CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 29 juin 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sB853CD26 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 329 29.6.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF DOĞAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY   The European Court of Human Rights has today delivered at a public hearing in Strasbourg a judgment [1] in the case of Doğan and Others v. Turkey (application nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02).   The Court declared admissible the applicants’ complaints under Articles 8 (right to respect for family life and home), 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 (protection of property) to European Convention on Human Rights and the remainder of the complaints inadmissible.   The Court held, unanimously, that there had been; a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property); a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for family life and home); and a violation of Article   13 (right to an effective remedy).   The Court further held, unanimously, that the question of the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction) was not ready for decision. (The judgment is available only in English.)   1.     Principal facts   The 15 applicants are Turkish nationals; Abdullah Doğan, Cemal Doğan, Ali   Rıza Doğan, Ahmet Doğan, Ali Murat Doğan, Hasan   Yıldız, Hıdır Balık, İhsan Balık, Kazım Balık, Mehmet Doğan, Müslüm Yıldız, Hüseyin Doğan, Yusuf   Doğan, Hüseyin Doğan and Ali Rıza Doğan.   Prior to October 1994 the 15 applicants lived in Boydaş, a village in the Hozat region of Tunceli, in south-east Turkey, where they or their fathers owned land and, in some cases, a house.   In October 1994 the applicants allege that State security forces forcibly evicted them from their village, given the disturbances in the region at that time, and also destroyed their property. The applicants moved with their families to Istanbul - or Muratçık village in Elazığ in the case Doğan (no. 8803/02) - where they currently live.   Between 1999 and 2001, the applicants filed petitions with the Turkish administrative authorities requesting permission to return to their village and to use their property. In response to petitions by five of the applicants, submitted in 1999 and 2000, the relevant authorities informed them that their petitions would be considered within the context of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project”, a scheme to re-settle villagers evicted in the context of clashes between the security forces and the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) proscribed as a terrorist organisation under Turkish law.   In 2001 the applicants lodged petitions with the Prime Minister’s Office, the State of Emergency Regional Governor’s Office and the Tunceli Governor’s Office, repeating their initial request. In response to their petitions of 2001, three of the applicants received letters from the authorities informing them that any eventual return to Boydaş village was prohibited for security reasons. The other applicants received no response. Under Article 10 § 2 of the Law on Administrative Procedures, a request was considered rejected if an administrative authority did not respond within 60 days.   There are approximately 1,500 similar cases from south-east Turkey (where applicants complain about their inability to return to their villages) registered before the European Court of Human Rights. This figure constitutes 25% of the total applications filed in respect of Turkey.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The case originated in 15 applications which were lodged with the Court on 3 December 2001. A public hearing in the case was held on 12 February 2004.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Georg Ress (German), President , Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese), Lucius Caflisch (Swiss) [2] , Riza Türmen (Turkish), John Hedigan (Irish), Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska (Macedonian), Hanne Sophie Greve (Norwegian), judges , and also Vincent Berger , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [3]   Complaints   The applicants complained about their forced eviction from their homes and the Turkish authorities’ refusal to allow them to return. They relied on: Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights), Article 6 (right to a fair hearing), Article 7 (no punishment without law), Article 8 (right to respect for family life and home), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) and, Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). Decision of the Court   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1   Whether the applicants’ homes were “possessions” in terms of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The Court noted that the applicants all lived in Boydaş village until 1994. Although they did not have registered property, they either had their own houses constructed on the lands of their ascendants or lived in houses owned by their fathers and cultivated their fathers’ land. They also had unchallenged rights over the common lands in the village and earned their living from breeding livestock and tree-felling. Those economic resources and the revenue the applicants derived from them qualified as “possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Whether there was an interference with the applicants’ right to protection of possessions The Court recalled that the situation which existed in the state of emergency region of Turkey at the time of the events complained of was characterised by violent confrontations between the security forces and members of the PKK which forced many people to flee their homes. The Turkish authorities had also evicted the inhabitants of a number of settlements to ensure the safety of the population in the region. In numerous similar cases the Court had found that security forces had deliberately destroyed the homes and property of applicants, depriving them of their livelihoods and forcing them to leave their villages.   In the applicants’ case, the Court observed that it was unable to determine the exact cause of their displacement because of a lack of sufficient evidence and the absence of an independent investigation into the alleged events. Concerning the denial of access to the applicants’ possessions since 1994, the Court noted that, despite the applicants’ persistent demands, the authorities refused any access to Boydaş village until 22 July 2003 on the ground of terrorist incidents in and around the village. The applicants were therefore deprived of all resources from which they derived their living. Moreover, they also affected the very substance of ownership in respect of six of the applicants in that they could not use and dispose of their property for almost nine years and ten months. As a result, since October 1994, their right over the “possessions” in question had become precarious. The denial of access to Boydaş village was therefore an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.   Whether the interference was justified The Court recognised that armed clashes, generalised violence and human rights violations, specifically within the context of the PKK insurgency, compelled the authorities to take extraordinary measures to maintain security in the state of emergency region. Those measures involved, among others, the restriction of access to several villages, including Boydaş, as well as the evacuation of some villages.     However, the Court observed that the refusal of access to Boydaş had serious and harmful effects that had hindered the applicants’ right to enjoyment of their possessions for almost ten years, during which time they had been living in other areas of the country in conditions of extreme poverty, with inadequate heating, sanitation and infrastructure. Their situation was compounded by the fact that the authorities had not provided them with alternative housing, employment or financial help and that they had to find work and shelter in overcrowded cities and towns, with high unemployment levels and inadequate housing facilities. The authorities had the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, to allow the applicants to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Turkey’s draft legislation on compensation for damage resulting from terrorism or from measures taken against terrorism was not in force and, accordingly, did not provide any remedy for the applicants’ grievances.   The Court therefore considered that the applicants had had to bear an individual and excessive burden which had upset the fair balance which should be struck between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. There had therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Article 8 Finding that the refusal of access to the applicants’ homes and livelihood constituted a serious and unjustified interference with the right to respect for family life and home, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.   Article 13 The Court found that there was no available effective remedy in respect of the denial of access to the applicants’ homes and possessions in Boydaş village. There had, therefore, been a violation of Article 13. ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] Judge elected in respect of Liechtenstein. [3] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.