CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 29 juin 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sD472578 { width:317.57pt; display:inline-block } .sAEBE8B04 { width:4.76pt; display:inline-block } .s3D51B655 { width:126.14pt; display:inline-block } .sE7223719 { width:279.49pt; display:inline-block } .s817FF104 { width:264.17pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD479557A { width:330.91pt; display:inline-block } .s6A0DCE2F { width:42.15pt; display:inline-block } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   332 29.6.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   Chamber judgments concerning the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Ukraine   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following five Chamber judgments, none of which is final. [1]     Violation of Article 6 § 1 Voleský v. the Czech Republic (application no. 63627/00)   No violation of Article 8 The applicant, Evžen Voleský, is a Czech national who was born in 1965 and lives in Brno.   He married J.V. and the couple had a son in 1991. In 1994 his wife left the matrimonial home with their son. On 22 June 1994 she petitioned for divorce and applied for a parental responsibility order.   In July 1995 the Brno Municipal Court made an interim order granting J.V. custody of the child and the applicant access every other weekend. In December 1999 the Regional Court terminated the applicant’s access rights on the ground that his contact with his son required preparation on the part of all persons involved. After that part of the judgment had been set aside by the Court of Cassation, the Regional Court decided in November 2002 that the applicant had the right to see his son once every 15 days in a social welfare centre in the presence of a child psychologist.   A number of attempts were made to judicially enforce the applicant’s right of access, but they were unsuccessful because the mother and child were not at their home; or because the mother refused to expose her son to a stressful encounter; or alternatively because the child himself refused to meet his father.   In the meantime the child was seen by a psychologist. A number of fines were imposed on the mother in criminal proceedings brought against her for failing to comply with the interim order.   Between February and May 2003 the applicant met his son several times in the presence of a psychologist, who drew up a report stating that it was not in the child’s interests to pursue these meetings. A social worker also drew up a report on the meetings between the applicant and his son since February 2003, saying that the applicant had not succeeded in making contact with the child and had behaved inappropriately despite the advice given by the psychologist. The present position is that J.V. has requested that any contact between the applicant and the child be prohibited, whereas the applicant has requested enforcement of the judgment allowing him to see his son every 15 days.   The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a hearing within a reasonable time) of the unreasonable length of the proceedings concerning parental responsibility. Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), he also alleged that the delays in the proceedings had adversely affected his right to respect for his family life and complained that the authorities had not taken sufficient steps to enforce his right of access to his son in the face of opposition from the mother.   The Court noted that the proceedings had lasted eight years and five months before four levels of jurisdiction. Having regard to the circumstances of the case it considered that this did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down by Article 6 and accordingly held, unanimously, that there had been a breach of the Convention in that regard.   The Court noted at the outset that the complaint about the effect of the length of the proceedings on the right to respect for the applicant’s family life did not raise a separate issue from the one examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Having regard to the conclusion it had reached, the Court held that it was not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 8.   The Court found that the authorities could not be deemed to have failed to take coercive or preparatory measures to re-establish contact between the applicant and his son. It considered that, in the exceptional circumstances of the case, the overriding interests of the child had prevented the authorities from going beyond what had been done since coercive measures might have been counter-productive.   In those conditions the Court held that, with a view to enforcing the right of access, the Czech authorities had taken measures that could reasonably have been expected of them in the very difficult conflict in question. Accordingly, the State could not be considered to have failed to comply with the positive obligations imposed on it under Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court held, by six votes to one, that there had not been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the non-enforcement of the applicant's right of access in respect of his son.   Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction) the Court awarded Mr Voleský 5,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR   1,500 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   Kastner v. Hungary (no. 61568/00)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Rezső Kastner, is a Hungarian national, born in 1963 and living in Budapest.   He complained about the length of the civil proceedings concerning a claim for overtime payments, relying on Articles 4 (prohibition of forced labour), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination).   