CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 26 avril 2016

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sD4B5322E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s97EB40D9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s8B6C6D43 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } Information Note on the Court’s case-law 195 April 2016 Murray v. the Netherlands [GC] - 10511/10 Judgment 26.4.2016 [GC] Article 3 Degrading punishment Inhuman punishment De facto irreducibility of life sentence imposed on prisoner suffering from mental illness: violation Facts – The applicant, who suffered from a mental illness, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Netherlands Antilles in 1980. His repeated requests for a pardon were refused. In his application to the European Court he complained under Article 3 of the Convention of the imposition on him of a life sentence with no possibility of a review and of the conditions of his detention. In a judgment of 10 December 2013, a Chamber of the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article   3 in respect of the applicant’s life sentence. It noted that the possibility of review of a life sentence had been introduced in 2011 through legislation that provided that any person sentenced to life imprisonment would be released on parole after serving at least 20   years of his or her sentence if a custodial sentence no longer served any reasonable purpose. The applicant’s case had been reviewed accordingly but he could not be released because he was still considered dangerous and capable of re-offending. The Chamber also held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 3 in respect of the applicant’s conditions of detention. In 2014 the applicant was granted a pardon on health grounds and released. On 17 April 2014 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the applicant’s request (see Information Note   173 ). He died shortly afterwards. Law – Article 3: At the outset, the Court resumed and further developed the general principles applicable to the present case. (a)     Life sentences – The imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment on an adult offender is not incompatible with Article   3 of the Convention, provided it is not grossly disproportionate and, from the date of imposition of the sentence, there is both a prospect of release and possibility of review. In line with existing comparative and international standards, the review should be guaranteed no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of the life sentence, with further periodic reviews thereafter, and should allow the domestic authorities to consider whether, in the course of the sentence, any changes in the life prisoner and progress towards his or her rehabilitation are of such significance that continued detention is no longer justified on legitimate penological grounds. This assessment must be based on rules having a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty and be based on objective, pre-established criteria, surrounded by sufficient procedural guarantees. (b)     Rehabilitation and prospect of release for life prisoners – As noted above, the review should permit the authorities to assess any changes in the life prisoner and any progress towards rehabilitation. In European and international law there is clear support, also endorsed by the Court, towards the principle that all prisoners, including those serving life sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release if rehabilitation is achieved. The State’s positive obligation is one of means and can be achieved, for example, by setting up and periodically reviewing an individualised programme that encourages the prisoner to develop so as to be able to lead a responsible and crime-free life. (c)     Health care for prisoners with mental-health problems – A lack of appropriate medical care for persons in custody can engage the State’s responsibility under Article   3 of the Convention. Obligations under that provision may go so far as to impose an obligation on the State to transfer prisoners to special facilities where they can receive adequate treatment. In the case of mentally ill prisoners, the assessment of whether particular conditions of detention are incompatible with the standards of Article   3 has to take into consideration the prisoners’ vulnerability and, in some cases, their inability to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment. It is not enough for them to be examined and a diagnosis made; proper treatment for the problem diagnosed and suitable medical supervision should also be provided. (d)     Life prisoners with mental disabilities and/or mental-health problems – Life prisoners who have been held criminally responsible may nevertheless have certain mental-health problems which could impact on the risk of their reoffending. States are required to assess such prisoners’ needs for treatment with a view to facilitating their rehabilitation and reducing the risk of their reoffending and to enable them to receive suitable treatment – to the extent possible within the constraints of the prison context – especially where it constitutes a precondition for the life prisoner’s possible, future eligibility for release. However, States also have a duty to take measures to protect the public from violent crime and the Convention does not prohibit them from subjecting a person convicted of a serious crime to an indeterminate sentence allowing for the offender’s continued detention where necessary to protect the public. As to the specific circumstances of the instant case, when the applicant lodged his application to the Court he had already been imprisoned for some thirty years. His repeated requests for a pardon were rejected, inter alia , because of the continued existence of a risk of recidivism. However, although at his trial the applicant was diagnosed with various mental-health problems, he was never provided with any treatment in prison. On the contrary, in the absence of concrete and feasible alternatives, he was eventually given a sentence of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the applicant’s detention in prison rather than in a custodial clinic could not obviate the need for the recommended treatment. The mere fact that the punishment imposed on him did not stipulate that he undergo treatment and that he had never made a request for treatment did not relieve the respondent State from its obligations concerning the duration of the applicant’s incarceration and the provision of appropriate medical care for his rehabilitation. Although the principle of rehabilitation of prisoners was explicitly recognised in the domestic law at least from 1999 onwards, the applicant’s risk of reoffending was deemed too great for him to be considered eligible for a pardon or conditional release. Treatment constituted, in practice, a precondition for the applicant to have the possibility of progressing towards rehabilitation. The lack of treatment or of an assessment of his treatment needs therefore meant that, when the applicant lodged his application with the Court, any request for a pardon was in practice incapable of leading to the conclusion that he had made such significant progress towards rehabilitation that his continued detention would no longer serve any penological purpose. It followed that the applicant’s life sentence was not de facto reducible as required by Article   3 of the Convention. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage. (See the Factsheets on Detention and mental health and on Life imprisonment )   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes