CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 26 mai 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s34DFC730 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s23860FF7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } Published on 26 May 2026   GRAND CHAMBER CASE OF AHMAD and MAKKI v. DENMARK (Applications nos. 5712/24 et 24292/24)   QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES   A. Article 3 Having regard to the principles set out and applied in relevant cases (see in particular Munjaz v.   United Kingdom , no.   2913/06, §§   49-53, 17   July 2012; M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2) , no.   75450/12, §§ 98 and 103-15, 19   February 2015, with further references; and Aggerholm v. Denmark , no.   45439/18, §§   83-85, 15 September 2020), the parties are invited to reply to the following questions: (i) In view of the restrictions applied to applicants as part of their seclusion, and the duration of this measure, did they experience inhuman or degrading treatment? (ii) In Mr Makki’s case, and to the extent it was also relevant to that of Mr Ahmad’s, was it convincingly established that the seclusion measure was therapeutically necessary throughout its entire duration, having regard to contemporary medical practice and current international standards on the matter? (iii) Was the measure employed as a matter of last resort, there being no other, less intrusive available? (iv) Was it convincingly shown with respect to each applicant that the seclusion was not prolonged beyond the period which was strictly necessary for that purpose? (v) Were there adequate safeguards, affording sufficient protection to the applicants and capable of demonstrating that the measure was therapeutically necessary and also that the requirements of necessity and proportionality were met? In particular, was there a regular review of the therapeutic necessity of continuing the seclusion measure? (vi) What is the rule and practice in Denmark regarding obtaining a second, independent medical opinion on the therapeutic necessity of seclusion (see pp. 75-76 of the CPT report on its 2019 visit to Denmark (CPT/Inf (2019) 35)?   B. Article 5 (i) Did the seclusion measure amount to a “further deprivation of liberty” for the purposes of Article   5, or merely to a further restriction of liberty (see Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom , no.   8225/78, §§   42 and 44, 28   May 1985;   Schneiter v. Switzerland (dec.), no.   63062/00, 31   March 2005, and Munjaz v.   the United Kingdom , no.   2913/06, §§   61-73, 17   July 2012; see also, in the context of imprisonment, Bollan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.   42117/98, 4   May 2000, and Stoyan Krastev v. Bulgaria , no.   1009/12, §§   31-54, 6   October 2020)? Without prejudice to the reply given to question B(i), the parties are invited to reply to the following questions: (ii) Was each applicant’s seclusion decided and extended “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”? What was the legal basis for the seclusion measure in each case? Was the seclusion measure necessary and proportionate to what is sought to be achieved, as required by section 4 of the Act on the Use of Coercion in Psychiatry ( Lov om anvendelse af tvang i psykiatrien )? (iii) Was the decision to seclude each applicant accompanied by relevant and effective safeguards? (iv) Did the applicants have access to judicial review of the lawfulness of their seclusion that was sufficient to prevent an unjustified deprivation of liberty?   C. Article 8 (i) In the specific context (detention in a psychiatric institution) and circumstances (seclusion as a therapeutic measure and/or in order to protect others from harm) of these applications, did the impugned measures interfere with the applicants’ right to respect for private life, as that notion has been elucidated in the Court’s case-law? Without prejudice to the reply given to question C(i), the parties are invited to reply to the following questions: (ii) Was that interference in accordance with the law? Did the domestic law provide adequate safeguards against excessive or arbitrary interference? (iii) Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society”? In particular, was it proportionate to the stated aims pursued?