CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 15 mars 2007

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 95 March 2007 Gheorghe v. Romania - 19215/04 Judgment 15.3.2007 [Section III] Article 6 Civil proceedings Article 6-1 Fair hearing Reasonable time Substantial delays (totalling almost three years) caused by a court error concerning the nature of the claim and a conflict of jurisdiction: violations   Facts : The applicant was diagnosed at birth as suffering from haemophilia A, which required specific medication. He worked in a local hospital and was examined every year by the Commission for Medical Expertise and Recovery of Working Capacity (the “Commission”). It issued him with temporary certificates attesting to a second-degree disability, which entitled him to obtain, from the County Disabled Persons’ Bureau (the “Bureau”), the rights provided for under Law no. 53/1992 on the special protection of disabled persons, together with tax relief under Law no. 35/1993. A certificate confirmed the existence of the second-degree disability but a handwritten endorsement indicated “valid for Law no. 35/1993”. The Bureau informed him that his rights under Law no. 53/1992 were suspended on the ground that only Law no. 35/1993 was indicated on his certificate. The applicant complained about the suspension to the Secretary of State for disabled persons, who replied that no statutory provision barred the aggregation of rights under Laws nos. 35/1993 and 53/1992. In proceedings before the Court of Appeal against the Bureau and the Secretary of State, the applicant sought recognition of his status as a disabled person requiring the special protection provided for under Law no. 53/1992, and claimed compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the suspension of his rights, which had triggered a serious and sudden decline in his state of health. The applicant’s lawyer sought an adjournment of the delivery of the judgment so that he could file pleadings. The Court of Appeal dismissed the first request as unfounded because the annual certificates attesting to a second-degree disability had been issued in recognition of the requested status. It found that it did not have jurisdiction to determine an award of damages and referred the case back to the Civil County Court. The applicant was admitted to hospital. The applicant’s lawyer requested an adjournment of the proceedings before the County Court, which relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Justice held that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction. That court then examined two witnesses called by the applicant and ordered a forensic medical report on his state of health. The report concluded that the discontinuance of treatment had led to a sudden worsening of his condition, creating the conditions for very serious complications. The applicant asked for an adjournment in order to find a new lawyer, who in turn sought an adjournment so that he could file pleadings. The Court of Appeal found that, during the period in question, the applicant had been recognised as having a second-degree disability. However, it dismissed the request for damages on the ground that he had not used a statutory remedy to dispute his classification in one of the disabled-person categories in the event that it no longer corresponded to the reality. He would only have been entitled to bring an action before the courts to assert his rights if the competent authorities, after deciding to change his category of disability, had then refused to award him the rights provided for by law. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice, complaining that the Court of Appeal had misconstrued the subject of his action, that it had omitted to rule on the complaint concerning the suspension of the rights provided for under Law no. 53/1992 and that the second-degree disability he had been recognised as suffering from entitled him to benefit from aggregation of the rights provided for by the two Laws. At the hearing he requested an adjournment of the examination of his appeal on the ground that he was unable to attend it because of his state of health. The hearing took place a few months’ later. In the meantime the applicant was admitted to hospital. The County Pensions Office placed him in retirement on grounds of disability. The Commission observed that his disability had worsened and that he was now suffering from a first-degree disability. The Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the Court of Appeal. The applicant was again admitted to hospital. Law : Article 6(1) – Fair hearing : In his initial application the applicant had expressly claimed damages for the refusal to grant him the rights accorded by law to the category of persons such as himself with a second-degree disability. However, neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Justice had ruled on the merits of his application but had both dismissed it on the sole ground that he had not disputed his classification as having a second-degree disability. In actual fact he had not ceased to seek recognition of the rights accorded to persons with second-degree disabilities. Moreover, he had to a large extent based his appeal to the Supreme Court on the fact that the dismissal of his application had resulted from a mistake as to the subject-matter of his action. But that ground of appeal had not been addressed by the Supreme Court. In view of the decisive impact of that ground, it had required a specific and explicit response from that court. In the absence of such a response it was impossible to ascertain whether the domestic courts had simply neglected to examine the content of the claim for an award of damages or whether the dismissal of the claim had been the result of a manifest error of judgment as to the subject-matter of the action. Accordingly, the applicant had not been granted a fair hearing. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Length of proceedings : What was at stake for the applicant in the litigation was of decisive importance in an assessment of the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings. Particular diligence was required of the authorities when an applicant was suffering from a serious and incurable disease and when his state of health was declining rapidly. The period to be taken into account had lasted for more than two years and eleven months, during which courts at two levels of jurisdiction had ruled on the merits of the case, which had no particular complexity capable of justifying the length of the proceedings. As to the medical report required to establish the applicant’s state of health, the assignment had been purely technical and relatively straightforward. Accordingly, the fact that this expert’s report had been considered useful by the Court of Appeal did not suffice to show that the case was a complex one. Concerning the adjournments requested by the applicant, the delay they had entailed amounted to about five months and the requests had been made exclusively for preparation of his defence or because of his state of health. As to the total length of the proceedings, a delay of over one year was attributable to mistakes of the Court of Appeal and the County Court, which had referred the case to each other until the Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute. The proceedings before the Supreme Court had lasted for over a year, which was particularly long in view of the urgency of the case on account of the worsening of the applicant’s condition, of which the Supreme Court should have been aware. The applicant’s state of health had declined considerably during the proceedings and considerable diligence had been required on the part of the authorities. The length of the proceedings in question had therefore been excessive. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article 41 – EUR 6,000 for non-pecuniary damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes