CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 9 juillet 2025

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Russia [GC] - 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al. Judgment 9.7.2025 [GC] Article 1 Jurisdiction of States Responsibility of States Respondent State’s jurisdiction over areas in eastern Ukraine under separatist control and areas under control of Russian armed forces after 2022 invasion; for complaints concerning military attacks by separatists or the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory; for its authorities’ actions in Russian sovereign territory Article 33 Inter-State application Multiple, flagrant and unprecedented Convention violations in Ukraine resulting from the downing of flight MH17 and numerous administrative practices Article 46 Article 46-2 Execution of judgment Individual measures Respondent State, without delay, to release or safely return all persons deprived of their liberty in occupied territory and to cooperate in establishing a mechanism for the identification of all children transferred from Ukraine to Russia and Russian-controlled territory and their reunification with their families or legal guardians Facts – The case arises from events which began in the spring of 2014 with the occupation and annexation by Russia of Crimea, part of Ukrainian sovereign territory, and the appearance of pro-Russian separatist armed groups in eastern Ukraine who subsequently took control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared independence from Ukraine. The violence rapidly escalated, with separatist armed groups seizing public buildings and towns. The government of Ukraine launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” to re-establish control. The separatists held “referendums” in territory under separatist control and subsequently declared the independence of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”). The fighting intensified and on 17   July 2014 flight MH17 was downed in the Donetsk region, causing the deaths of all 298   civilians aboard, including 196   Dutch nationals. On 24   February 2022 Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian armed forces entered Ukrainian sovereign territory at various border points and launched attacks by land, air and sea. Ukrainian towns and cities in the north, south and east were subjected to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire causing large‑scale death, injury and destruction. Over the subsequent years, control over territory in Ukraine has shifted in the face of Russian advances and Ukrainian counter-offensives. Heavy fighting continues on multiple fronts. Russian aerial strikes continue across Ukraine. The case encompasses four inter-state applications. The first three applications (nos.   8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) concern complaints related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine involving the separatists from spring 2014. In its two applications, the Ukrainian Government pleaded an administrative practice by Russia of numerous Convention violations. The application lodged by the Dutch Government concerned alleged violations of Articles   2, 3 and 13 resulting from the downing of flight MH17. By a decision of 25   January 2023, the Grand Chamber declared the three applications partially admissible. On 17   February 2023 the Grand Chamber decided to join the fourth application (no.   11055/22) to the pending case. The application concerns the Ukraine Government’s complaints of further administrative practices committed by the Russian Federation following its full-scale invasion beginning on 24   February 2022. Law – (1) Preliminary observations and general findings – (a) Participation of the respondent State – The respondent State had not participated in the proceedings on the merits in respect of the first three applications or in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of the fourth application. Respecting the adversarial nature of and the need for equality of arms between the parties in the proceedings, the Court continued to engage in correspondence with the respondent Government in the normal manner. A respondent State’s failure or refusal to participate effectively in the proceedings was not in itself a reason for the Court to discontinue the examination of an application. The Court found that there was insufficient cause for the respondent Government’s failure to submit a memorial or to participate in the hearing. It thus decided to proceed with its examination of the case, finding that that was consistent with the proper administration of justice. (b) Terminology – Whether the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine amounted and amounts to an invasion, to an occupation and to an annexation was a matter of fact to be established on the evidence. The Court was satisfied, bearing in mind the ordinary meaning of the word “invasion”, that the entry of Russian armed forces into Ukrainian territory from 24   February 2022 in the circumstances outlined in its judgment had amounted to an invasion. Furthermore, to the extent that Ukrainian territory was found to be under the Russian Federation’s effective control for the purposes of that State’s jurisdiction under Article   1, the Court considered it appropriate to refer to such territory as occupied territory. Applying the definition of “annexation” by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem , the Court considered that any Ukrainian sovereign territory under the respondent State’s effective control which the latter had purported formally to integrate into the Russian Federation, and to which it had, accordingly, applied its own laws in the place of the applicable Ukrainian law, might be described as annexed territory. The terms “annexed” and “annexation”, where used by the Court in its judgment, did not imply any recognition of a transfer of sovereignty over the areas in question. The Court clarified that any description of the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine as an invasion, an occupation and an annexation was not intended to do more than describe the situation as it presented itself as a matter of fact and was without prejudice to any different assessment of the facts made by any other tribunal in separate legal proceedings. It did not reflect any evaluation of, or judgment as to, the legality or otherwise as a matter of international law more generally of the acts in question. (c) The third-party interveners – Thirty third-party interveners had provided written submissions to the Court, including twenty-six High Contracting Parties which was unprecedented. The intervention by twenty-six High Contracting Parties reflected their perception of the importance of the case to the Convention system as a whole. Their common submissions expressed not only their joint position on the specific legal issues arising in the case but also their shared view of the respondent State’s conduct in the light of the Council of Europe’s underlying aims and objectives. (d) The present conflict – The Court noted that the admissibility hearing had taken place against the backdrop of increasing tensions in the region and since then the nature of the conflict had substantially changed. As the Court deliberated on the case before it, the hostilities had continued on Ukrainian territory, with new deaths and extensive destruction every month. There had been widespread condemnation of the Russian Federation’s actions from the international community. The transformation from covert to openly acknowledged operations in Ukraine had brought transparency to the Russian Federation’s objectives in Ukraine which appeared to be no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State, through the forcible acquisition of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of any remaining Ukrainian nation to Russian influence and control. The Russian Federation had, moreover, not identified any clear limitations to its territorial ambitions, either in Ukraine or beyond and the potential for further escalation had frequently been invoked by senior Russian political figures. Although the Court had already examined applications arising out of situations of conflict in Europe, the events in Ukraine were unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The nature and scale of the violence as well as the ominous statements of the Respondent State’s President and other senior Government figures concerning Ukraine’s statehood, its independence and its very right to exist represented a threat to the peaceful co-existence that Europe had long taken for granted. The dangerous rhetoric had also on occasion been extended to encompass other Council of Europe member States, including Poland, Moldova and the Baltic countries. Those actions sought to undermine the very fabric of the democracy on which the Council of Europe and its member States were founded by their destruction of individual freedoms, their suppression of political liberties and their blatant disregard for the rule of law. In none of the conflicts previously before the Court had there been such near universal condemnation of the “flagrant” disregard by the respondent State for the foundations of the international legal order established after the Second World War and such clear measures taken by the Council of Europe to sanction the respondent State’s disrespect for the Council of Europe’s fundamental values: peace, human life, human dignity and the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention. The Court was not called upon to decide on the legality of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine in the abstract or the individual criminal responsibility of those implicated in the events, but rather to decide on the conformity of the respondent State’s actions with the fundamental guarantees contained in the Convention and its Protocols. (e) Temporal jurisdiction – The Court’s temporal jurisdiction did not extend further than 16   September 2022, when the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention. The Court could, however, have regard to facts which had occurred following the termination date in so far as it considered appropriate in its assessment of whether there had been a violation of the Convention in respect of acts which occurred prior to 16   September 2022. (f) Approach to the evidence – The Court applied the approach to the evidence, to the burden and standard of proof and to the drawing of inferences outlined in its admissibility decision with one exception: since the Court was examining the merits of the alleged violations, the applicable standard of proof to be satisfied was that of “beyond reasonable doubt”. (g) Relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law – The applicant Governments and third-party interveners had invited the Court to clarify its approach to the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions in situations of armed conflict and the relevance in that respect of IHL provisions, particularly in circumstances like those in the present case where no derogation under Article   15 of the Convention had been lodged. In that respect the Court confirmed its duty to interpret the Convention in the light of the rules set out in Article   31 §   3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and so far as possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed part, including IHL. In particular, in the context of international armed conflict the specific IHL provisions did not displace Convention human rights guarantees but were used as an interpretative tool when determining the scope of those guarantees; the safeguards under the Convention continued to apply. In examining the alleged violations of specific Convention Articles against the backdrop of international armed conflict, the Court observed that it would have regard to the relevant IHL provisions, interpret IHL and where necessary for it to carry out its role, assess the respondent