CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 2 mars 2010

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 128 March 2010 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom - 61498/08 Judgment 2.3.2010 [Section IV] Article 3 Inhuman treatment Positive obligations Transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities despite risk of capital punishment:   violation   Article 13 Effective remedy Appeal to House of Lords rendered ineffective by transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities before appeal could be heard: violation   Article 34 Hinder the exercise of the right of petition Transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure, allegedly because of “objective impediment” making compliance impossible: violation   Article 46 Article 46-2 Execution of judgment Individual measures Respondent Government required to take all possible steps to obtain assurance from Iraqi authorities that applicants would not be subjected to death penalty   Facts – This case concerns a complaint by two Iraqi nationals that the British authorities in Iraq had transferred them to Iraqi custody in breach of an interim measure indicated by the European Court under Rule   39 of the Rules of Court, so putting them at real risk of an unfair trial followed by execution by hanging. The applicants were arrested by British forces in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq by a Multi-National Force. They were initially detained in British-run detention facilities as “security internees” on suspicion of being senior members of the Ba’ath Party under the former regime and of orchestrating violence against the coalition forces. In October 2004 the British military police, which had been investigating the deaths of two British soldiers in an ambush in southern Iraq on 23   March 2003, concluded that there was evidence of the applicants’ involvement in the killing. In December 2005 the British authorities formally referred the murder cases against the applicants to the Iraqi criminal courts. In May 2006 an arrest warrant was issued against them under the Iraqi Penal Code and an order made authorising their continued detention by the British Army in Basra. The British authorities reclassified the applicants’ status from “security internees” to “criminal detainees”. In 2006 the cases were then transferred to Basra Criminal Court, which decided that the allegations against the applicants constituted war crimes triable by the Iraqi High Tribunal, which had power to impose the death penalty. The Iraqi High Tribunal made repeated requests for the applicants’ transfer into its custody. The applicants sought judicial review in the English courts of the legality of the proposed transfer. The Divisional Court declared it lawful on 19   December 2008 and its decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 30   December 2008. While accepting that there was a real risk that the applicants would be executed, the Court of Appeal found that, even prior to the expiry of the UN Mandate on 31   December 2008, the United Kingdom had not been exercising, in relation to the applicants, autonomous power as a sovereign State, but had acted as an agent for the Iraqi court. It had no discretionary power of its own to hold, release or return the applicants. In essence it was detaining them only at the request and to the order of the Iraqi High Tribunal and was obliged to return them to the custody of that tribunal in accordance with the arrangements between the United Kingdom and Iraq. That was a fortiori so with the expiry of the Mandate, as after that date the British forces would enjoy no legal power to detain any Iraqi. In any event, even if the United Kingdom was exercising jurisdiction, it nevertheless had an international-law obligation to transfer the applicants to the custody of the Iraqi High Tribunal which had to be respected unless it would expose the applicants to a crime against humanity or torture. The death penalty by hanging did not fit into either of those categories. The Court of Appeal therefore dismissed the appeal. It also refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords or to grant the applicants interim relief. Shortly after being informed of the Court of Appeal’s ruling the European Court gave an indication under Rule   39 that the applicants should not be removed or transferred from the custody of the United Kingdom until further notice. However, the Government replied on 31   December 2008 that, since the UN Mandate was due to expire at midnight, exceptionally they could not comply and had transferred the applicants to Iraqi custody earlier in the day. The applicants’ trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal started in May 2009 and ended in September 2009 with a verdict cancelling the charges against them and ordering their immediate release. Upon an appeal by the prosecutor, the Iraqi Court of Cassation remitted the cases for further investigation by the Iraqi authorities and for a retrial. The applicants remain in custody. In its admissibility decision of 30   June 2009 (see Information Note no.   120), the European Court found that, given the total and exclusive de facto , and subsequently also de jure , control exercised by the United Kingdom authorities over the detention facilities in Basra, the applicants had been within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction until their physical transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities on 31   December 2008. Law – Article 3: Although, the death penalty had not been considered to violate international standards when the Convention was drafted, there had since been an evolution towards its complete de facto and de jure abolition within all the member States of the Council of Europe. Two Protocols to the Convention had thus entered into force, abolishing the death penalty in time of war (Protocol No.   6) and in all circumstances (Protocol No.   13), and the United Kingdom had ratified them both. All but two member States had signed Protocol No.   13 and all but three of the States which had signed it had ratified it. These figures and consistent State practice in observing the moratorium on capital punishment were strongly indicative that Article   2 of the Convention had been amended so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances. Accordingly, there was no longer any bar to considering the death penalty – which caused not only physical pain but also intense psychological suffering as a result of the foreknowledge of death – as inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of Article   3. Given the nature of the evidence and allegations against them, from August 2004, when the death penalty was reintroduced in Iraq, there had been substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would run a real risk of being sentenced to death if tried and convicted by an Iraqi court. The applicants themselves must have been aware of that risk. In the Court’s view, at least from May 2006, when the Iraqi criminal courts accepted jurisdiction over their cases, the applicants had been subjected to a well-founded and continuing fear of execution which it was reasonable to assume caused them intense psychological suffering that had undoubtedly intensified since their transfer into Iraqi custody on 31   December 2008. As to the Government’s contention that, in accordance with well-established principles of international law, they had had no option but to respect Iraqi sovereignty and transfer the applicants to the custody of the Iraqi courts when requested, the Court reiterated that it was not open to a Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another State which conflicted with its obligations under the Convention, especially in a case involving the death penalty and the risk of grave and irreversible harm. Furthermore, although the British courts had considered themselves bound by the principles of international law restricting the duty to provide “diplomatic asylum” to cases where the individual concerned was at risk of treatment so harsh as to constitute a crime against humanity, the Court considered that the applicants’ situation was clearly distinguishable. The applicants had not sought refuge with the United Kingdom authorities, but had actively been brought, through their arrest and detention by British armed forces, within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the respondent State had been under a paramount obligation to ensure that the applicants’ arrest and detention did not end in a manner which would breach their rights. In any event, the Court was not satisfied that the need to secure the applicants’ rights under the Convention had inevitably required a breach of Iraqi sovereignty. It did not appear that any real attempt had been made to negotiate with the Iraqi authorities to prevent the risk of the death penalty. For example, although the evidence showed that the Iraqi prosecutors had initially had “cold feet” about bringing the cases themselves because the matter was “so high profile”, the opportunity did not appear to have been seized to seek the consent of the Iraqi Government to an alternative arrangement involving the applicants being tried by a British court, either in Iraq or in the United Kingdom. Likewise, no request was made to the Iraqi authorities, before the decision was made to refer the applicants’ cases to the Iraqi courts, for a binding assurance that, in the event of a referral, the applicants would not be at risk of capital punishment. Indeed, no such assurance had ever been obtained. In the absence of such an assurance, the referral of the applicants’ cases to the Iraqi courts and their physical transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities had failed to take proper account of the United Kingdom’s obligations under Articles   2 and   3 of the Convention and Article   1 of Protocol No.   13. Accordingly, while the outcome of their cases before the Iraqi High Tribunal remained uncertain, the applicants had been subjected, since at least May 2006, to inhuman treatment through the fear of execution by the Iraqi authorities. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article 6: The Court accepted the national courts’ finding that it had not been established that, at the date of their transfer to the Iraqi authorities, the applicants risked a flagrantly unfair trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal. Nor, now that the trial had taken place, was there any evidence before the Court to cast doubt on that assessment. Conclusion : no violation (unanimously). Articles 13 and 34: The Government had argued that there had been an “objective impediment” to compliance with Rule   39 indication in that the applicants’ transfer to the Iraqi authorities had been the only course of action that was consistent with respect for Iraqi sovereignty. The Court considered, however, that the respondent State was responsible for the situation in which it had found itself as, firstly, it had not obtained a binding assurance regarding the death penalty before referring the applicants’ cases to the Iraqi courts and transferring them physically to Iraqi custody and, secondly, it had entered into arrangements with another State which conflicted with its Convention obligations to safeguard the applicants’ fundamental human rights. Nor had it established that there had been no realistic or practicable means available to safeguard those rights. Moreover, the Government had not satisfied the Court that they had taken all reasonable steps, or indeed any steps, to seek to comply with the Rule   39 indication. They had not informed the Court, for example, of any attempt to explain the situation to the Iraqi authorities and to reach a temporary solution. The Government’s approaches to the Iraqi authorities prior to the applicants’ transfer on 31   December 2008 had not been sufficient to secure any binding assurance that the death penalty would not be applied and their subsequent efforts had come after the applicants had left the jurisdiction and therefore at a time when the British authorities had lost any real and certain power to secure their safety. In sum, the respondent State had not taken all reasonable steps to comply with the interim measure and had thereby exposed the applicants to a serious risk of grave and irreparable harm. This had also had the effect of unjustifiably nullifying the effectiveness of any appeal to the House of Lords. Conclusion : violations (six votes to one). Article 46: The Government were required to seek to put an end to the suffering the fear of execution caused the applicants as soon as possible, by taking all possible steps to obtain an assurance from the Iraqi authorities that they would not be subjected to the death penalty. Article 41: The findings of a violation of Articles   3, 13 and   34, coupled with the Article   46 indication, constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes