CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 28 avril 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 18 May 2026   THIRD SECTION Application no. 31205/25 MIK D.O.O. against Slovenia lodged on 3 October 2025 communicated on 28 April 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the civil proceedings in which the applicant company’s request for the recusal of a judge was dismissed. On 19 September 2019 the applicant company requested the recusal of the first-instance Judge, L.S., on the grounds that the applicant company’s legal representative had previously been involved in enforcement proceedings against Judge L.S.’ parents. The applicant company submitted that, in that context, Judge L.S.’ father had behaved aggressively and had stated that his daughter was a judge and that “the lawyer would see what was coming” (“ da bo odvetnik že videl ”). The applicant company further alleged that Judge L.S.’ father had visited its legal representative at his office without invitation, while also acting as an opposing party in separate civil proceedings. After being informed of the request, Judge L.S. indicated that she agreed with the applicant company that her recusal was warranted on account of her personal (subjective) bias as well as the appearance of bias. However, the president of the first-instance court dismissed the request and Judge L.S. continued to deal with the case. On appeal, the Ljubljana Higher Court held, in particular, that the circumstances relied on by the applicant company did not demonstrate objective bias on the part of Judge L.S. After exhausting all domestic remedies, the applicant company obtained access to emails sent by the president of the first-instance court. The emails indicated, inter alia, that Judge L.S.’ wish to be recused due to her personal (subjective) bias as well as the appearance of bias, should not be included in the decision dismissing the request of the applicant company.   Relying on Article 6 §   1 of the Convention, the applicant company complains that Judge L.S.’ participation in the proceedings breached its right to a fair trial. QUESTION TO THE PARTIES Was the court which dealt with the applicant company’s case impartial, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, Micallef v. Malta [GC], no.   17056/06, § 93, ECHR 2009; Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § 73, ECHR 2015; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, § 287, 4 December 2018, and, mutatis mutandis , Rudnichenko v. Ukraine , no.   2775/07, §§   117 ‑ 19, 11 July 2013)?