CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 24 avril 2025
- ECLI
- ECLI:CEDH:002-14455
- Date
- 24 avril 2025
- Publication
- 24 avril 2025
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Solution
source officielleViolation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Criminal charge;Fair hearing;Impartial tribunal);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 18 - Limitation on use of restrictions on rights (Article 18 - Restrictions for unauthorised purposes);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
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Ukraine - 16497/20 Judgment 24.4.2025 [Section V] Article 6 Article 6-1 Fair hearing Impartial tribunal Seriously flawed administrative-offence proceedings resulting in the conviction of a high‑level anti-corruption official for accepting gifts: violation Article 8 Article 8-1 Respect for private life Publication of information, identifying the applicant with a description of the offence at issue and the penalty imposed, on the publicly accessible State “Corrupt Officials Register”, for an indefinite period: violation Article 18 Restrictions for unauthorised purposes Applicant’s prosecution with predominant ulterior purpose of personally attacking his moral and professional integrity: violation Facts – Following an investigation into allegations of corruption, administrative-offence proceedings were brought against the applicant, the then Director of the National Anti‑Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (“the NABU”), for accepting gifts, specifically holidays. He was found guilty at first instance and the maximum penalty was imposed: a fine of 3,400 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (approximately 120 euros) and confiscation of the gift, that is, the cost of the holiday accommodation (its value was estimated at UAH 25,000; approximately EUR 840). That decision was upheld and endorsed by the Court of Appeal. Shortly after, the applicant’s surname, name, patronymic, place of work and post with a brief description of the constituent elements of the offence and the penalty, were published in the publicly accessible online Unified state register of persons who have committed corruption or corruption-related offences (“the Corrupt Officials Register”). After the expiry of his term of office, the applicant was appointed to the post of Deputy Head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and subsequently Deputy Director of the Defence Procurement Agency. Law – Article   6 §   1: (1) Applicability – The Court found that the proceedings at issue had been criminal for the purposes of Article   6. In particular, although the offence of which the applicant had been found guilty was not classified as criminal under national law, the relevant provisions applied had concerned a vast range of professional groups and were aimed at sanctioning corruption-related wrongdoings too trivial to entail criminal liability. Furthermore, the fine, which had been imposed on the applicant in addition to the “gift confiscation” measure, had been both deterrent and punitive. Conclusion : Article   6 applicable under its criminal limb. (2) Merits – (a) Alleged unfairness of the trial – The applicant had been found guilty primarily based on the statements of the key witness, N., about the holidays and the related expenses, which had been imprecise, lacked consistency and contradicted, to some extent, evidence given by another witness. That gave rise to serious grounds for challenging N.’s credibility and the probative value of his testimony. Given the decisive role of N.’s evidence in his conviction, the applicant could reasonably have expected to receive a specific and explicit reply to his arguments regarding the quality of that evidence. However, neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed his related arguments or considered the witness evidence from the defence. Furthermore, the applicant had referred to certain circumstances implying that undue pressure might have been put on N., which had been capable of casting doubts on the reliability of his evidence. Specifically, he had argued that N. might have been vulnerable to pressure from the prosecution authorities, given his recent application to have a past criminal conviction removed from the official records. Neither court had addressed that argument. The domestic courts’ approach, in accepting N.’s statements as decisive evidence to convict the applicant, without addressing any of the latter’s serious arguments putting in doubt its reliability, had been manifestly unreasonable. Moreover, the trial court had not assessed the defence witnesses’ statements when calculating the value of the supposed gift (holiday expenses) which had also been important for the outcome of the proceedings, given that the applicable legal provisions did allow, subject to certain conditions, gifts of limited value to be accepted. The domestic authorities, therefore, had distributed the burden of proof in an arbitrary manner and had failed to address the applicant’s decisive arguments, depriving him of any practical opportunity to effectively challenge the charges against him. (b) Alleged lack of impartiality of the trial court – The Court found that the applicant had justified fears as to the lack of objective impartiality of the trial court judge due to his possible dependence on the prosecution authorities as the adverse party. In particular, the trial judge had also been involved as a witness in a parallel criminal investigation into allegations that a former prosecutor had taken a bribe, supposedly with the aim of sharing it with the judge. Referring to the realistic possibility for the prosecution authorities to change the judge’s procedural status from a witness to a suspect at any moment, they could have been regarded as having leverage over him in the applicant’s case. However, those fears had never been addressed. It was the trial judge himself, sitting in a single-judge formation who had dismissed the applicant’s challenge to his impartiality without any reasoning. The appellate court had disregarded the applicant’s related argument altogether, without even mentioning it in its ruling. Therefore, the defect in question – the unreasoned refusal of a recusal request despite arguments that had not been frivolous or groundless – had not been remedied at the appellate level. (c) Overall conclusion – Accordingly, the Court concluded that the applicant had not had a fair trial by an impartial tribunal; the decision-making process leading to his conviction for a corruption-related administrative offence had been seriously flawed. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article   8: (1) Applicability – Since alleged misconduct on the applicant’s part had not been established within fair judicial proceedings, there were no grounds for applying the Gillberg exclusionary principle as suggested by the Government. The question was thus whether there had been sufficiently serious prejudice to the applicant’s enjoyment of his right to respect for his private life. The Court found that the impugned measure had prejudiced both the applicant’s professional and social reputation and, therefore, that he had suffered a serious prejudice to the enjoyment of his right to respect for his private life, regardless of the subsequent developments in his career. In that connection, the Court took into account the following: the nature of the information about the applicant published in the Corrupt Officials Register by which he had been easily identifiable and, bearing in mind his professional function of combatting corruption, had related to the core of his professional reputation; the inherently stigmatising label of being “corrupt” which had seriously affected his esteem among others, especially in view of his long-standing career in the anti-corruption field and his high-level post therein, casted shadow on his good name, undermined the credibility of all his professional efforts or achievements and had called in question his moral values; the permanent public accessibility of the Register and the lack of any limitation in time for the inclusion of the applicant’s name therein. Conclusion : Article   8 applicable. (2) Merits – The interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life had been “in   accordance with the law” and could be regarded, as argued by the Government, as pursuing the legitimate aim of preventing corruption in the public service. Since the decision-making process leading to the applicant’s conviction had been seriously flawed, the Court found that the national authorities had failed to adduce “relevant and sufficient” reasons for the impugned interference. Furthermore, it found that it had not been proportionate to the pursuit of the declared legitimate aim. Under the current domestic legal regulations pertaining to the Corrupt Officials Register, once a person had his or her name published on that register, it remained there indefinitely, unless in case of some narrowly construed exceptions. Although the Code of Administrative Offences provided that if a person convicted of an administrative offence did not re-offend within a year, he or she was considered to have no convictions, it remained unclear how that provision could be meaningfully implemented if the person’s information continued to be included in the Register even thereafter, and there was no possibility of having it removed. Moreover, unless the applicable regulations changed, that situation was to continue indefinitely. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article   18 in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8: The Court considered that the circumstances of the case taken cumulatively indicated that, in addition to the declared purpose of verifying an allegation of corruption, the prosecution authorities might have also sought to target the applicant personally and to discredit him. It appeared that that ulterior purpose had been the one that had truly actuated the authorities. In that connection, the Court took into account the following: the Minister of the Interior’s hostile attitude towards the applicant prior to the events in question and the subsequent investigation being carried out by the National Police under that Minister’s authority; the existence of a certain degree of antagonism between the NABU and the Prosecutor General’s office (with publicly exchanged accusations of unlawful actions); the vulnerability of N. to pressure from the prosecution authorities and the unclear circumstances in which he had made his first statements which had been interpreted as incriminating the applicant; the striking difference between the initial amount allegedly paid for the applicant’s holidays, which had been leaked to the mass media , and the amount later given (namely EUR 16,000 versus EUR 250); the existence of that leak itself; and a public statement made by the Prosecutor considering the matter. Lastly, the way the judicial proceedings, undermined by serious shortcomings, had been conducted had not only failed to dissipate the already existing, by then serious suspicion of predominant ulterior motives behind the applicant’s prosecution, but had rather contributed to that suspicion. In conclusion, the Court found it sufficiently established that the authorities' overriding focus had not been to prevent corruption in the public service but rather to mount a personal attack on the applicant’s moral and professional integrity. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article   41: finding of a violation sufficient in respect of non-pecuniary damage; no claim in respect of pecuniary damage. (See Gillberg v.   Sweden [GC], 41723/06, 3   April 2012, Legal Summary )   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. To access legal summaries in English or French click here . For non-official translations into other languages click here .Citations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;CLIN;ENG
- Dispositif
- Satisfaction
- Date
- 24 avril 2025
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CEDH:002-14455
Données disponibles
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