State’s compliance with IHL provisions. In its admissibility decision, the Court had acknowledged that a harmonious interpretation of Convention provisions with relevant IHL provisions might not be possible in the absence of a derogation under Article   15, since the provisions might be in conflict with one another, as regards the Article   2 complaints advanced by the applicant Governments. It would address whether such conflict arose on the facts of the present case in the context of those complaints. (2) Jurisdiction and attribution – Article   1 ( complaints in respect of which jurisdiction now falls to be determined) : (a) Continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the basis of effective control – Given the absence of any information to suggest a decrease in the level of control exercised by the respondent State over the “DPR” and the “LPR” since the hearing on admissibility on 26   January 2022, and the formalisation of the control already exercised by it through the purported “accession” of those two territories to the Russian Federation and the retroactive application of Russian criminal law to the territories and assimilation of “DPR” and “LPR” interests to those of the Russian Federation itself, the Court found that those areas continued to be under the respondent State’s effective control throughout the period falling within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (i.e., until 16   September 2022). (b) Jurisdiction in respect of the complaints in application no. 11055/22 – The complaints concerning the Russian authorities’ actions on Russian sovereign territory, in respect of filtration processes and the transfer and adoption of children, clearly fell within Russia’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article   1. In so far as the complaints concerned the respondent State’s actions in areas in the hands of the Russian armed forces after the 2022 invasion, it was clear from the evidence and the speed and scale of the Russian advance, that the respondent State’s military presence in Ukraine was substantial. As a result, Russian armed forces had taken control of areas of Ukraine. The fact that some of the territory in question had been later recovered by Ukraine during successful counter-offensives did not undermine that conclusion. By virtue of the control exercised over the territory concerned by the Russian armed forces, the Court held that Russia exercised effective control over such territory and thus had jurisdiction for the purposes of Article   1 for any period during which such areas had remained under the control of its armed forces, up until 16   September 2022. (c) Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks between 2014 and 2022 – In its admissibility decision the Court had joined to the merits the respondent Government’s objection as to whether the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints of administrative practices of bombing and shelling in violation of Article   2 and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1, together with associated Article   14 complaints, fell within the respondent State’s Article   1 jurisdiction. With the joining of application no.   11055/22, the Court also had to examine the military attacks referred to in that application. The reality of the extensive, strategically planned military attacks perpetrated by Russian forces across Ukrainian sovereign territory between 2014 and 2022, carried out with the deliberate intention and indisputable effect of assuming authority and control, falling short of effective control, over areas, infrastructure and people in Ukraine, was wholly at odds with any notion of chaos. In planning and in executing, directly or via the armed forces of the “DPR” and “LPR”, its military attacks across Ukrainian territory with a view to acquiring and retaining effective control over areas of sovereign Ukrainian territory and thereby removing those areas from the effective control of Ukraine, the Russian Federation had assumed a degree of responsibility over those individuals affected by its attack. In those circumstances, the Russian Federation exercised, through its de jure and de facto armed forces, authority and control over individuals affected by its military attacks up until 16 September 2022. Such individuals therefore fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1. It followed that the Russian Federation was under an obligation pursuant to that provision to secure to individuals affected by its military attacks the Convention rights and freedoms relevant to their situation. (d) Attribution – Acts and omissions of the Russian military were acts of Russian State organs and were plainly attributable to the respondent State. In its admissibility decision, the Court had already explained that the acts and omissions of separatists in the areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation had been attributable to that State. It was right to equate the separatists with de facto organs of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of Article   4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Any other solution would allow States to avoid their Convention obligations by choosing to act through entities whose supposed independence was purely fictitious. Conclusion : jurisdiction established (unanimously); preliminary objection concerning military attacks dismissed (unanimously). (3) Downing of Flight MH17 – (a) Article   2 (substantive limb): The Court agreed that the evidence suggested that the missile had been intentionally fired at flight MH17, most likely in the mistaken belief that it had been a military aircraft but in the full knowledge that the deaths of all those on board would be the inevitable outcome. Based on the evidence gathered by the international joint investigation team (“JIT”), and in the absence of any information from the Russian Federation, the only reasonable conclusion was that the missile had been fired by a member of the Russian military crew of the Buk-TELAR or by a member of the “DPR”. It was not necessary for the Court to determine exactly who had fired the missile since acts of the Russian armed forces and of the armed separatists had been attributable to the Russian Federation. The Court accepted that a Buk-TELAR acting alone could not distinguish between military and civilian aircraft. Deploying a Buk-TELAR in isolation, without the remaining units of the Buk missile system and in particular without a Buk-TAR, and without other measures capable of accurately identifying military targets, would constitute a violation of IHL. The Court inferred from the evidence and from the absence of any information from the Russian Federation that no other measures had been taken to ensure the accurate verification of the target of the Buk-TELAR in breach of the IHL principles of distinction and precautions. The attack had accordingly been an indiscriminate attack prohibited under IHL and thus did not constitute a lawful act of war. Accordingly, there was no potential conflict arising from the absence in Article 2 § 2 itself of any accommodation of deaths which were compatible with IHL. Furthermore, the intentional use of force leading to the deprivation of the lives of the civilians on board the flight could not, be justified under any of the grounds listed in Article   2 §   2. Moreover, the Russian Federation, in addition to its negative obligation, had also violated the positive obligation inherent in Article   2 by failing to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those on board the flight. The Buk-TELAR had been deployed in an area where civilian flights had still been operating. A Buk missile had significant destructive power and the chances that the occupants of an aircraft struck by such a missile would survive an attack had been nil. In those exceptional circumstances, the Russian authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the lives of all civilians present in civilian aircraft flying over the area. An obligation to take measures to avoid that risk accordingly arose. The applicant Dutch Government had pointed to a number of administrative measures which could have significantly reduced or even eliminated the risk posed by the Buk-TELAR to civilians travelling in civilian aircraft over eastern Ukraine. The respondent State, however, had not provided an explanation for why none of these measures had been taken. The measures proposed represented the very minimum steps to be expected of a State deploying such a destructive weapon in those circumstances. The respondent State’s failure to take any steps had been representative of a cavalier attitude to the lives of civilians at risk from its hostile activities in eastern Ukraine. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (b) Article   2 (procedural limb): The Court held that the respondent State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the downing of flight MH17. Any inquiries made by its authorities had been piecemeal, focusing on certain aspects of the incident ostensibly with a view to showing the lack of any Russian involvement and deflecting responsibility onto Ukraine. Those inquiries, which had not complied with the requirement of independence, had regularly resulted in the disclosure of information which had later been shown to have been at best inaccurate and at worst a complete fabrication. The next of kin of those killed had not been involved in any inquiries undertaken by the Russian authorities and had not been directly informed of the outcome. The inquiries had not been capable of leading to the establishment of the facts or the identification and punishment of those responsible. Furthermore, the Russian authorities had failed to cooperate effectively with the JIT investigators and had failed to adequately respond to or execute legal assistance requests. The evidence from the JIT provided clear examples of the respondent State’s obstructive approach to attempts to elucidate the cause and circumstances of the crash. The inaccurate revelations and disclosures of the Russian Ministry of Defence had been directed at contradicting and undermining what the JIT investigation had revealed, deliberately setting false trails and wasting JIT time and resources. The failure to cooperate had had a material impact on the JIT’s ability to conclude its investigation into the involvement of the Russian armed forces and senior Russian politicians in the downing of the flight. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (c) Article   13 in conjunction with Article   2: The respondent State’s continued blanket denial of involvement in the downing of flight MH17 and refusal to provide information for scrutiny, had made it impossible for the full truth to be established by any independent fact-finding body. Consequently, any suggestion that the elucidation of the facts might be achieved and the liability of Russian State officials established in civil proceedings in Russia could only be described as fanciful. In those circumstances, there was no evidence that the victims’ relatives would have access to effective remedies in the Russian Federation capable of establishing the liability of State officials and awarding compensation. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (d) Article   3 (substantive): In its admissibility decision, the Court had joined to the merits the question whether the alleged suffering of the relatives of victims of the downing of flight MH17 had attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article   3. The Court had no doubt that the crash victims’ next of kin had experienced, and continued to experience, profound grief and distress on account of the killing of their loved ones and the aftermath of the crash. According to the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists, the nature of the deaths of the victims had caused the next of kin profound grief of a traumatic nature which had gone beyond that inevitably experienced in the case of the loss of a relative. Although the next of kin had not witnessed the downing of the aircraft or the crash site directly, they had not been able to avoid seeing the footage of the crash site and the bodies of their relatives shown very widely in the media. They had been forced to witness the gruesome images of the bodies of their relatives being treated with little respect at the crash site. The respondent Government had not responded positively to the international community’s requests to ensure that the fighting ceased so that adequate measures could be taken to secure the crash site to recover the bodies in a timely and appropriate manner. As a result of the limited access to the crash site, it had taken eight months to complete the recovery of the bodies which throughout that period had remained out in the open. In those circumstances, together with the general lawlessness prevailing in the area of the crash site, the next of kin had experience a strong sense of powerlessness and anxiety. Some next of kin had been required to identify what remained of the bodies of their relatives in circumstances where the condition of the body had rendered the task even more distressing and some had to bury the incomplete bodies of their relatives; in some cases, further body parts had been returned to them after the burial had taken place. In two cases, the bodies had still not been recovered. The next of kin had participated in the JIT investigation and had reached to the Russian authorities and the Russian President himself in a bid to obtain crucial information concerning the downing of the flight. The respondent State’s failure to carry out an effective investigation and their failure to cooperate with the JIT had significantly aggravated the suffering of the next of kin by prolonging the agonising wait for answers. It had left the relatives in a state of uncertainty as the exact circumstances of the downing of the flight and the responsibility of senior figures in the Russian Government. For those reasons, the Court concluded that the continuing profound suffering of the next of kin of the victims of the downing of flight MH17 had a character and dimension that attained a level of severity amounting to inhuman treatment under Article   3. Conclusion : violation (unanimously); preliminary objection dismissed (unanimously). (4) Admissibility of Application no.   11055/22 – The respondent Government had not taken part in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of this application and had not made any submissions on its admissibility. The Court found that the majority of the complaints made in the application did not as such amount to new complaints but were a continuation of the complaints made in previous applications and already declared admissible s. Most of the new complaints of administrative practices were declared admissible: – Article   3: causing of suffering exceeding the minimum level of severity through unlawful military attacks and abductions and forced disappearances; – Article   8: forced displacement and transfer of civilians, involuntary displacement of civilians and prevention of their return home, the application of filtration measures, the destruction of homes and personal possessions and the theft and pillage of personal possessions; – Article   11: unlawful interference with the peaceful right to protest; – Article   2 of Protocol No.   1: failure to ensure a right of access to educational facilities and indoctrination of students; – Article   14 in conjunction with the above Articles in respect of the above complaints; – Article   13 in conjunction with Articles   2, 3, 4 §   2, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Articles   1 and   2 of Protocol No.   1 and Article   2 of Protocol No.   4. Conclusion : admissible (unanimously); remainder of new complaints inadmissible (unanimously). (5) Administrative practices – (a) Identification of the administrative practices alleged – The Court examined the allegation of unlawful military attacks in the context of the conduct of hostilities, in respect of which the applicant Ukrainian Government had pleaded a number of Convention Articles, as a single thematic complaint. Such attacks had not taken place in occupied territory and it was therefore appropriate to address them separately from allegations concerning the conduct of Russian agents in occupied areas. Similarly, it examined separately the allegation of the abduction and transfer to Russia of Ukrainian children which concerned a particular course of conduct alleged to engage a number of Convention rights and had occurred in both occupied Ukrainian territory and Russian sovereign territory. As to the remaining complaints the Court examined each Convention right one by one. (b) Approach to the evidence for administrative practices and overall conclusions – The Court acknowledged that, given the overall context and the alleged pattern of violations, direct evidence of the alleged events might be difficult to come by, in view of the repeated restrictions on monitoring in occupied territory, witnesses’ or victims’ fear of retaliation or persecution for speaking out, and the fact that many of them could only share their accounts years later (after their release, in the case of detainees, or after Ukraine had reacquired control over occupied territory, for example). The Court therefore was satisfied that it could draw relevant inferences when assessing the evidence before it. The Court relied in particular on primary evidence from the monitoring missions of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (the OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the OSCE) and from fact-finding bodies such as the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and OSCE Moscow mechanism experts. On the basis of that evidence and the extensive additional evidence before it, the Court concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the reported incidents had been sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system of violations constituting repetition of acts. Moreover, reports commented on the prevailing climate of impunity and general lawlessness in eastern Ukraine from 2014 and the lack of legitimate and effective judicial services. The reports of the UN Commission of Inquiry showed starkly the huge scale of the grave violations of human rights perpetrated by Russia across Ukrainian territory following the 2022 invasion. It was inconceivable that the higher authorities of the Russian Government could have been unaware of such practices over more than eight years. The evidence attested to the erosion of the rule of law in the areas under the control of the Russian forces and the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the areas under their control or affected by their military attacks. Moreover, many of the measures had been of a regulatory nature. The unprecedented abuses described in the judgment could not have been carried out without the direct authorisation, encouragement and support of the higher authorities. Accordingly, the Court found it proven beyond reasonable doubt that the repetition of acts in violation of the Convention had been officially tolerated by the Russian authorities. In respect of many of the alleged violations, the Court highlighted the absence of any basis in law for the actions taken. The respondent Government had failed to provide the necessary information to enable the Court to conclude that any legal acts adopted by the “DPR” and the “LPR” might be accepted as “law” for the purposes of its assessment of alleged Convention violations. Moreover, the conditions required for Russian law or measures taken by the occupying authorities to be recognised as providing a valid legal basis, for Convention purposes, for acts undertaken in Ukraine had not been met. Taken as a whole, the evidence presented a picture of interconnected practices of manifestly unlawful conduct by agents of the respondent State on a massive scale. The Court also underlined, as regards the qualified rights in the Convention, that there was no evidence of any constraints applied to agents of the Russian Federation in the exercise of the functions carried out by them on behalf of the respondent State. Extensive human rights violations had been committed on a huge scale not only without sanction but frequently as part of a far-reaching administrative system put in place by the respondent State’s authorities without any apparent safeguards whatsoever. It was, therefore, important to record that the evidence overwhelmingly showed conduct by the respondent State’s agents that, as well as being unlawful, had clearly been disproportionate to any aims that might be considered legitimate under the qualified rights in the Convention. (c) Specific findings of administrative practices – (i) Articles   2 and 3 (substantive), and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 (administrative practice of military attacks against civilians and civilian objects in the period between 11   May 2014 and 16   September 2022); and Article   8 from 24   February 2022): The evidence showed the use of heavy weaponry since the start of the conflict in 2014 and the frequent use of explosive weapons, cluster munitions, unguided rockets and multiple unguided bombs in populated areas. Military attacks by the separatists across the contact line had continued almost uninterrupted for the following seven and a half years with almost daily exchanges of fire with skirmishes and local escalations on a regular basis and periods of particularly active hostilities, such as the heavy shelling of populated areas. From 24 February 2022 the scale and territorial reach of the military attacks launched by the respondent State had escalated sharply with the almost total devastation of cities like Mariupol and Izium by the Russian armed forces. It was clear from the relevant reports that from that date, the respondent State’s armed forces, including “DPR” and “LPR” separatists, had conducted an intense, sustained and widespread campaign of military attacks. Those attacks had killed and injured thousands of civilians and damaged and destroyed civilian objects, including homes, hospitals, schools, commercial property and essential infrastructure and buildings sheltering civilians and clearly marked as such, on a massive scale. There was ample evidence of the extensive shelling of civilian areas in the absence of any immediately identifiable military targets. There was no doubt as to the scale of the deaths, injury and damage to property which had been caused over the more than eight years of military attacks under examination. The Court had not been provided with figures for the number of civilians killed and injured as a result of military attacks by the respondent State prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The OHCHR had recorded a total of 3,405   conflict-related civilian deaths and the number of injured civilians had been estimated to exceed 7,000. The OHCHR had a further recorded a further 6,306   civilian deaths and 9,602   wounded between the start of the full-scale invasion and 17   October 2022. The Court emphasised that those figures were based on verified fatalities and casualties. The actual number of civilians killed and injured because of military attacks were likely to be considerably higher. Accordingly, Article   2 was applicable in respect of the military attacks conducted in breach of IHL by the respondent State between May 2014 and 16   September 2022. That was the case irrespective of whether such attacks had resulted in death or injury: the very nature of the conduct, involving indiscriminate and disproportionate military attacks and also attacks directed at residential areas and civilian infrastructure, had been such as to put civilian lives at risk. Those deadly attacks could not be justified under Article   2 §   2. The Court also found that the intense and sustained military attacks on Ukrainian sovereign territory