CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 21 février 2008

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 105 February 2008 Alexandridis v. Greece - 19516/06 Judgment 21.2.2008 [Section I] Article 9 Article 9-1 Manifest religion or belief Applicant being sworn in as a lawyer forced to disclose that he was not a member of the Orthodox Church and did not wish to take a religious oath: violation   Facts : The applicant, who was admitted to practise as a lawyer at a court of first instance, had to take an oath of office. Under the relevant domestic legislation, this entailed in principle taking a religious oath. In order to be allowed to make a solemn declaration, the applicant was obliged to declare that he was an atheist or that his religion did not permit him to take an oath. The applicant alleged that, in accordance with usual practice, the court secretariat had provided him with a form containing a standard text. At a public hearing he had given the form, duly completed, to the president of the court. When the latter had asked him to place his right hand on the Bible in order to take the oath, he had informed her that he was not an Orthodox Christian and therefore wanted to make a solemn declaration, which he had been allowed to do. The Greek Government, meanwhile, stated that, instead of going to the court secretariat, the applicant had approached the president of the court directly and sought permission to make a solemn declaration. The president had granted the request. The applicant had subsequently gone to the secretariat of the court. There were two different forms, one for the religious oath and the other for a solemn declaration; the applicant had not asked for the correct form and had filled out the form used for the religious oath. In their observations in reply to those of the applicant, the Government mentioned that the applicant had indeed taken the form for religious oaths with him when he appeared before the president of the court, but had then requested permission to make a solemn declaration. He had made no attempt to have the document rectified subsequently. Law : The Court observed that the Government had presented two versions of the facts that were inconsistent with each other, and that none of the documents showed that the applicant had failed to follow the proper procedure for taking the oath. Moreover, the record of the hearing, the only official document drawn up following the proceedings in question, corroborated the applicant’s version of events. In the instant case the procedure for taking oaths reflected a presumption that lawyers going before the court were Orthodox Christians and wished to take the religious oath. Hence, when the applicant went before the court, he had been obliged to declare that he was not an Orthodox Christian and, hence, to reveal in part his religious beliefs in order to be allowed to make a solemn declaration. The freedom to manifest one’s beliefs also contained a negative aspect, namely the individual’s right not to manifest his or her religion or religious beliefs and not to be obliged to act in such a way as to enable conclusions to be drawn as to whether he or she held – or did not hold – such beliefs. The State authorities did not have the right to intervene in the sphere of individual conscience and to ascertain individuals’ religious beliefs or oblige them to reveal their beliefs concerning spiritual matters. This was all the more true in cases where a person was obliged to take such action with a view to performing certain duties, in particular when taking an oath of office. The fact that the record of the hearing, which was the only official document certifying that the oath had been taken, stated that the applicant had sworn a religious oath, contrary to his beliefs, suggested that lawyers taking the oath were considered in principle to be Orthodox Christians. While the Government contended that two forms had existed, one for religious oaths and the other for solemn declarations, the Court was unable to conclude from the evidence produced that two forms had existed at the material time. In conclusion, the fact that the applicant had had to reveal to the court that he was not an Orthodox Christian and that he wanted to make a solemn declaration rather than take the religious oath, had interfered with his freedom not to have to manifest his religious beliefs. Conclusion: violation of Article 9 (unanimously). The Court also found a violation of Article 13 (unanimously). Article 41 – EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes