CEDH · PRESS;GENERAL;ENG — 20 janvier 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sD711EC90 { margin-left:31.52pt; padding-left:7.48pt; font-family:serif } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   017 20.01.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   CHAMBER JUDGMENT MAYZIT v. RUSSIA   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a judgment [1] in the case of Mayzit v. Russia (application no. 63378/00).   The Court held unanimously: that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights; that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4 (right to have lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) of the Convention; that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) (right to legal assistance of own choosing); that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (b) (right to adequate time and facilities for preparation of defence).   Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant 3,000   euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)     1.     Principal facts   The applicant, Yuriy Yevgenyevich Mayzit, is a Russian national, born in 1953 and living in Kaliningrad.   He was arrested on suspicion of having intentionally damaged property, following a complaint that he had, among other things, shot at the windows of a Mr S. with a hunting rifle in revenge for unpaid debts.   According to information submitted by the Russian Government, the applicant was detained in Remand Centre IZ-39/1 in Kalingrad from 26 July 2000 to 7 March 2001 and from 16   May 2001 to 18 July 2001. He was kept in six different cells, of between 25.1m² and 7.8m², with between 10 and 6 bunks, and was allowed daily walks lasting not less than one hour. The applicant maintained: that the cells were dirty and infected with cockroaches, bed-bugs and lice; that the cells were overcrowded, with detainees being obliged to sleep in turns; and, that the cell windows were covered with steel shutters and let in very little light.   The applicant lodged a request for release on 30 July 2000 which was dismissed on 15 December 2000 by the Central District Court.   On 4 September 2000 the applicant was given time to study the case-file and his trial was set   to start on 9 October 2000. Due to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant, the court appointed his defence counsel, the applicant having apparently refused the appointment of eight different defence counsel and not having suggested another lawyer. During the trial the applicant twice requested that he be represented by his mother and his sister. The court rejected the requests, given that the case was complex and that special legal knowledge and professional experience, which his mother and sister did not have, were required.   On 25 December 2000 the applicant was found guilty of intentionally damaging property and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, reduced to four years on appeal. On 6 May 2004 his conviction was partly quashed by the Supreme Court. The applicant has been released from prison having served the sentence relating to the remaining conviction.     2.     Procedure and composition of the Court   The application was lodged on 10 July 2000 and declared partly admissible on 29 April 2003.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Christos Rozakis (Greek), President , Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot), Peer Lorenzen (Danish), Nina Vajić (Croatian), Snejana Botoucharova (Bulgarian), Anatoli Kovler (Russian), Khanlar Hajiyev (Azerbaijani), judges , and also Søren Nielsen , Section Registrar .     3.     Summary of the judgment   Complaints   The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention, that his application for release was not examined speedily, that his relatives were not permitted to represent him during the trial, that he received inadequate legal representation and that the detention conditions made it impossible for him to prepare properly for his trial. He relied on Article 3, Article 5 § 4, Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c).       Decision of the Court   Article 3 The Court noted that the applicant was detained for nine months and 14 days in different cells which, according to the information provided by the Government, were designed for between six and ten inmates, leaving between 1.3m² and 2.51m² for each inmate. The Court questioned whether such accommodation could be regarded as attaining acceptable standards, recalling that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) had set 7 m² per prisoner as an appropriate, desirable guideline for a detention cell.   Despite the fact that the cells in which the applicant stayed were designed for a specific number of inmates, the applicant asserted that the actual number of inmates was two to three times higher and that, therefore, he had had to share a bed with one or two other inmates. The Government did not contest that allegation; nor did they submit any evidence to the contrary. The Court also recalled that overcrowding in pre-trial detention facilities was a general problem in Russia. In those circumstances, the Court did not find it of crucial importance to determine the exact number of inmates in the cells during the periods concerned. The material available suggested that, at any given time, there would be less than 2 m² of space per inmate. The cells were therefore overcrowded.   