CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 1 juillet 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s39CD8836 { width:84.08pt; display:inline-block } .s7F8C608D { width:77.48pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3286B780 { width:140.8pt; display:inline-block } .s73E9FC7D { width:453.6pt; display:inline-block } .s6F35888 { width:70.84pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s3EDFEA27 { width:157.47pt; display:inline-block } .s3B07F8FE { width:152.13pt; display:inline-block } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   341 1.7.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   Chamber judgments concerning Croatia, France, Italy and Turkey     The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following six Chamber judgments, of which only the friendly-settlement judgment is final. [1]     Kovačević v. Croatia (application no. 12775/02)   Friendly settlement The applicant, Željko Kovačević, is a Croatian national, born in 1949 and living in Zagreb.   He was infected with Hepatitis B and C following a vaccination while he was in the army and brought civil proceedings claiming compensation. The proceedings were stayed in 2000 under the 1999 Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act and not resumed until November 2003.   He complained that the enactment of the Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act was in breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   The case has been struck out following a friendly settlement in which 6,000 euros (EUR) is to be paid for any non-pecuniary or pecuniary damage, costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Couillard Maugery v. France (no. 64796/01)   No violation of Article 8 The applicant, Catherine Couillard Maugery, is a French national who was born in 1968 and lives in Commentry (France).   She is the mother of three children: a boy born in 1987 and two girls born in 1995 and 1999. The two older children have been in care for a number of years, while the youngest lives with her mother. The applicant’s son was the subject of educational assistance orders and care orders from the age of one. Her elder daughter was three months old when she was placed in the care of the Solidarity Office for the département . The proceedings concerning the care orders and the mother’s right of access gave rise to a large number of court decisions.   The applicant argued that the placing of her children in care had infringed her right to respect for her family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.   The European Court of Human Rights observed that the measures taken in respect of the applicant’s children had amounted to interference with her right to respect for her family life. The measures had been in accordance with the law and had been designed to protect the health, safety and morals of minors and to ensure that they were brought up in a suitable environment. The reasoning of the domestic courts clearly demonstrated that they had been taken in order to safeguard the children’s interests. The interference had therefore pursued a legitimate aim, namely “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.   As to whether the measures had been “necessary”, the Court noted that a large number of court decisions had been given at regular intervals with regard to the placing of the two children in care, following repeated psychological and psychiatric assessments of the applicant and the children.   It was clear that the judges who had successively dealt with the matter had reached their decisions after carrying out a careful and thorough examination of the applicant’s and her two children’s situation and taking into account the children’s own wishes.   It appeared from the domestic courts’ decisions that the children had been placed in care on account of their mother’s serious health problems and the impact they had on the children’s own equilibrium and health.   The Court considered that the various courts that had made orders in the care proceedings had done so on a very regular basis, giving carefully reasoned and detailed decisions and taking into account the various aspects of the situation and any developments. That being so, and in view of the obviously paramount interest of the children in being placed in an environment providing the best conditions for their development, the Court considered that the care orders in the present case could not be called into question on the basis of Article 8.   As to the meetings and contact which the applicant had had with her children, the Court noted that over the years they had been the subject of numerous decisions given at regular intervals. As with the care orders, the judgments and orders on the subject had been issued after expert psychological and psychiatric assessments of the mother and children had been carried out. Furthermore, the courts had taken into account a large number of reports by the social services. It was also clear from the evidence that the concerns and desires expressed by the children themselves had played a significant part in the decisions. In addition, it appeared that a number of meetings or contacts had not taken place for reasons attributable to the applicant herself, who had, moreover, refused the various forms of assistance offered to her and had displayed hostility towards the social workers.   In the Court’s view, the relevant authorities had made all the efforts that could reasonably have been expected of them in order to enable family ties to be maintained. They had undertaken a precise and meticulous assessment of the dangers facing the children, whose health, safety and upbringing might have appeared to be in jeopardy. The Court further noted that family ties had not been broken, as it was clear from the facts of the case that the mother and her two children had become significantly closer over the years.   In those circumstances, the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. (The judgment is available only in French.)   Walser v. France (no. 56653/00)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Werner Walser, is a Liechtenstein national who was born in 1925 and lives in Schaan (Liechtenstein).   On 15 October 1998 the Paris Court of Appeal sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment for “misleading advertising as to the existence, price and conditions of sale of a service, the scope of undertakings entered into and the identity of the service provider, by disseminating commercial advertisements in the form of France Télécom bills” and “infringing the legally registered trademark of France Télécom”. The court issued a warrant for his arrest.   The applicant appealed on points of law. On 5 November 1999 he was exempted from the obligation to surrender to custody, subject to payment of a security of one million French francs. Four days later, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation ruled that the applicant had forfeited his right of appeal as he had not paid the security and had not surrendered to custody as provided in Article 583 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has since been repealed by the Law of 15 June 2000 on strengthening the protection of the presumption of innocence.   The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Convention that the decision to declare his appeal on points of law inadmissible had infringed his right of access to a court.   The Court reiterated that where an appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible because   a defendant had not surrendered to custody, this impaired the very essence of the right of appeal by imposing a disproportionate burden on the appellant, thus upsetting the fair balance that had to be struck between the legitimate concern to ensure that judicial decisions were enforced, on the one hand, and the right of access to the Court of Cassation and the exercise of the rights of the defence on the other.   