Having declared admissible the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 and the remainder of his application inadmissible, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and awarded the applicant EUR   4,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)     Violation of Article 6 § 1 Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Piven v. Ukraine (no. 56849/00)   Zhovner v. Ukraine (no. 56848/00)   The applicants in both these cases are Ukrainian nationals who live at Konotop (Ukraine). Iryna Valeriyivna Piven was born in 1960 and Ganna Oleksiyivna Zhovner in 1959.   They brought an action in the Konotop District Court against the technical college ( професійно-технічне училище ) no.   20 in Konotop for the payment of length-of-service bonuses and their full salary for specific periods. Mrs Piven also claimed sick pay. The district court upheld their claims on 1 April 1998 and also on 4 March 1999 regarding part of Mrs Piven’s claims.   After taking various steps to enforce payment of the amounts awarded, the applicants only succeeded in receiving reimbursement of their full salary.   The applicants submitted that the judgments concerning the length-of-service bonuses and also sick pay as regards Mrs Piven had not been complied with, in breach of their rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a hearing within a reasonable time) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).   The Court observed that the enforcement proceedings had been pending for six and five years in the Piven case and for six years in the Zhovner case. The college was a state-owned establishment whose current expenditure was paid by the State budget through the Treasury. According to the Konotop District Court, the judgments in question had not been complied with because the State budget legislation had not made provision for this type of expenditure and there were no rules concerning the duties of the ministries concerned in the event of a budgetary shortfall. The Court noted that the same court had criticised the inactivity of the court bailiff responsible for enforcing the judgments and that a stay of execution had been granted until the college was paid the amount of the length-of-service bonuses and the sick pay from the State budget, but that no specific time-limit had been stipulated.   The Court noted that the Government had not provided any evidence that compliance with the judgments in this specific case would have seriously undermined public order. Nor had they presented any concrete programme to ensure payment of judgment debts in the event of a budgetary shortfall, despite the fact that the Konotop District Court had noted that there was a need for regulations in this area.   Having regard to the gaps in the legislation and to the fact that no time-limit had been stipulated in respect of the stay of execution, the applicants had no guarantee that the judgments would be executed in the near future. Accordingly, by refraining for years from taking the measures necessary to comply with the final court decisions delivered in the present case the Ukrainian authorities had deprived the provisions of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of all useful effect. Consequently, the Court held unanimously in both cases that there had been a violation of Convention in that regard.   With regard to the complaint of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court noted that the applicants were owed debts that were sufficiently established to be enforceable and to amount to a possession for the purposes of the Convention. Their inability to enforce the final binding judgments had constituted an interference with the exercise of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.   The Court also noted that the State could not rely on the implementation of economic policies as a pretext for failing to make payment since the stay of execution of the judgments in question had not been combined with other measures intended to resolve the problem of a lack of resources to pay the enforceable judgment debts and thus amounted to an individual measure.   Even supposing that this interference by the State was founded in law and served a legitimate purpose, the Court held that the fair balance between the requirements of the general interest of the community and the need to protect the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions had been upset and that the applicants had borne and continued to bear an individual and excessive burden. Consequently, the Court held unanimously in these two cases that there had been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction) the Court awarded EUR   117 to Mrs   Piven for pecuniary damage and EUR   50 to Mrs Zhovner . It also awarded them EUR   3,200 each for non-pecuniary damage and EUR   42 for costs and expenses. (The judgments are available only in French.)     Violation of Article 6 § 1   Violation of Article 13 Voytenko v. Ukraine (no. 18966/02)   Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The applicant, Anatoliy Pavlovych Voytenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1961 and lives in the village of Nova Vodolaga, in the Kharkiv Region, Ukraine.   He complained about the length of the proceedings - which lasted four years - to enforce a judgment concerning the payment of the equivalent of approximately 440 EUR owed to him by the State. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time), 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 (protection of property).   The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 and awarded the applicant EUR   2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR   33.29 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)     ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.