CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 29 juin 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   330 29.6.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENTS IN THE CASES OF LEYLA ŞAHIN v. TURKEY AND ZEYNEP TEKIN v. TURKEY   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing judgments [1] in the cases of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (application no. 44774/98) and Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey (application no. 41556/98).   In the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); and no separate question arose under Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken together with Article 9 of the Convention, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education).   In the case of Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey , the Court decided unanimously to strike the case out of the list.   (The Leyla Şahin v. Turkey judgment is available in English and French; the Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey judgment is available only in French).   1.     Principal facts   Leyla Şahin v. Turkey The applicant, Leyla Şahin, is a Turkish national who was born in 1973. She has lived in Vienna since 1999, when she left Istanbul to pursue her medical studies at the Faculty of Medicine at Vienna University. She comes from a traditional family of practising Muslims and considers it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf.   At the material time she was a fifth-year student at the faculty of medicine of the University of Istanbul. On 23 February 1998 the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular directing that students with beards and students wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and tutorials.   In March 1998 the applicant was denied access to a written examination on one of the subjects she was studying because was wearing the Islamic headscarf. Subsequently the university authorities refused on the same grounds to enrol her on a course, or to admit her to various lectures and a written examination.   The faculty also issued her with a warning for contravening the university’s rules on dress and suspended her from the university for a term for taking part in an unauthorised assembly that had gathered to protest against them. All the disciplinary penalties imposed on the applicant were revoked under an amnesty law.   Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey The applicant, Zeynep Tekin Pomer is a Turkish national who was born in 1975 and lives in İzmir.   At the material time she was a second-year student at nursing college at the University of Ege. The Higher-Education Authority issued a circular on 22 December 1988 requiring student nurses to wear special headwear when doing clinical training. In December 1993 the applicant was reprimanded for wearing the Islamic headscarf instead of the regulation headwear. She was subsequently caught wearing the Islamic headscarf on a number of occasions and on 23 December 1993 was suspended from the college for 15 days in accordance with the circular of 22 December 1988.   The applicant appealed against the disciplinary penalty to the administrative court. It dismissed her appeal on the grounds that the principle of secularism established by Article 2 of the Constitution prevailed. In a judgment of 16 October 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s judgment.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The applications were lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 March 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. They were declared admissible on 2   July 2002. A public hearing was held in Strasbourg on 19 November 2002.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Matti Pellonpää (Finnish), Antonio Pastor Ridruejo (Spanish), Elisabeth Palm (Swedish), Riza Türmen (Turkish), Marc Fischbach (Luxemburger), Josep Casadevall (Andorran), judges , and also Michael O’Boyle , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   In both cases the applicants complained under Article 9 of the Convention that they had been prohibited from wearing the Islamic headscarf at university. They also complained of an unjustified interference with their right to education, within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   Miss Şahin further complained of a violation of Article 14, taken together with Article 9, arguing that the prohibition on wearing the Islamic headscarf obliged students to choose between education and religion and discriminated between believers and non-believers. Lastly, she relied on Articles 8 and 10.   Decision of the Court in the case of Leyla Şahin   Article 9 of the Convention   Without deciding whether it was always the case that Islamic headscarves were worn to fulfil a religious duty, the Court noted that Miss Şahin’s decision was inspired by a religion or belief. Accordingly, it proceeded on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, constituted an interference with her right to manifest her religion.   There was a legal basis for that interference in Turkish law, as the case-law of the Constitutional Court made it clear that authorising students to “cover the neck and hair with a veil or headscarf for reasons of religious conviction” in universities was contrary to the Constitution. In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court had for many years taken the view that wearing the Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the fundamental principles of the Republic. Furthermore, it was beyond doubt that regulations on wearing the Islamic headscarf had existed well before the applicant had enrolled at the university. Students, particularly those who, like the applicant, were studying a health-related subject, were required to comply with rules on dress. In those circumstances, it would have been clear to Miss Şahin, from the moment she entered the University of Istanbul, that there were regulations on wearing the Islamic headscarf and, after the circular was published in 1998, that she was liable to be refused access to lectures if she continued to do so.   The Court found that the impugned measure primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order.   