Regarding the sanitary conditions of the cells, the applicant alleged that they were dirty and infested with cockroaches, bed-bugs and lice, and that the windows were covered with steel shutters which let in very little light. The Government submitted that the sanitary conditions were “satisfactory”, according to the report of the Chief Prison Directorate, without, however, providing further details or evidence. The Court concluded that, although the applicant was allowed to undertake an outdoor activity for one or two hours a day, the rest of the time he was confined to his cell, with very limited space for himself.   Although there was no indication that there was a positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant, the Court found that such conditions of pre-trial detention, which the applicant had had to endure for more than nine months, must have undermined his human dignity, arousing in him feelings of humiliation and debasement. Finding that the applicant’s conditions of detention, in particular the overcrowded environment and the length of time he was detained in such conditions, amounted to degrading treatment, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 3.   Article 5 § 4 The Court noted that the applicant’s request for release of 30 July 2000 was not dealt with until four months and 15 days later, which was not “speedy”, particularly as domestic law required that a court rule on such an application within five days. In addition, the Court found that the delay was entirely attributable to the authorities. The Court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4.   Article 6 § 3 (c) The Court observed that Article 6 § 3 (c) required that proceedings take place with adequate representation for the defence, but that it did not give the accused the right to decide himself in what manner his defence should be assured. That depended upon the applicable legislation or rules of court. Notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, the right to choose one’s own counsel could not be considered to be absolute. It was necessarily subject to certain limitations where free legal aid was concerned and also where it was for the courts to decide whether the interests of justice required that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by them. When appointing defence counsel the national courts had certainly to have regard to the defendant’s wishes. However, they could override those wishes when there were relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that that was necessary in the interests of justice.   Nor could a State be held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal-aid purposes. The competent national authorities were required under Article 6 § 3 (c) to intervene only if a failure by legal-aid counsel to provide effective representation was manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way.   The Court noted that Russia’s Code of Criminal Procedure required defenders to be professional advocates, members of the bar, although it would also have allowed the court trying the applicant’s case, if it had seen fit, to let the applicant’s mother and sister represent him. That court considered, however, that as lay persons, they would not have been able to ensure the applicant’s efficient defence in compliance with the procedure and that they would not, for health or occupation reasons, have been sufficiently available to attend the proceedings. In the Court’s opinion, those considerations were legitimate and outweighed the applicant’s wishes.   Insofar as the applicant alleged that the legal aid lawyers appointed were inefficient, he had not provided evidence of their negligence.   Considering the applicant’s defence as a whole, the Court noted that he was given ample opportunity to present his own case. The restriction imposed on his choice of representation was limited to excluding his mother and sister. He could have chosen any advocate to represent him but apparently made no effort to do so. The facts of the case did not disclose any disadvantage to the defence or unfairness in that respect. There had therefore been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c).   Article 6 § 3 (b) The Court noted that the indictment was served on the applicant in August 2000, and that the District Court, in September 2000, set 9 October 2000 as the date for the trial to start, to allow the applicant time to study the case-file. In those circumstances, and having regard to the charges against him, the Court was satisfied that the applicant had sufficient “time” to prepare for the trial.   Regarding the “facilities” available, the Court did not rule out that where a person was detained pending trial, that might include such conditions of detention that allowed the person to read and write with a reasonable degree of concentration. Although it was clear that the conditions of the applicant’s detention did not favour intense mental work, the Court noted that no restrictions were placed on him as regards access to the case-file and free and unrestricted legal aid assistance was placed his disposal. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that appropriate facilities were available.   Finally, the Court found that the applicant’s allegations about the lack of access to law books in prison, lack of access to photocopying, his placement in a small cell during the days of court hearings and the use of handcuffs remained unsupported by factual evidence. Nor had it been shown that the applicant at any moment availed himself of the right to bring to the attention of the competent authorities those issues, had he considered them to influence, at the relevant time, the preparation of his defence.   The Court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (b).   ***   The Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.