CEDHCASELAW;CLIN;ENG
CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 14 octobre 2025
- ECLI
- ECLI:CEDH:002-14565
- Date
- 14 octobre 2025
- Publication
- 14 octobre 2025
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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Solution
source officielleViolation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Disciplinary proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal)
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Greece - 42514/16 Judgment 14.10.2025 [Section III] Article 6 Disciplinary proceedings Article 6-1 Impartial tribunal Independent tribunal Lack of impartiality guarantee in disciplinary proceedings by the President of the Court of Cassation against a prosecutor, after she had conducted the preliminary disciplinary investigation and examined the prosecutor’s recusal request against her: violation Facts – In March 2016, V.T., the then President of the Court of Cassation (“the CC”), opened a preliminary disciplinary investigation against the applicant, a prosecutor, due to concern expressed by the Cypriot Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General as regards the applicant’s decision to close criminal investigations into a criminal fraud case involving Greek and Cypriot individuals. The applicant subsequently submitted a report to the Prosecutor at the CC requesting that a preliminary investigation be launched, including into the fact that the deputy Minister of Justice had referred to the pending disciplinary proceedings against her in a speech before Parliament, even though the proceedings were confidential. She also submitted her written defence to V.T. as well as a recusal request arguing that V.T. had previously been involved in the case and, therefore, could not be impartial. The applicant alleged that V.T., in her previous capacity as interim prime minister in 2015, had provided the deputy Minister of Justice with confidential information about the disciplinary proceedings and had developed special relations with the Cypriot officials who had written to her about the applicant’s actions. Lastly, she alleged that V.T. had failed to remain impartial because she had addressed questions to her and to the witnesses in a prejudicial manner and had given her an incomplete file. In April 2016 V.T. referred the case to a Vice-President of the CC so that the latter could pursue the preliminary investigation, stating that the recusal request constituted an abuse of process, that the reasons relied on had been unfounded and that the applicant’s objective had been to delay the proceedings. She also issued an official press release as President of the CC stating that she was “fighting big, interconnected interests”, referring to the pending disciplinary proceedings, mentioning the applicant by name, analysing the merits of the recusal request based on the case-law of the CC and reiterating that the request was “unfounded” and an “abuse of process”. The press release was republished in part in a newspaper article. The applicant complained to the Vice-President of the CC about the press release. In May 2016 the Vice-President of the CC concluded the preliminary investigation and proposed, on the basis of the evidence collected by V.T. and the applicant’s written defence, that V.T. bring a disciplinary action against the applicant. Noting that V.T. had dismissed the recusal request as an abuse of process, the Vice-President declared it inadmissible for lack of standing. In June 2016 V.T. brought a disciplinary action against the applicant and referred her to the seven-member disciplinary council of the CC. As regards the applicant’s recusal request, V.T. stated that it was inadmissible, as it had not been lodged with the Prosecutor of the CC. In October 2016 the council found that the recusal request was inadmissible and dismissed the applicant’s objections that the disciplinary action was invalid. It found the applicant had committed acts entailing serious negligence, which had damaged the prestige of the judiciary, and sentenced her to sixty days of salary deprivation. In March 2017 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the nine-member disciplinary council of the CC. It found that V.T. had not dismissed the applicant’s recusal request but had merely referred the case to the Vice-President of the CC. It also found that, in any event, the request was unfounded noting inter alia , that the applicant’s allegations regarding V.T.’s previous functions as interim prime minister did not amount to a valid ground for recusal. It further found that the applicant’s allegation that V.T. had leaked information regarding the proceedings was unsubstantiated. Law – Article   6 §   1: (1) Applicability – The Court found that Article   6 was not applicable under its criminal limb but under its civil one. The disciplinary councils of the CC, albeit outside the standard judicial structure of the civil and criminal courts, were established by law and decided disciplinary matters within their competence. The councils adopted decisions on disciplinary actions having the power to find the interested party guilty or not guilty of an offence and to decide on the appropriate sanction on the basis of the applicable legal provisions; they established the facts and their legal characterisation after freely assessing the evidence. The persons subject to disciplinary proceedings could, with legal assistance, present their written defence and appear in person to present their defence orally, submit their own evidence, including calling witnesses, and had full knowledge of the case file. The councils were composed, exclusively, of judges of the CC selected randomly each year by lot and benefitting from guarantees of institutional independence, notably immovability. If there was a doubt about the impartiality of a judge sitting in those councils, domestic law provided for the possibility of the judge’s withdrawal or of a recusal request. Accordingly, the Court considered that the disciplinary