As to the “necessity” of the interference, the Court observed that it was based on two principles – secularism and equality – which reinforced and complemented each other.   Under the Constitutional Court’s case-law, secularism in Turkey was, among other things, the guarantor of: democratic values; the principle that freedom of religion was inviolable, to the extent that it stemmed from individual conscience; and, the principle that citizens were equal before the law. Restrictions could be placed on freedom to manifest one’s religion in order to defend those values and principles. That notion of secularism appeared to the Court to be consistent with the values underpinning the Convention and it noted that upholding that principle could be regarded as necessary for the protection of the democratic system in Turkey. It further noted the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on the protection of the rights of women. Gender equality – recognised by the European Court as one of the key principles underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe – was also regarded by the Turkish Constitutional Court as a principle implicit in the values underlying the Constitution.   Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considered that, when examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, there had to be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, could have on those who chose not to wear it. The issues at stake included the protection of the “rights and freedoms of others” and the “maintenance of public order” in a country in which the majority of the population, while professing a strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way of life, adhered to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on freedom to wear the Islamic headscarf could, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially since that religious symbol had taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years. The Court did not lose sight of the fact that there were extremist political movements in Turkey which sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts. It considered that the regulations concerned were also intended to preserve pluralism in the university.   It was the principle of secularism which was the paramount consideration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious insignia in universities. It was understandable in such a context where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality between men and women, were being taught and applied in practice, that the relevant authorities would consider that it ran counter to the furtherance of such values to accept the wearing of religious insignia, including as in the case before the Court, that women students covered their heads with a headscarf while on university premises.   As to the manner in which the university authorities had applied the measures, the Court noted that it was undisputed that in Turkish universities, to the extent that they did not overstep the limits imposed by the organisational requirements of State education, practising Muslim students were free to perform the religious duties that were habitually part of Muslim observance. In addition, the resolution adopted by Istanbul University on 9 July 1998 had treated all forms of dress symbolising or manifesting a religion or faith on an equal footing in barring them from the university premises.   Irrespective of the case-law of the Turkish courts and the applicable rules, the fact that some universities might not have applied the rules rigorously – depending on the context and the special features of individual courses – did not mean that the rules were unjustified. Nor did it mean that the university authorities had waived their right to exercise the regulatory power they derived from statute, the rules governing the functioning of universities and the needs of individual courses. Likewise, whatever a university’s policy on the wearing of religious symbols, its regulations and the individual measures taken to implement them were amenable to judicial review in the administrative courts.   The Court noted that by the time the circular was issued on 23 February 1998 there had already been a lengthy debate on whether students could wear the Islamic headscarf. When the issue had surfaced at Istanbul University in 1994 in relation to the medical courses, the university authorities had reminded the students of the applicable rules. Rather than barring students wearing the Islamic headscarf access to the university, the university authorities had sought throughout the decision-making process to adapt to the evolving situation through continued dialogue with those concerned, while at the same time ensuring that order was maintained on the premises.   In those circumstances and having regard in particular to the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States, the Court found that the University of Istanbul’s regulations imposing restrictions on the wearing of Islamic headscarves and the measures taken to implement them were justified in principle and proportionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, could be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”.   Articles 8 and 10, and Article 14 taken together with Article 9, of the Convention and Article   2 of Protocol No.   1   The Court found that no separate question arose under these provisions, as the relevant circumstances were the same as those it had examined in relation to Article 9, in respect of which it had found no violation.   Decision of the Court in the case of Zeynep Tekin   In a letter of 19 February 2003, the applicant informed the Court that she wished to withdraw her application, without offering any explanation. She did not reply to a letter from the Court requesting further information about the reasons for her decision and the Turkish Government did not comment on it.   The Court found that it was no longer justified to continue the examination of the application within the meaning of Article 37 of the Convention (striking out applications) and decided unanimously to strike the case out of the list.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.