The exemption obtained by the applicant had been purely illusory in that it had not released him from the obligation to surrender to custody, since it had been physically impossible for him to pay the security required.   Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considered that the applicant had suffered an excessive restriction on his right of access to a court, and therefore on his right to a fair hearing. It accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and awarded the applicant EUR 3,000   for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 6,744   for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 Santoro v. Italy (no. 36681/97)   Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 The applicant, Vito Sante Santoro, is an Italian national, born in 1957 and living in Ostuni (Brindisi, Italy).   On 24 March 1994 Brindisi District Court ordered that the applicant be placed under police supervision and made subject to a regime of preventive measures for one year.   The court found that numerous criminal complaints had been made against the applicant, in particular, alleging that he had received stolen goods under cover of his vehicle dismantling and spare parts business.   The order imposing the preventive measures was forwarded to the Brindisi Prefect on 7 April 1994 and served on the applicant on 3 May 1994. On 25 July 1995 Ostuni Police drafted a document specifying the various obligations to be imposed on the applicant and decided that he be subject to a further year’s special supervision from that date.   On 10 January 1995 until 28 July 1995 the applicant was struck off the electoral register as a result of the special measures and, on 15 December 1995, he was struck off for another year in view of the decision by the Ostuni Police to prolong his special supervision.    On 16 December 1996 the Court of Cassation ruled that the order for special supervision of the applicant had ceased to apply on 2 May 1995, one year after the order had been served on him.   As a result of the special measures, the applicant was prevented from voting in the regional council ( Consiglio Regionale ) elections of 23 April 1995 and the national parliamentary elections of 21 April 1996.   He complained that he was prevented from voting, relying on Article 3 of Protocol   No. 1 (right to free elections), and that the preventative measures were prolonged illegally, relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement).   The Court found it hard to understand why there should have been a delay of one year and more than two months between the date the order imposing the preventive measures was served on the applicant and the date the document specifying the obligations was drafted. The Court also noted that the Court of Cassation had declared that the special supervision ceased to apply on 2   May   1995. However, it did not provide any redress. Neither had it been suggested by the Italian Government that the applicant might have made use of any other domestic proceedings to obtain compensation. Finding, therefore, that, between 2   May   1995 and 24 July 1996, the interference with the applicant’s liberty of movement was neither “in accordance with law” nor “necessary”, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.   Concerning Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, more than nine months had elapsed between the date on which the order imposing the preventive measures was forwarded to the prefect and the date on which the applicant was disenfranchised. In the Court’s view, such a delay was excessive. Had the disenfranchisement been applied in due time and for the statutory period of one year, that measure would have ended before the regional elections and well before the parliamentary elections. The Court therefore concluded, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.   The Court awarded the applicant 2,000   EUR for non-pecuniary damage and 5,500   EUR for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Bakbak v. Turkey (no. 39812/98)   Violation of Article 3 Violation de l’article 3 The applicant, İsmail Bakbak, is a Danish national of Turkish origin who was born in 1967 and lives in Denmark.   On 8 July 1997, while on holiday in Turkey, the applicant was arrested at a bar in Fethiye by police officers who had been called in by the owner of the premises. He was taken into police custody and examined by a doctor, who did not observe any signs of blows or violence on his body. He was subsequently detained pending trial. On 10 July 1997 the applicant was examined at Fethiye Medical Centre. The medical report drawn up following his examination referred, among other things, to sensitivity in his legs, shoulders and back and a cut and a graze on his legs. At the request of the forensic medical examiner, an orthopaedic examination was carried out at a public hospital in order to assess the sensitivity complained of by the applicant. The doctor who carried out the examination stated that the applicant did not have any particular orthopaedic injuries.   The applicant was charged with insulting a public officer while intoxicated. On 5 August 1997 an application by him to be released was allowed. On returning to Denmark, he underwent several medical examinations and was prescribed one month’s sick-leave. The doctors who examined him were of the opinion that the treatment inflicted on him while in custody in Turkey had caused him mental and psychological problems.   On 18 November 1997 the Criminal Court sentenced the applicant to four months’ imprisonment and decided to stay the execution of the sentence. A criminal complaint lodged by the applicant against the police officers who had arrested him and supervised him during his time in custody gave rise to a finding that there was no case to answer.   The applicant complained under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected both on his arrest and in police custody.   The Court observed that there were discrepancies between the three medical reports drawn up during the applicant’s time in detention. In the absence of any explication from the Turkish Government as to these discrepancies, it considered that the initial medical examination had not been conducted properly.   On the basis of the evidence before it and in the absence of a plausible explanation from the Turkish Government, the Court found it established that the injuries noted in the reports by the medical centre and the public hospital had been caused by treatment which, even though it had not attained a high level of severity, had to be classified as inhuman and engaged the responsibility of the State.   The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 3 and awarded the applicant EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,530 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   Yeşil v. Turkey (no. 50249/99)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Nuriye Yeşil, is a Turkish national who was born in 1978. At the time when she lodged her application, she was in Ümraniye Prison (Istanbul). She was sentenced to eight years and four months’ imprisonment for being a member of an armed gang, the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front).   The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that she had not had a fair trial.   The Court reiterated that civilians standing trial for offences under the Criminal Code had legitimate reason to fear that a national security court which included a military judge among its members might not be independent and impartial. Accordingly, it held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court also reiterated that a court whose lack of independence and impartiality had been established could not under any circumstances guarantee a fair trial to persons subject to its jurisdiction. It therefore held that it was not necessary to examine the other complaints concerning the unfairness of the proceedings.   The Court considered that the judgment constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant and awarded her EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.