by the respondent State between 24   February 2022 and 16   September 2022 and their widespread failure to respect IHL provisions had inevitably created fear and terror among the civilian population in Ukraine. Survivors of attacks had been left physically scarred and psychologically traumatised. Those in besieged cities had been forced to shelter for weeks or months in dire conditions. The level of suffering met the minimum level of severity for the purposes of Article   3 and the military attacks amounted to inhuman treatment of civilians. The above findings under Articles   2 and 3 also applied to military attacks on cities, notably in Mariupol, Izium and Chernihiv, which had amounted to a siege. However, in addition to violating its negative obligations, the Court found that the respondent State had also violated its positive obligations under those provisions by failing to take the necessary measures to protect civilian lives and well-being when conducting sieges between 24   February 2022 and 16   September 2022. The respondent State had been under an obligation to ensure adequate supplies of water, food and heat for settlements under siege as well as access to medical assistance and humanitarian corridors for the safe evacuation of the civilian population. However, the relevant reports revealed a complete disregard for the lives and well-being of civilians in besieged areas and there was no evidence of any such measures having been taken. It was also plain from the evidence that the military attacks in breach of IHL had caused enormous damage to private property in Ukraine, including homes and personal possessions, commercial and business property and privately-owned energy, transport and medical facilities. It could not be said that that serious interference with the right to respect for homes and with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions had been in accordance with the law, pursued a public or general interest permitted by Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention or had been necessary and proportionate. Conclusion : violation (unanimously); Articles   2, 3, and Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 (from 11   May 2014 to 16   September 2022); Article   8 (from 24   February 2022 to 16   September 2022). (ii) Article   2 (substantive) (administrative practice of extrajudicial killings in occupied territory from 11   May 2014 to 16   September 2022): There was overwhelming evidence that demonstrated beyond any doubt that from the very outset of the conflict the armed separatists, and later Russian armed forces, had killed civilians who had quite clearly not been participating in the hostilities and Ukrainian soldiers who had indisputably been detained, unarmed and hors de combat. There was evidence of summary executions, deaths due to the use of force not in the immediate vicinity of hostilities, and deaths during detention. There was also a great deal of evidence as to the conduct of the Russian armed forces during their occupation of areas of Ukraine after 24   February 2022, in particular the frequent recourse to lethal violence against civilians and Ukrainian soldiers who had been hors de combat . There was evidence of the large-scale murder of civilians perpetrated in occupied territory in the immediate aftermath of the arrival in those areas of Russian armed forces and the unprovoked shooting of civilians, including children, seeking to flee hostilities in areas under Russian control. The Court reiterated that the protection of civilians and military personnel hors de combat was a fundamental principle of IHL and found that the use of lethal force had not been justified under IHL. The killings could also not be justified by reference to the exceptions listed in Article   2 §   2. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (iii) Article   3 (substantive) (torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in occupied territory from 11   May 2014 to 16   September 2022): The evidence showed that from the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the armed separatists had used violence against detainees, both civilian and military, in areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation. There had been regular reports of incidents of violence across “DPR” and “LPR” territory in the context of abductions, deprivations of liberty, interrogations and forced entry between 11   May 2014 and 24   February 2022. A network of places existed of deprivation of liberty where people had been tortured and ill-treated and subjected to inhuman conditions of detention. After the 2022 invasion, the evidence showed a significant increase in the scale and in the gravity of acts of ill-treatment. The nature of the violence inflicted had been set out in details in reports before the Court and included beatings, forced nudity and intimate searches conducted during filtration and in detention places; mock executions; cutting off of body parts; electric shocks; use of prolonged stress positions in detention; exposure to extreme temperatures and forcing prisoners of war (“POWs”) to ingest their insignia. The evidence also showed that detainees had been forced to witness the severe beatings or summary executions of others. There was evidence of a widespread and systemic use of sexual violence by armed separatists and Russian troops, in respect of men and women, old and young, from the outset of the conflict, which had escalated after the 2022 invasion. Rapes had been committed at gunpoint, with extreme brutality and accompanied by acts of torture, such as beatings, strangling or electric shocks. Women and men had often been subjected to sexual violence and rape in detention. There was also extensive evidence of rape outside classical situations of detention. Some victims had been gang-raped, others subjected to sexual slavery over long periods. Family members who had tried to intervene to stop the attacks had been killed. Civilians and POWs had been subjected to repeated threats