CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 13 juillet 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s1C7BEF1E { margin-left:28.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .sFE832CA2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 359 13.7.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT PLA AND PUNCERNAU v. ANDORRA   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra (application no. 69498/01).   The Court held: by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights; unanimously, that it was not necessary to examine the application separately under Article 8 of the Convention.   The Court also held, unanimously, that the question of the application of Article 41 was not ready for decision. (The judgment is available in English and in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The case concerns an application brought by two Andorran nationals, who both live in Andorra, Antoni Pla Puncernau and Roser Puncernau Pedro. Antoni is the adopted son of Roser Puncernau Pedro (who died while the proceedings were still pending before the European Court of Human Rights) and Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol (who died in 1996).   The case concerns court decisions that Antoni, as an adopted child, could not inherit the estate of Mr Pla Pujol’s mother.   In 1939 Carolina Pujol Oller, Mr Pla Pujol’s mother, drew up a will leaving him her estate (property). One of the clauses stipulated that her son was to pass on his inheritance to a child or grandchild “from a legitimate and canonical marriage”. In the event of failure to satisfy those conditions, the estate was to pass to the children and grandchildren of Ms Pujol Oller’s daughters.   Mr Pla Pujol married Roser and, in 1969, they adopted Antoni, assuming full parental responsibility. In 1995 Mr Pla Pujol bequeathed the property he had inherited to Antoni, giving Roser a life-interest in the estate.   On 18 May 2000 the High Court of Justice of Andorra found that that Antoni, as an adopted child, could not be considered “a child of a lawful and canonical marriage” and could not, therefore, inherit Ms Pujol Oller’s estate. The court ordered the applicants to hand over the property to Ms Pujol Oller’s great-granddaughters, deemed to be her rightful heirs. The decision was upheld by the Constitutional Court.   2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged on 16 May 2001 and declared admissible on 27 May 2003. A public hearing took place in the Human Rights Building in Strasbourg on 7 October 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Nicolas Bratza (British), President , Viera Strážnická (Slovakian), Josep Casadevall (Andorran), Rait Maruste (Estonian), Lech Garlicki (Polish), Javier Borrego Borrego (Spanish), Stanislav Pavlovschi (Moldovan), judges , and also Michael O’Boyle , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaints   The applicants complained that the court decisions finding that Antoni could not inherit his grandmother’s estate were discriminatory. They relied on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.   Decision of the Court   Article 14 The Court recalled that the national courts were better placed than an international court to evaluate, in the light of local legal traditions, the particular context of the legal dispute submitted to them – especially when interpreting an eminently private instrument such as a clause in a person’s will – and the various competing rights and interests. Accordingly, an issue of interference with private and family life could only arise under the Convention if the national courts’ assessment of the facts or domestic law were manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Convention.   The Court observed that the legitimate and canonical nature of the marriage between Antoni’s father and mother was indisputable. Also, there was nothing in Ms Pujol Oller’s will to suggest that “ son ” meant only biological sons or that she intended to exclude adopted grandsons. The Court understood that she could have done so, but as she did not, the only possible and logical conclusion was that that was not her intention.   The High Court of Justice’s interpretation, that by not expressly stating that she was not excluding adopted sons Ms Pujol Oller meant that she did intend to exclude them, appeared over contrived and contrary to the general legal principle that, where a statement was unambiguous, there was no need to examine the intention of the person who made it.   Admittedly, the Court was not in theory required to settle disputes of a purely private nature. That being said, in exercising its European supervisory role, the Court could not remain passive where a national court’s interpretation of a legal act appeared unreasonable, arbitrary or, as in the applicants’ case, blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination established by Article 14 and more broadly with the principles underlying the Convention.   The High Court of Justice’s interpretation of the clause in question had the effect of depriving Antoni of his right to inherit under his grandmother’s estate and Roser of her right to the life tenancy of the estate assets left her by her late husband. Since the testamentary disposition, as worded by Ms Pujol Oller, made no distinction between biological and adopted children it was not necessary to interpret it in that way. Such an interpretation therefore amounted to the judicial deprivation of an adopted child’s inheritance rights.   The Court did not discern any legitimate aim pursued by the decision in question or any objective and reasonable justification on which the distinction made by the domestic court might be based. In the Court’s view, an adopted child was in the same legal position as a biological child of his or her parents in all respects. The Court had stated on many occasions that very weighty reasons needed to be put forward before a difference in treatment on the ground of birth out-of-wedlock could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.   The Court reiterated that the Convention was a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and that great importance was currently attached in the member States of the Council of Europe to the question of equality between children born in and out of wedlock regarding their civil rights. Thus, even supposing that the clause in question did require an interpretation by the domestic courts, that interpretation could not be made exclusively in the light of the social conditions existing when the will was made or at the time of Ms Pujol Oller’s death, namely in 1939 and 1949, particularly where a period of 57 years had elapsed between the date when the will was made and the date on which the estate passed to the heirs. Where such a long period had elapsed, during which profound social, economic and legal changes had occurred, the courts could not ignore those new realities. The same was true with regard to wills: any interpretation, if an interpretation was necessary, should aim to ascertain the testator’s intention and render the will effective, while bearing in mind that the testator could not be presumed to have meant what he or she did not say and without overlooking the importance of interpreting the clauses in the will in the manner that most closely corresponded to domestic law and to the Convention as interpreted in the European Court of Human Right’s case-law.   The Court therefore found that there has been a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8. The Court further held that there was no need to examine the application separately under Article 8.     Judge Bratza expressed a partly dissenting opinion and Judge Garlicki expressed a dissenting opinion which can be found annexed to the judgment.   *** The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.