 October 2018; and Sramek v.   Austria , 22 October 1984, § 42, Series A no. 84)? In this context what procedural safeguards were in place (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 234)? The parties are requested to compare and contrast any safeguards applicable in the context of disciplinary proceedings and the respective judicial review.   (ii)     Was judge S, hearing the applicant’s case, impartial given his friendship and close professional ties with Z (see, for example, albeit in a different configuration, Suren Antonyan v.   Armenia , no.   20140/23, § 136, 23   January 2025; and contrast Steck-Risch and Others v. Liechtenstein , no.   63151/00, § 48, 19 May 2005, and Doynov v. Bulgaria , no. 27455/22, §   59, 1 April 2025)?   (iii)     Was judge P, hearing the applicant’s case, partial on the basis of her alleged proximity with Z, and enmity with the applicant ( see Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia , no. 16812/17, § 359, 18   July 2019)?   (iv)     Bearing in mind the relevance of national procedures for ensuring impartiality (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 99, ECHR 2009) did the procedure for abstention and recusal in the present case afford the applicant with a relevant procedural safeguard as required by Article 6 (see, for example, A and B v. Malta , no. 4986/24, § 76, 24 June 2025; Mikhail Mironov v. Russia , no. 58138/09, § 37 et seq., 6 October 2020; and Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. Georgia , nos. 4468/21 and 17256/22, § 58, 29 August 2024)?   (b)     Furthermore, were the administrative courts’ findings arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable? and have the administrative courts failed to observe the principle of fairness laid down in Article 6, in particular, was the applicant allowed to adduce relevant documentary or witness evidence? And did any such rejection contain adequate reasons? Did the administrative courts’ give specific and express replies to submissions which were decisive for the outcome of the proceedings (see, for example, Carmel Saliba v. Malta , no.   24221/13, § 49, 29 November 2016, and Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova , no. 30085/13, § 47, 15 May 2025)?   2.     (a) In so far as the applicant complains, separately, under Article 6 about the recusal procedure before the Judge for Extraordinary Remedies, is Article   6 applicable to those proceedings? In particular, can such proceedings be considered as part and parcel of the main proceedings, or are they to be considered as ancillary (see respectively, A and B v. Malta , no. 4986/24, § 38, 24 June 2025, and Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.), 2003); see also Biagioli v. San Marino dec., no. 8162/13, §§ 82 and 85, 8 July 2014)? In the latter case, to what extent can such proceedings influence the main proceedings, so to make Article 6 applicable on that basis?   (b)     If Article 6 is applicable to the proceedings before the Judge for Extraordinary Remedies, did the applicant have a fair trial before that court? In particular, was the applicant allowed to present evidence and observations relevant to her case and were her arguments actually “heard”, that is to say duly considered, by the court?