CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 28 avril 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 18 May 2026   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 11301/24 Vitalii SMIRNOV against Georgia lodged on 16 April 2024 communicated on 28 April 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the freezing of the bank accounts of the applicant and his company. On 16 March 2023 a judge issued a freezing order, at the request of the prosecutor, in the context of an ongoing criminal investigation into offences of fraud, tax evasion and money laundering involving dozens of individuals and companies. The order was upheld on appeal on 31   March   2023. On 15 March 2024 the freezing order was extended for a further year, and that decision was again upheld on appeal on 26 March 2024. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions was unlawful and lacked justification. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1, on account of the freezing of his bank accounts and those of his company? 2.     If so, was that interference lawful? In particular, was the applicable legislation sufficiently precise regarding the legal grounds and conditions for freezing, and were the freezing orders compliant with the latter?   3.     Was the interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest? Did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see, for general principles,   Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey , nos. 21392/08   and 2 others, §§   142-52; see also   Filkin v. Portugal , no. 69729/12, 3 March 2020)?