CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 21 septembre 2004

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[1]   Santambrogio v. Italy (application no. 61945/00)       No violation Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Massimo Santambrogio, is an Italian national who was born in 1949 and lives in Santo Stefano Ticino (Italy).   Following a decree of judicial separation, his wife was granted custody of the two children and the sole right to live in the matrimonial home. As he had to move out and had no regular income, the applicant went to live with his mother.   In 1999 his wife instituted divorce proceedings. The applicant applied for legal aid on the ground that he had been unemployed since March 1995. His application was dismissed by the legal-aid office of the Milan Court on the grounds that he was not in a “state of poverty” ( in stato di povertà ), as his means exceeded the upper statutory limit. An appeal by the applicant against that decision was dismissed and his requests for a review were turned down. In May 2003 Mr Santambrogio was granted legal aid to appeal to the Court of Cassation in connection with the divorce proceedings.   The applicant complained that the refusal to grant him legal aid amounted to a violation of Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   The European Court of Human Rights reiterated that legal-aid systems could not function unless machinery existed to enable the cases for which legal aid should be available to be determined. It noted in that connection that the system that had been set up in Italy afforded substantial guarantees to protect individuals from arbitrariness.   Although the applicant, who did not qualify for legal under the means test, was refused legal aid for proceedings that could raise potentially complex issues, the Court noted that legal representation was not absolutely compulsory. Moreover, the applicant did in fact have legal representation thanks to the financial support of his family and accordingly had been able to defend his interests. In those circumstances, the Court found that his right of access to a court had not been infringed. It held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   In the light of that conclusion, it held that no separate examination of the identical complaint under Article 8 was necessary. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Schirmer v. Poland (no. 68880/01)   Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Henryka Schirmer, a Polish national, born in 1915 and living in Warsaw, complained that the Polish courts refused to order the eviction of her tenant because the alternative accommodation she had offered – over which she had a so-called co-operative quasi-proprietorial right – was not her property in the civil law sense of the word. The Polish courts’ decisions were based on the 1994 Law on the Lease of Dwellings, which was designed to ensure that evicted tenants were offered alternative accommodation.   Having been prevented from using her apartment for up to one year and 11 months – until the repeal of the 1994 Law – the applicant submitted that there had been an interference with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her property, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the Convention.   The Court considered that the legal status of the alternative apartment and the applicant's right to it were sufficiently similar to ownership to meet the aims of the 1994 Law.   Although the domestic courts applied the provision which required that the alternative apartment be owned by the person seeking the eviction, no consideration was given as to whether the interests of the owner were sufficiently safeguarded. Moreover, the courts were not given any leeway to carry out that balancing exercise. As a result, the applicant's rights were not given sufficient attention. More generally, the drafters of the 1994 Law put too much emphasis on the rights of tenants, overlooking those of landlords.   As a result of the decisions complained of, the applicant had to bear an individual and excessive burden that upset the fair balance between the demands of the general interest and protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Consequently, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and awarded the applicant EUR 4,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego v. Poland (no. 42049/98)               Violation Article 6 § 1 Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego, a Polish association, was allocated an expropriated property in 1964. In 1992 the Warsaw Property Commission returned the property to its former owner, a religious association, awarding the applicant association 420,353,658 old Polish zloty (42,035 new zlotys, equivalent at that time to 21,000 French francs (FF)) in compensation.   The applicant association filed an action against the State Treasury with Przemyśl Regional Court, which increased the amount awarded to 546,133.02 new zlotys (FF 273,066). However, on appeal, the Supreme Court found that, following the Property Commission’s decision, the State Treasury had ceased to own the property and that there were therefore no grounds on which a claim against the Treasury could be made. The regional court’s decision was consequently quashed and the applicant’s action dismissed.   The applicant association complained that it was effectively denied access to a court to contest the amount awarded, which covered only a fraction of the costs it had incurred in maintaining and developing the building. It relied on Article 6 § 1 (access to court) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).   The Court noted that, in view of the Supreme Court's resolution, it was not open to the applicant association to file a claim against the State Treasury with a civil court. Nor had it been shown by the Polish Government that the applicant association would have been able to file a claim with a court against the original – and now also current – owner of the property, the religious association. The Supreme Court's resolution therefore left the applicant without any procedural means of vindicating its rights.     The Polish Government had not persuaded the Court that the aim of protecting the State from financial claims arising out of past expropriations could justify such a significant limitation of the applicant's right to have its claims examined by a court.   The applicant association had incurred considerable expenditure in respect of the property at issue, given that it had been using and maintaining it for 25 years. To restrict access to a court in respect of claims concerning outlays for maintenance and renovation of the property had to be considered disproportionate.   In the proceedings before the property commission, the applicant association was also misled as to the possibility of pursuing its civil claims before a court. Had it been made clear from the outset that it was not entitled to sue in a civil court to recover its outstanding claims, it might reasonably be assumed that the applicant association would have argued its claim before that commission even more vigorously and, in consequence, might have stood a better chance of recouping a greater proportion of its pecuniary claims.   Concluding that the applicant association was denied a right of access to a court in respect of its claim for reimbursement of the outlays it had incurred, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and that it was not necessary to examine the complaint raised under Article 13. The Court awarded the applicant association EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 916 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Stoicescu v. Romania (no. 31551/96)             Revision [2] Stefan Stoicescu is a Romanian national who was born in 1940 and lives in Bucharest. In his capacity as heir, he brought an action for restitution of a house in Bucharest, which had belonged to his aunt and had been nationalised by the State in 1950. Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), the applicant complained, among other things, of the national courts’ refusal to return the building in question to him.   In a judgment of 4 March 2003 a Chamber of the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a fair hearing and the denial of access to court, and a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court ordered the Romanian State to return the property in question to the applicant or, failing that, to pay him EUR 270,000 for pecuniary damage. It also awarded him EUR 6,000 for non-pecuniary damage.   The Romanian Government requested revision of the Court’s judgment of 4 March 2003 on account of the discovery of a new fact, namely that the applicant had lost his status as heir when his certificate of inheritance was declared null and void following an application by a third-party who inherited under the terms of a will.   The Court noted that following proceedings in the Romanian courts between 1995 and 1999 the applicant’s certificate of inheritance, which formed the basis of his claim for the return of the property, had been declared null and void. That decision could decisively affect the admissibility decision and the judgment that had been handed down by the Court in the case in 2000 and 2003.   The Court considered that, due to the lack of a computerised database of pending cases in Romania at the material time, the Romanian Government could not reasonably have been aware of events. However, Mr Stoicescu had been involved in the proceedings concerning the validity of his certificate of inheritance for over seven years and could have informed the Court of the position before it gave its judgment, but had knowingly declined to do so.   Since 20 May 1999, when the Bucharest Court of Appeal declared his certificate of inheritance null and void, Mr Stoicescu had lost his status as his aunt’s heir and his right to the return of the property. In those circumstances, he could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of the Convention, of a violation of his rights. Accordingly, the Court unanimously declared the Romanian Government’s application for revision admissible. Consequently, it declared Mr   Stoicescu’s application inadmissible and revised the judgment of 4 March 2003 in full. (The judgment is available only in English.)   ***   These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides that “a party may, in the event of the discovery of a fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which, when a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not reasonably have been known to that party, request the Court, within a period of six months after that party acquired knowledge of the fact, to revise that judgment”.