of violence, including threats of summary execution. The perpetrators had threatened to harm the victims’ close family members, including threatening to rape their children. Those threats had been made in a context where many of the victims had witnessed sexual violence or summary execution being perpetrated on others, with no regard for the age or vulnerabilities of victims. In the face of the overwhelming evidence, the Court found it indisputable that there were multiple, repeated instances of the ill-treatment of civilians and POWs. There was a pattern of treatment, encompassing the practices described, that amounted to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering and involving the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering with the aim, inter alia , of obtaining information, inflicting punishment and intimidating and humiliating victims. The prevalence of sexual violence and rape by Russian soldiers in occupied territory was especially abhorrent. It was persuaded that sexual violence and rape had been deployed in Ukraine following the 2022 invasion as part of a military strategy to dehumanise, humiliate and break the morale of the Ukrainian population, as individuals and as a community, and to assert dominance over Ukrainian sovereign territory. The sexual assaults and rape of civilians in communities across occupied territory in Ukraine, had been carried out within an overall context of lawlessness and with complete impunity, leaving women and men powerless to protect themselves and their families and living in fear. The systematic rape of women as a weapon of war was an act of extreme atrocity that amounted to torture. Overall, the pattern of ill-treatment of civilians and POWs in occupied areas of Ukraine between 11   May 2014 and 16   September 2022 had amounted to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. There was also ample evidence for the same period of civilians and POWs being held in inadequate detention conditions, in blatant contravention of the applicable IHL provisions, which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Finally, abductions and disappearances after 24   February 2022 had occurred in a context of mass arbitrary detentions and systematic and horrific abuse, with no possibility for the relatives to seek information or obtain an investigation. The Court found that flagrant, continuous and callous disregard of the obligation to account for the whereabouts and fate of missing relatives had caused suffering which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (iv) Article   4 §   2 (administrative practice of forced labour in occupied territory from 11   May 2014 to 16   September 2022): The evidence of alleged forced labour had arisen almost exclusively in the context of detention by armed separatists or Russian armed forces. Although Article   4 §   3 excluded from the definition of “forced labour” any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article   5, the Court found that that exception to the Article   4 §   2 prohibition of forced labour was inapplicable in the present case in the light of the widespread context of unlawful arrest and detention in breach of Article   5 in which those instances of alleged forced labour had occurred. There had been credible reports of the separatists forcing detained Ukrainian soldiers and civilians to work from the early days of the conflict. They had been forced to carry out reconstruction and maintenance duties, to dig trenches, load and unload ammunition and engage in demining work. Tasks closely linked to the hostilities appeared t incompatible with IHL and demining work amounted to dangerous labour which was proscribed by IHL. Detainees had also been coerced or obliged to join the separatist forces and, later, the Russian armed forces to fight at the front lines. Shortly before the start of the 2022 invasion, the “DPR” and the “LPR” authorities had ordered the “general mobilisation” requiring all men between the ages of 18 and 55 to enlist in the separatist armed forces. Forcing civilians in occupied territory or POWs to serve in the forces of a hostile power was strictly prohibited by IHL. There was no evidence that the forced labour had been justified under IHL. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). (v) Article   5 (administrative practice of unlawful and arbitrary detention in occupied territory from 11   May 2014 to 16   September 2022): There was comprehensive and detailed evidence as to the prevalence of abductions, kidnappings, arrests and detention across occupied areas of Ukraine in a general climate of fear and impunity. Journalists, religious leaders, Ukrainian civil servants, activists and those holding pro-Ukrainian unity views had been particularly targeted. The Court noted in particular the practice of administrative or preventive arrest widely employed in the “DPR” and the “LPR”. Those practices had been purportedly authorized for certain periods by legal instruments of the separatist entities but had also occurred in the absence of any purported legal framework. Countless civilians had been detained between 2014 and 2022. Following the 2022 invasion Russian armed forces had unlawfully confined large numbers of civilians in areas under their control. Victims had included local authority personnel, government personnel, veterans of the Ukrainian armed forces, volunteers evacuating civilians and civilians arrested for reasons which had not been apparent and without any review from a judicial or administrative body. Detainees had frequently not been informed of the reasons for their detention. The evidence also revealed that a process of filtration had been implemented across occupied territory to screen individuals seeking to leave besieged cities or other dangerous areas, including areas of military operations, for connections with or allegiance to the Ukrainian administration. That had often resulted in further screening at “filtration camps” and the detention of civilians on