CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 11 octobre 2011

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 145 October 2011 Schuchter v. Italy (dec.) - 68476/10 Decision 11.10.2011 [Section II] Article 3 Degrading treatment Inhuman treatment Extradition Extradition putting applicant at risk of lengthy, consecutive prison sentences: inadmissible   Facts – The applicant, a German national, was remanded in custody in 2009 after being arrested in Italy under an international arrest warrant issued by the US authorities, who suspected her of being involved in a number of fraud cases in the USA between 1996 and 1999. The offences in question being punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment, the United States requested her extradition from Italy, which was approved by the Italian courts. In her application to the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant, who suffers from depression and serious eating disorders (anorexia), alleged that her extradition to the USA would have serious consequences for her life and health and would expose her to a risk of imprisonment for an excessive duration, in particular if a number of sentences were to be served consecutively and in conditions that would be fatal for her in view of her state of health. She further argued that the US penal system would not enable her to receive appropriate treatment and that she would be force fed, which constituted physical and mental torture. Law – Articles 2 and 3 (a)     Length of potential sentence – The offences for which the applicant was to be tried in the US were not punishable by life imprisonment but by prison sentences of thirty years maximum. The US courts, when convicting someone of a number of offences, could decide to impose consecutive sentences. In those circumstances it could not be ruled out, at least in theory, that the applicant might be sentenced to a very long prison term, equivalent in practice to life imprisonment. The Court thus had to determine whether, in such a case, the sentence could be described as irreducible. It observed in this connection that the US legislation did not deprive the applicant of all possibility of being released or of having her sentence commuted: she could, among other things, benefit from a reduction of sentence for extraordinary or compelling reasons, or seek measures of clemency, in particular a suspension on procedural grounds (reprieve) or a commutation. Whilst such measures were discretionary, the applicant nevertheless had the possibility, under US law, of benefiting from an adjustment of sentence leading ultimately to her release. It followed that her potential life sentence was not irreducible de jure . Moreover, there was nothing in the case file to suggest that she could never benefit de facto from an alleviation of her sentence. In conclusion, in the light of the criteria set out in its case-law, the Court found that it was not established that the applicant would be deprived of any hope of release if she were given a heavy prison sentence equivalent to life imprisonment. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded). (See also Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no.   21906/04, 12   February 2008, Information Note no.   105; Iorgov v.   Bulgaria (no.   2) , no.   36295/02, 2   September 2010, Information Note no.   133; and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, communicated case, Information Note no. 138) (b)     Consequences of a prison sentence – Under the United States Code the court deciding on any preventive measures to be taken on the applicant’s arrival in the United States would, in any event, take her state of health into account. It would most likely request a medical examination before deciding what measure to apply and would thus not necessarily remand the applicant in custody. Moreover, if she were ultimately to be given a prison sentence, the court would have to take account of her state of health not only at the time of sentencing but also throughout the term of imprisonment, and that consideration might lead it to rule out or limit any custodial measure. Lastly, in view of its findings concerning the alleged lack of appropriate medical treatment, the Court found that the applicant had not established that, if she were nevertheless imprisoned, her life would be at risk. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded). (c)     Alleged lack of medical treatment in US prisons – The applicant had not substantiated by any objective evidence her claims that she would not benefit from medical treatment adapted to her anorexia and mental condition. In any event, her state of health would be taken into account throughout the proceedings, including at the time of sentencing and while the sentence was being served. It was thus not possible to find it foreseeable that the US authorities would ignore her state of health. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded). (d)     Alleged risk of treatment in breach of Article   3 – As regards the applicant’s fears about the possibility of force-feeding, the Court reiterated that a therapeutic measure regarded as necessary according to recognised medical principles could not, in principle, be analysed as inhuman or degrading treatment. That was the case, in particular, of force-feeding for the purpose of saving the life of a prisoner who refused to eat. In the Court’s opinion, there was no evidence to suggest that, if it proved necessary to feed the applicant against her will in order to save her life, the US authorities would act in a manner that was contrary to the principles established in its case-law regarding the existence of a medical necessity, the procedural guarantees accompanying such a decision and the conditions of implementation, which could not exceed the threshold of seriousness beyond which a course of treatment entailed a violation of Article   3 of the Convention. It was thus not possible to find it foreseeable that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article   3. That finding also held true for the applicant’s apparent fear of violence in US prisons. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes