CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 9 décembre 2004

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s1EDF3BA6 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 618 9.12.2004   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF VAN ROSSEM v. BELGIUM   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of van Rossem v. Belgium (application no. 41872/98). The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect of one’s home) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   The Court held that it was not necessary to make an award under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, since the applicant had submitted no such request within the time-limits allowed, even though the Court had drawn his attention to that point. (The judgment is available only in French.)   1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Jean-Pierre van Rossem, is a Belgian national who was born in 1945 and lives in Grimbergen (Belgium).   Suspected of forging documents and making criminal use of them, misappropriation and dishonouring cheques, the applicant was questioned by a police superintendent on 26 June 1990. The following day, the investigating judge who was inquiring into the case issued five warrants for searches to be carried out at Mr van Rossem’s home, his wife’s home and at the offices of the three companies he ran. As a result of those investigatory measures, a number of documents were seized; a list of the documents seized was drawn up on completion of the searches of the homes, but not in respect of the searches conducted at the offices of two of the companies.   Mr van Rossem was arrested on 21 November 1991. A few days later he was elected to the House of Representatives in parliamentary elections. On 25 June 1995 the applicant was sentenced by Antwerp Criminal Court to five years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine; the court dismissed the applicant’s arguments that the search warrants had been too general on the ground that the investigators were aware of the offences of which he was accused and consequently knew what they were to look for. Ruling on appeal, the Antwerp court upheld the prison sentence after having dismissed the applicant’s arguments concerning the lawfulness and propriety of the searches.   Mr van Rossem appealed unsuccessfully on points of law. 2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 18 May 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared partly admissible on 6 November 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:   Christos Rozakis (Greek), President , Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Françoise Tulkens (Belgian), Peer Lorenzen (Danish), Nina Vajić (Croatian), Snejana Botoucharova (Bulgarian), Anatoli Kovler (Russian), judges , and also Søren Nielsen , Section Registrar .   3.     Summary of the judgment [2]   Complaint   The applicant complained, under Article 8 of the Convention, of the conditions in which the searches were carried out.   Decision of the Court   The Court noted that the searches conducted in this case had been accompanied by certain procedural safeguards. However, it observed that the different search warrants had been formulated in broad terms. Those investigatory measures were ordered “in order to investigate and seize any documents that might assist in the investigation”. No limitation of any sort was imposed, thus conferring wide powers on the investigators.   According to the Court, a search warrant had to be accompanied by certain limitations, so that the interference which it authorised was not potentially unlimited, particularly with regard to the right to respect for a person’s home. The warrant had therefore to contain a minimum number of indications, so that it was subsequently possible to verify whether the police officers who enforced it had complied with the scope of the investigation thus authorised. In the present case, the search warrants ought at least to have contained the same information as that included in the public prosecutor’s application for an investigation.   The fact that investigators would have known “what they were to look for” could not be considered a determining argument. In the Court’s opinion, the determining element was that the person or persons whose premises were being searched, or a third party, had sufficient information about the proceedings giving rise to the operation to enable them to identify, prevent and challenge any abuse. In the present case, only the applicant, who had been questioned, could be considered as having been informed in advance of the context in which the measures had been taken; this could have enabled him to monitor the scope of the searches and seizures which were carried out. However, he had not been present at any of the searches. In addition, the Court noted that no inventory had been drawn up of the objects seized at the companies’ premises, so that Mr Van Rossem could not reasonably have identified each item. Such an inventory would have enabled him to ask for withdrawal of the seized objects and this partial failure to produce an inventory had rendered any supervision particularly difficult or even impossible.   Consequently, the Court considered that there was not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate aims pursued by the searches and the means deployed to achieve that aim. Accordingly, it found that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.