councils, should be regarded as a tribunal having full jurisdiction in the determination of disciplinary responsibility in proceedings to which the guarantees of Article   6 applied. Conclusion : Article   6 §   1 applicable under its civil limb. (2) Merits – The Court considered it appropriate to examine the issue of impartiality from the objective standpoint and as the disciplinary councils constituted a “tribunal” with full jurisdiction over the matter, it limited its examination to the issue of fairness of the proceedings before those bodies. The domestic law, as in force at the material time, had provided that the President of the CC could bring disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors by conducting a preliminary investigation and bringing a disciplinary action. That power was removed in 2021 after amendments to the law. V.T. had conducted the pre-trial phase of the impugned disciplinary proceedings and, following the lodging of disciplinary action, the proceedings had continued before the disciplinary councils, in which V.T. had not sat. The Court noted with concern that although under domestic law disciplinary investigations were secret, V.T. had issued an official press release during the preliminary disciplinary investigation. At the time she had not only been the president of the court hearing the applicant’s disciplinary case but as President of the CC she had embodied, par excellence , the highest authority within the civil and criminal courts. The President of the CC had the general supervision and control of all judges and a central role in the careers of civil and criminal judges, being the president of the Supreme Judicial Council, a body deciding on promotions, assignments, transfers and secondments of judges and prosecutors. Furthermore, contrary to ordinary judges, the President of the CC was selected by a decision of the Council of Ministers from among the serving judges of the CC and was eligible for the office of interim prime minister in the context of a caretaker government. Furthermore, V.T. had been well known to the public, notably on account of her previous functions as interim prime minister. Therefore, on account of her position, V.T. should have been particularly cautious not to create the impression that she had wished to influence the outcome of the proceedings. The Court observed that while a party to proceedings such as prosecutors could not be bound by the same obligations of independence and impartiality that Article 6 imposed on a “tribunal”, that approach had to be nuanced in the present case where the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against a member of the judiciary. Since the prospect of opening a disciplinary investigation against members of the judiciary was liable to exert pressure on the latter, it was essential that those vested with the authority to conduct disciplinary investigations and bring disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary should act objectively and impartially in discharging such duties. That applied in particular to a judicial body which had the power to propose to another judicial body the initiation of disciplinary proceedings with a view to the imposition of disciplinary penalties on members of the judiciary. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupied among State bodies in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, the Court had to be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary against measures affecting their status or career that could threaten their judicial independence and autonomy. It therefore found that V.T. had had the obligation to act objectively and impartially when conducting the preliminary investigation and bringing the disciplinary proceedings against a member of the judiciary benefiting from guarantees of independence. That obligation had been even more important as the applicant had argued in her recusal request that V.T. had had a relationship with a member of the executive branch in connection with her previous functions as interim prime minister. The applicant had explicitly complained of the press release in the investigation phase and of unjustified negative publicity during the hearing. However, the nine-member disciplinary council had not made any mention of that public statement, while rejecting as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegation that V.T. had leaked information on the confidential disciplinary investigation. It had dismissed her recusal request with a reasoning similar to that of the press release. Accordingly, it had failed to address the impact of the official press release issued by V.T. in her capacity as President of the CC directly in the context of the disciplinary proceedings on the fairness of the impugned proceedings. In view of its content and the manner in which it had been made, V.T.’s statement had been ipso facto incompatible with the notion of an “independent and impartial tribunal”, it being understood that what was at stake was not actual proof of influence or pressure on judges but the importance of the appearance of impartiality. Accordingly, and drawing attention to the singular context of the case, the Court found that the applicant’s concerns as to the impartiality of the courts that had heard her case had not been unreasonable, subjective or unjustified. The particularities of the impugned proceedings therefore had failed to meet the required Convention standard under the objective impartiality test. Conclusion : violation (by six votes to one). Article   41: no claim in respect of damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. To access legal summaries in English or French click here . For non-official translations into other languages click here .Citations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;CLIN;ENG
- Date
- 14 octobre 2025
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CEDH:002-14565
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- Texte intégral
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